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Foreword
The present work deals with states’ power political behavior towards the International
Criminal Court (ICC). Its purpose is to critically evaluate the incentives structures
for states that arise from the institutional design of the court. It will be argued that
states constrain and customize their commitments in order to leave room for strategical
behavior while being a state party to the court. This is due to the states’ possibilities to
solve cooperation problems of international law with the International Criminal Court.
The states (in the absence of a strong enforcement mechanism) do not know which of
the other states will comply with the law and which will not. Their own compliance
can become a strategic disadvantage in relation to states that don’t comply.
The central finding of the study is that those states constrain and customize the com-
mitments the least that have a high level of democracy and ratified a high number of
treaties of humanitarian law and human rights law. That shows that the ICC is a pos-
sibility to solve cooperation problems of international law. With the ICC a permanent
international institution is provided that is able to investigate and prosecute genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. The creation of such
a court reduces monitoring costs that would occur when those norms were otherwise
monitored by many di erent monitoring agencies. Moreover, the self-binding to such
a court increases the credibility of commitment already made to humanitarian law and
human rights law.
For the empirical study, data is gathered up to August 2016. Since then, some things
have changed. Two states withdrew from the Rome Statute. Burundi in October
2017 and the Philippines in March 2019. South Africa and Gambia announced their
withdrawal in 2016, but finally decided to stay states parties. Malaysia announced
their intention to ratify the Rome Statute in 2019, but finally decided not to do so.
Thus, the ICC has currently (May 2019) 122 states parties. The crime of aggression,
as fourth core crime, came into force in 18th July 2018, but still only 38 states rati-
fied the relating amending agreement. The practice of constraining and customizing
commitments to the ICC is still alive.
For the sake of informational freedom and swarm intelligence this study is published
online instead of hiding its arguments and findings in the bookshelves of academia. It
is the hope that this work provides inspiration to anyone who would like to build of
the thoughts provided here in order to find better ideas to bind states more closely to
the goals of humanitarian law and human rights.
3
Contents
1 Introduction 12
1.1 Empirical Puzzle: A Commitment is a Commitment is a Comimtment? 14
1.2 State of the Art and Research Gaps: Black Box States Parties . . . . . 18
1.3 Delegation Dilemma and Constrained and Customized Commitments . . 21
1.4 Research Design: Building an Index and Testing Determinants . . . . . 24
1.5 Scientific and Political Relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.6 Structure of the Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2 Following Universal Norms or Making Rational Decisions? States’ Com-
mitment to International Law and Courts in Research Literature 28
2.1 Commitment to International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.1.1 The Problem of Anarchy in International Relations . . . . . . . . 30
2.1.2 Theories on States’ Commitment to International Law . . . . . . 31
2.1.3 Empirical Studies on States’ Commitment to International Law . 40
2.2 Delegation of Authority to the International Criminal Court . . . . . . . 43
2.2.1 The Problem of Non-Compliance with International Law . . . . 43
2.2.2 Theories on States’ Delegation to International Courts . . . . . . 53
2.2.3 Empirical Studies on Delegation to International Courts . . . . . 60
2.3 Research Gaps and Contributions to the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.3.1 Opening the Black Box of States Parties to the ICC . . . . . . . 64
2.3.2 Di erent Incentives in Delegating Authority to the ICC . . . . . 65
3 Theory of States’ Constraining and Customizing Commitments to the ICC 68
3.1 Guardian of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2 Why States Want the ICC – Incentives to Ratify the Rome Statute . . . 76
3.2.1 Privileges of Being a State Party to the ICC . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.2.2 Support in Dealing with the Past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.2.3 Solving Cooperation Problems with the ICC . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.3 Why States Have to Fear the ICC – Obstacles in Ratifying . . . . . . . 97
3.3.1 Missing Institutional Counterparts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.3.2 What if the ICC is too Weak? Fear of Politicization . . . . . . . 107
3.3.3 What if the ICC is too Strong? Fear of Juristocracy . . . . . . . 115
3.4 States Constrain and Customize their Commitments to the ICC . . . . . 123
3.4.1 The Delegation Dilemma of States: Ratification or Not? . . . . . 123
3.4.2 Constraining Courts Solving the Delegation Dilemma . . . . . . 125
4
3.4.3 States Customizing and Constraining their Commitments . . . . 129
3.5 Solving Cooperation Problems with the ICC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.5.1 Cooperation Problems of International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.5.2 Reducing Costs of Monitoring versus Fear of Monitoring . . . . . 138
3.5.3 Enhancing Credibility versus Window Dressing . . . . . . . . . . 141
4 An Index as Summary Measurement for Comprehensive Commitment 147
4.1 Modeling Ways of Constraining and Customizing Commitments . . . . . 147
4.1.1 Joining the Rome Statute (Dim1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.1.2 Amending APIC, Art. 8 and Crime of Aggression (Dim2) . . . . 149
4.1.3 Modifying APIC, Art. 8 and Crime of Aggression (Dim3) . . . . 154
4.1.4 Implementing Norms on Complementarity & Cooperation (Dim4)156
4.1.5 Triggering Investigations and Prosecutions (Dim5) . . . . . . . . 157
4.2 Data and Methods I – Dimension Reduction and Index Building . . . . 161
4.2.1 Case Selection and Data Set I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
4.2.2 Methods of Data Collection and Data Analysis I . . . . . . . . . 163
4.3 Results I – The Index of Commitment to the ICC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
4.3.1 Variation in the Di erent Dimensions of Commitment . . . . . . 167
4.3.2 The Index of Commitment to the ICC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
4.3.3 Patterns of Commitment to the ICC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
5 Testing the Explanatory Power of Solving International Cooperation Prob-
lems with the ICC 183
5.1 Model and Operationalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
5.1.1 Hypotheses on Solving Cooperation Problems . . . . . . . . . . . 183
5.1.2 Dependent Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
5.1.3 Independent Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
5.1.4 Control Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
5.2 Data and Methods II – Testing Hypotheses with Regression Analyses . . 192
5.2.1 Case Selection and Data Set II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
5.2.2 Methods of Data Collection and Data Analysis II . . . . . . . . . 193
5.3 Results II – The Explanatory Power of Solving Cooperation Problems . 197
5.3.1 Explaining States’ Positions on the Index of Commitment . . . . 197
5.3.2 Explaining States’ Ratification the Rome Statute . . . . . . . . . 212
6 Conclusion and Outlook 227
6.1 Summary of the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
5
6.2 Contribution to Research on the ICC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
6.3 Limits of Empirical Results and Need for Further Research . . . . . . . 231
6.4 Why Constrained Commitments Can Still Lead to Strong Bonds . . . . 233
7 Appendices 237
7.1 List of States Parties to the Rome Statute (08-2016) . . . . . . . . . . . 237
7.2 Puzzle: Ratification and Democracy (08-2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
7.3 List of Treaties on Humanitarian Law (08-2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
7.4 List of Treaties on Human Rights (08-2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
7.5 Examination of Robustness: Index of Commitment to the ICC . . . . . 241
7.6 Index of Commitment to the ICC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
7.7 Correlation Matrix – Dependent and Independent Variables . . . . . . . 245
7.8 Regression Analyses with Civil Law and Presidential System . . . . . . 246
7.9 Database & Codebook I: Index of Commitment (DV) . . . . . . . . . . 248
7.10 Database & Codebook II: Determinants of Commitment (IV) . . . . . . 251
References 255
6
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
AC Andean Community
ACHR American Convention on Human Rights
AfChHPR African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
AfCtHPR African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights
AI Amnesty International
AL Arab League
APIC Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the ICC
Art. Article
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASP Assembly of States Parties to the ICC
AU African Union
BIA Bilateral Immunity Agreement
BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index
CAN Communidad Andina de Naciones
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CAT Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
CCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CERD International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
CESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CICC Coalition for the International Criminal Court
COE Council of Europe
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DV Dependent Variable(s)
EAC East African Community
ECCC Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
ECHR European Court of Human Rights
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EU European Union
FH Freedom House
GATT General Agreement on Tari s and Trade
GC Geneva Conventions
GDP Gross National Product
HC Hague Conventions
HL Humanitarian Law
HRW Human Rights Watch
HR Human Rights
IACtHR Inter-American Court of Human Rights
ICC International Criminal Court
ICCPR International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICL International Criminal Law
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
7
ICSID International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
ICT International Criminal Tribunal
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IHT Iraqi High Tribunal
IL International Law
IMT International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
IMTFE International Military Tribunal for the Far East
IO International Organization
IR International Relations
ITLOS International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
IV Independent Variable(s)
KSC Kosovo Specialist Chambers
KWCT Kosovo War Crimes Tribunal
LAS League of Arab States
Mercosur Mercado Común del Sur
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OAS Organization of American States
OAU Organization of African Unity
OHCHR O ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
OTP O ce of the Prosecutor
para. paragraph
PIF Pacific Islands Forum
PTS Political Terror Scale
RO Regional Organization
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCSL Special Court for Sierra Leone
SPSC Special Panels for serious Crimes in Timor-Leste
STL Special Tribunal for Lebanon
TAN Transnational Advocacy Network
TANs Transnational Advocacy Networks
TJ Transitional Justice
TJDB Transitional Justice Data Base
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TRCs Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN United Nations
UNCLOS United National Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNO United Nations Organization
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN-GA United Nations General Assembly
UN-ICC RA UN-ICC Relationship Agreement
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USA United States of America
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
WTO World Trade Organization
WTO-DSB World Trade Organizations’ Dispute Settlement Body
8
List of Figures
1 States Parties to the Rome Statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2 States Parties to the Rome Statute (Democracies and Non-Democracies) . . . 16
3 Gap between Commitment and Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4 Establishing Courts Filling ’Partly’ the Gap of Commitment and Compliance 49
5 States Constraining and Customizing their Commitments to the ICC . . . . . 69
6 Relationship of First and Secondary Level of International Law . . . . . . . . 74
7 Monitoring Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Int. Criminal Law . . . . . 91
8 Fear of Politicization and Juristocracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
9 Delegation Dilemma of States towards the ICC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
10 Solving Cooperation Problems with the ICC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
11 States Parties to the APIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
12 States Parties to the Amendment to Article 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
13 States Parties to the Amendment on the Crime of Aggression . . . . . . . . . 171
14 Implementation of Law on Complementarity to the ICC . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
15 Implementation of Law on Cooperation with the ICC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
16 Frequency Distribution of the States’ Index Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
17 Streamlined Frequency Distribution of the States’ Index Positions . . . . . . 175
18 Frequency Distribution of the States’ Index Positions by Ratification . . . . . 176
19 Grouped Frequency Distribution of the States’ Index Positions . . . . . . . . 177
20 Causal Mechanism – Commitment and Solving Cooperation Problems . . . . 184
21 Scatterplot – Index and Political Freedom in the World (Reversed) . . . . . . 198
22 Scatterplot – Index and Compulsory Jurisdiction ICJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
23 Scatterplot – Index and Ratified Humanitarian Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
24 Scatterplot – Index and Ratified Geneva Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
25 Scatterplot – Index and Ratified Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
26 Level of Political Freedom by Ratification of the Rome Statute . . . . . . . . 213
27 Compulsory Jurisdiction ICJ by Ratification of the Rome Statute . . . . . . . 214
28 Commitment to Humanitarian Law by Ratification of the Rome Statute . . . 215
29 Commitment to Geneva Law by Ratification of the Rome Statute . . . . . . . 216
30 Commitment to Human Rights by Ratification of the Rome Statute . . . . . 216
32 Adj. Pred. through Humanitarian Law (Democracies vs. Non-Democracies) . . 224
31 Adj. Pred. through Com. Jur. ICJ (Democracies vs. Non-Democracies) . . . . . 224
33 Adj. Pred. through Geneva Law (Democracies vs. Non-Democracies) . . . . . . 225
34 Adj. Pred. through Human Rights (Democracies vs. Non-Democracies) . . . . 226
35 Frequency Distribution – Index (Scores per Variable) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
36 Frequency Distribution – Index (Scores per Dimension) . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
37 Frequency Distribution – Index (Ratification as Strongest Factor) . . . . . . . 243
9
List of Tables
1 Probability of Self-Enforcement Due to Compliance Mechanisms . . . . . . . 47
2 International and Regional Courts and Tribunals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3 Minimum and Maximum Scores – Ratification of Humanitarian Law . . . . . 144
4 Minimum and Maximum Scores – Ratification of Human Rights Law . . . . . 144
5 Modeling Comprehensive Commitments to International Courts . . . . . . . . 148
6 Modeling Customized and Constrained Commitments to the ICC . . . . . . 149
7 Overview on Dimensions and Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
8 Scores of the Dimensions of the Index of Commitment to the ICC . . . . . . 166
9 Frequencies – Dimensions of Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
10 States Parties and Non-Party States to the Rome Statute . . . . . . . . . . . 168
11 States Parties and Non-Party States to the APIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
12 States Parties to the Amendment to Article 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
13 States Parties to the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression . . . . . . . . 171
14 States Parties Article 8 & Democracy Dummy 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
15 States Parties Crime of Aggression & Democracy Dummy . . . . . . . . . . . 172
16 States Involved in Armed Conflicts 2000-2015 by Ratification Status . . . . . 174
18 Contingency Table – States Parties ICC & States Parties EU . . . . . . . . . 178
19 Contingency Table – Commitment to the ICC & States Parties EU . . . . . . 178
17 Groups Within the Index of Commitment to the ICC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
20 Contingency Table – States Parties ICC & States Parties Mercosur . . . . . . 180
21 Contingency Table – Commitment to the ICC & States Parties Mercosur . . 180
22 Contingency Table – States Parties ICC & States Parties CAN . . . . . . . . 180
23 Contingency Table – Commitment to the ICC & States Parties CAN . . . . . 180
24 Contingency Table – States Parties ICC & States Parties AU . . . . . . . . . 181
25 Contingency Table – Commitment to the ICC & States Parties AU . . . . . . 181
26 Contingency Table – States Parties ICC & States Parties ASEAN . . . . . . 181
27 Contingency Table – Commitment to the ICC & States Parties ASEAN . . . 182
28 Summary Statistics – Determinants for Commitment to the ICC . . . . . . . 191
29 Explaining States’ Positions on the Index of Commitment (HL) . . . . . . . . 204
30 Size of Coe cients of the Three Explanatory Variables (HL) . . . . . . . . . . 207
31 Explaining States’ Positions on the Index of Commitment (GL) . . . . . . . . 208
32 Size of the Coe cients of the Three Explanatory Variables (GL) . . . . . . . 209
33 Explaining States’ Positions on the Index of Commitment (HR) . . . . . . . . 210
34 Size of the Coe cients of the Three Explanatory Variables (HR) . . . . . . . 211
35 Comparison of Coe cients of Explanatory Variables in Full Models . . . . . . 212
36 Contingency Table – States Parties ICC & Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ . . . . . . 214
37 Explaining States’ Ratification of the Rome Statute (HL) . . . . . . . . . . . 218
10
38 Probabilities for Ratification of the Rome Statute in Full Model (HL) . . . . 220
39 Explaining States’ Ratification of the Rome Statute (GL) . . . . . . . . . . . 221
40 Probabilities for Ratification of the Rome Statute in Full Model (GL) . . . . 222
41 Explaining States’ Ratification of the Rome Statute (HR) . . . . . . . . . . . 223
42 Probabilities for Ratification of the Rome Statute (Full Model HR) . . . . . . 225
43 Contingency Table – Ratification of the Rome Statute & Political Freedom . 238
44 List of Humanitarian Law Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
45 List of Human Rights Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
46 Dimensions of the Index – Scores per Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
47 Dimensions of the Index – Scores per Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
48 Dimensions of the Index – Ratification as Strongest Factor . . . . . . . . . . 243
49 Cross-Correlation Table (All Variables) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
11
1 Introduction
There is an increasing legalization of international relations (Abbott et al., 2000)
that can be described as uneven (Goldstein et al., 2000), unequally institutionalized
(Zangl/Zürn, 2004), pluralistic (Berman, 2007), fragmented (Fischer-Lescano/Teubner,
2007), and in disorder (Walker, 2008). Since the end of Cold War this process has been
catalyzed by an increasing proliferation of international judicial bodies which includes
courts, arbitration bodies or dispute settlement mechanisms (Romano, 1999; Kings-
bury, 1999; Alter, 2014). It is accompanied by ’political jurisprudence’ (Shapiro, 1981)
and a general trend of ’judicialization’ of politics both on the national and the inter-
national level (Vallinder, 1995; Stone Sweet, 1999; Slaughter, 2000a; Hirschl, 2004).
International courts and tribunals are created to monitor norm compliance, to give
legal advice, to settle disputes legally and civilly, and in the best case to hold states
and individuals accountable and thereby enforce international law (Shelton, 2009).
They have done this in the hope of filling in the gap between the states’ voluntary
self-commitment to international agreements and their actual compliance with inter-
national law.1
On 17 July 1998 the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted
and on 1 July 2002 it entered into force and started to unfold in The Hague. It is
the first permanent international court that is able to hold individuals accountable
for four core crimes (jurisdiction ratione materiae): the crime of genocide (art. 6),
crimes against humanity (art. 7), war crimes (art. 8) and the crime of aggression (art. 5,
para. 1(a) and art. 8 bis, amendment to the Rome Statute of the ICC on the Crime of
Aggression).23
From the view of political science it is puzzling that so many states, even non-
democratic states joined the ICC, since international institutions that hold individ-
uals accountable can be considered a serious intrusion into national sovereignty (Sim-
1 In the literature of political sciences on international law there is a conceptional distinction
between ’commitment’ in the formal sense of ratifying international agreement and ’compliance’
with those agreements, see e.g. Shelton (2000); Simmons (2009); Risse et al. (2013).
2 The crime of aggression was adopted at the Review Conference in Kampala in 2010 and with the
ratification by the State of Palestine in 2016 the threshold of 30 ratification was reached. To put
it into e ect an approval by a two-thirds majority of all states parties had to be reached as of
January 2017. It entered into force on 17 July 2018.
3 Those core crimes embodied in the Rome Statute must have been committed after of the e ective
date of the Rome Statute (jurisdiction ratione temporis art. 11); by natural persons (jurisdiction
ratione personae art. 25), either in the territory of a state party, from nationals of a state party,
or in a state that accepted the jurisdiction of the Court (jurisdiction ratione loci art. 12), or
under certain circumstances if the crime is referred to the ICC by the UN-Security Council to
the Prosecutor pursuant to chapter VII of the UN charter (art. 13(b)).
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mons/Danner, 2010; Katzenstein, 2014). At the same time, there are frequent cases of
non-cooperation by the states parties. One such example is the case of the Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir, who could passed unhindered through Chad, Kenya, Dji-
bouti, Malawi and South Africa, although an arrest warrant had been issued against
him and all the countries in question were parties to the ICC.
This shows that the commitments to the ICC are not equally strong. They do not
all have the same degree of self-obligation to the Statute of Rome. Even among the
states parties there seem to be huge di erences. Becoming a state party to the ICC is
not enough for supporting the court. However, what then explains the states extent
of commitment to the ICC?
This work presents an empirical measure for a comprehensive commitment to the ICC
that is able to visualize the diverging commitment behavior of states. Comprehensive
commitment describes the self-binding behavior of states beyond the ratification of the
Rome Statute, including the commitment to the additional and amending agreements,
creation of interpretative declarations, the implementation of the core norms of the
Rome Statute into national law and the active use of this court in case of potential
norm violations.
As we will see, only a few states commit themselves comprehensively. Only 26 of 195
states have none or hardly any constraints or customization and thus have made a
comprehensive commitment to the ICC, such as the Germany, Belgium or Croatia. In
fact, most of the states parties to the court have constraints and customized commit-
ments that are at least in part so strong that their commitment behavior is almost
comparable to those of non-party states, such as Bangladesh, Burundi or Afghanistan.
Conceptually, the study draws on the delegation dilemma to explain, why states con-
strain and customize their commitments. On one hand, they have strong incentives
to become a state party to the ICC. On the other, there is reason to fear that the
ICC could become either too weak to cope with trials of politicization or too strong
and exceed its own mandate. The extent of the constraining and customizing prac-
tice depends upon the states’ anticipated possibilities of solving cooperation problems
with the ICC. This explains the curious behavior of states towards the ICC. They
voluntarily ratified the Rome Statute, but many refuse to cooperate with it.
In developing a measure for state commitment and explaining varying commitment as a
result of the delegation dilemma, the study makes several contributions to the existing
literature. Research focusing on the ICC deals mainly with International Relations
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(IR)4, International Criminal Law (ICL) and Transitional Justice (TJ). However,
they have diverging perspectives on the ICC and di erent scientific focal points. IR
considers the ICC as an international court and looks on states motives to delegate
authority to them. ICL mostly sees the ICC as a individual case or as a legal evolution
of the international criminal tribunals and reflects its norms, its institutional design or
its development. TJ considers the ICC as one of the legal instruments of transitional
justice and mostly concentrates on the ICC’s e ect on peace and reconciliation. Due
to the di erent perspectives on the ICC there emerge some blind spots that will be
illuminated by the present work.
It combines legal and political considerations by connecting states’ behavior to the
legal area and its history. It looks at domestic conditions on states behavior. By
means of empirical methods it opens the black box of states parties to the ICC and
shows that there are indicators for commitment beyond ratification.
Using the theoretical knowledge of IR, it shows states’ motives in a more general
way. It shows that democracy as an explanatory factor plays an important role but is
not a su cient condition for states commitment to the ICC. The decisive factors for
the comprehensiveness of states commitment to the ICC are the commitments they
have made in human rights law and humanitarian law reflecting their general attitude
to international law. Seen in this way, e.g. the USA is a less strong outlier as it is
commonly presented in the literature. Although it is a democracy, the USA is no state
party to the ICC. However, it has only ratified 16 of 25 humanitarian law agreements
and only 5 of 18 human rights agreements.
1.1 Empirical Puzzle: A Commitment is a Commitment is a
Comimtment?
The distinguishing feature of this study and the point of departure from the previous
works mentioned above is that the degree of commitment shall not be seen only in light
of the ratification of the Rome Statute. The commonly held view is that commitment
understood only as ratification is very high. At the time of measurement there were
124 states parties to the Rome Statute (see Figure 1), among them the newest states
parties being the State of Palestine and El Salvador.5
4 Following the convention the sub-discipline is termed as ’International Relations’ and its research
object as ’international relations’.
5 For the “List of States Parties to the Rome Statute (08-2016)” see p. 237. Time of measurement
is August 2016. Burundi withdrew in October 2017, the Philippines in March 2019, so that the
ICC has currently (state of May 2019) again 122 states parties.
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Figure 1: States Parties to the Rome Statute
As to be expected, among the states parties (as of 09/2016) almost all are democracies.
There are only 12 democracies that did not ratify the Rome Statute, whereas most of
them are small island states, such as Bahamas, Palau, Kiribati or Micronesia. However,
there are also three democratic political heavy weights that did not ratify: India, Israel
and the United States of America (USA). It is notable that all three of these are
strongly involved in international and non-international conflicts.6
Likewise, not surprisingly, those which would be a ected most by the ICC’s investi-
gations and prosecutions did not ratify the Rome Statute. Among the 71 states that
are not party to the Rome Statute (see Figure 2) 59 are non-democratic7 and are key
players or scenes of international and non-international conflicts, such as Ethiopia,
Thailand, Myanmar, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, Sudan or Syria, or are
particularly repressive, such as China, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, Turkey or
Yemen.8
6 Following the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) “Battle-Related Death Dataset”,
counting the sum of conflict years per conflict from 2000 to 2015, Israel has 15 conflict years,
USA has 16 and India 75. See: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ (29-03-17).
7 The distinction between democratic and non-democratic states follows the Freedom House levels
of 2015. Democratic states are those states that are labeled as “free” having a level of 1-2.5 and
non-democratic are those that are labeled as “partly free” or “non-free” having a level of 3-7.
See: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016 (28-03-2017).
8 For an overview of the ratification of democracies and non-democracies see Table 43 on p. 238.
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Figure 2: States Parties to the Rome Statute (Democracies and Non-Democracies)
What is even more puzzling is the fact that 50 of 109 non-democratic states ratified
and are parties to the Rome Statute. That any state joins an international court can
be considered interesting, since such an act requires the delegation of authority (Alter,
2011; Katzenstein, 2014). The ICC can be considered to represent a serious intrusion
into national sovereignty (Simmons/Danner, 2010), since as a criminal court it is able
to prosecute individuals. We can consider sovereignty costs as particularly high, where
the relationship between states and their territories as the hallmarks of Westphalian
sovereignty is concerned (Abbott/Snidal, 2000, 437).
Non-democratic states’ ratification of the Rome Statute can be considered a real conun-
drum. The fact that non-democracies bind themselves to the ICC cannot be considered
as mere cheap talk, a costless signal or window-dressing, as it can lead to investigations
and prosecutions. Some of those states, in addition to the states mentioned above, are
very repressive, such as Burundi, Bangladesh, Nigeria or Afghanistan. Or they have
been in the center of international and non-international conflicts, such as Uganda,
Mali, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Colombia, the Philippines or Chad.
While the high degree of commitment can be considered to be a stage win of the
court, the ICC struggles with frequent cases of the non-cooperation of its parties.
Currently, the ICC pursues investigations and prosecutions in 11 so called “situation[s]
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in which one or more (...) crimes appear to have been committed” (art. 13)9 e.g. in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (ICC-01/04) against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and
Bosco Ntaganda because of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity during the
Congo Wars since 2002. Another example took place in Darfur/Sudan (ICC-02/05)
against Omar al-Bashir since 2002 due to allegations of genocide by killing and mental
harm, both as attacks against soldiers and sta  involved in a peacekeeping mission in
Darfur; or, in Georgia (ICC-01/15) owing to murder and forcible transfer of population
and persecution, as well as intentionally directing attacks against peacekeepers in
the context of the international armed conflict in South Ossetia in 2008.10 The ICC
also launched preliminary investigations in several other situations, e.g. in Afghanistan
in the context of the armed conflict since 2003 between pro- and anti-Government
forces; in Iraq/UK because of alleged war crimes committed by nationals of the United
Kingdom in the context of the Iraq conflict and occupation from 2003 to 2008; in
registered vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia because of the Israeli attack on
a Humanitarian Aid Flotilla en route to Gaza Strip in 2010; or, in Ukraine in the
context of the suppression of the protest on the Maidan.11
In connection with the investigations and prosecutions as well the preliminary inves-
tigations, the ICC struggles with a lack of cooperation and support on the part of
the states parties such as in the case of the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. Due
to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in the region of Darfur since
2001, the ICC issued for the first time against a head of state an international arrest
warrant against al-Bashir in 2009. In 2010 the ICC issued a second arrest warrant
stressing the need to prevent further atrocities. Nevertheless, al-Bashir was able to
move unhindered through Chad and Kenya in 2010, through Djibouti and Malawi in
2011 and South Africa in 2015. All are parties to the ICC (Magliveras, 2013). The
ICC-Chief-prosecutor Fatou Bensouda got to the heart of the problems:
“Searching for a head of state is like searching for Al Capone with the polite request he
may please surrender himself” (Bensouda, 2014).
Problems of cooperation and support of international criminal courts are not new.
Both International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with the
9 The ICC distinguishes between ’situations’ and ’cases’. A ’situation’ is (???). Whereas, ’cases’
“comprise specific incidents during which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
seem to have been committed by one or more identified suspects” (ICC Pre-Trail Chamber I, No.
ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, para. 65.).
10 For detailed information on the ’situations under investigation’ see
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Situations.aspx (23-07-18).
11 For detailed information on preliminary examinations see the annual ’Report on Preliminary
Examination Activities’ from the O ce of the Prosecutor.
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Balkan states and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) with the Kigali
Government struggled hard for cooperation (Jorda, 2004, 579f.). However, since the
ICC is a permanent international court, states parties have to commit themselves to
cooperate with the ICC. A case of non-cooperation can be a case of non-compliance
with the Rome Statute, making the commitment to the ICC of those states unreli-
able.12
Summing up the puzzle, one can say that there is a high level of commitment to
the ICC measured by a high number of ratifications of the Rome Statute, among
them many non-democratic states. At the same time, there is a lack of cooperation
on behalf of states parties. Being a party to the ICC, does not reveal much about
the cooperation and assistance behavior of the states during its investigations and
prosecutions. Considered empirically, the commitments to the ICC are not equally
strong and raises the research questions:
1) How strong is the commitment of states to the ICC beyond the ratification
of the Rome Statute?
2) What explains the states’ extent of comprehensive commitment to the ICC?
1.2 State of the Art and Research Gaps: Black Box States Parties
In the research literature of political science and international law commitment to an
international agreement is usually understood as those acts of states binding them-
selves through ratification13 by which the respective international norms are recog-
nized, states allow themselves, at least in part, to be subjected to their legal validity
or even delegate away sovereignty to an international institution and expressing the
willingness for a certain future behavior.
In IR there are plenty of theoretical considerations as to why states bind themselves to
international law, particularly to human rights. These range from being only cheap talk
in order to increase power and security (Waltz, 1979) and strengthen the hegemonic po-
sition in international relations (Koskenniemi, 2004), to reduction of transaction costs
12 Part IX (art. 86-102) of the Statute of Rome covers the rules on “International cooperation and
judicial assistance”. The obligation to cooperate results of article 86 ICC: “States Parties shall,
in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”. There is an
obligation to establish national procedure for these cooperation (art. 88 ICC): “States Parties
shall ensure that there are procedures available under their national law for all of the forms of
cooperation which are specified under this Part.”
13 For better clarity and readability in accordance with the conventions of international relations
and international law, ’ratification’ will be used as a blanket term for all acts of a state binding
to an international agreement according to article 11 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT) and thus including acceptance, approval or accession of a treaty.
18
and increasing their credibility as a more trustworthy partner in international trade
and politics (Keohane, 1984a; Abbott/Snidal, 2000) and to signal reliability towards
the domestic and transnational civil society locking-in democracy (Helfer/Slaughter,
1997; Moravcsik, 2000) up to being a matter of norms and beliefs (Keck/Sikkink, 1998;
Sikkink, 2011; Goodman/Jinks, 2013).
Many ask why states create international courts and tribunals and delegate author-
ity to them although this means a serious intrusion into their sovereignty. This
covers a spectrum ranging from expressing power interest s(Steinberg, 2002; Pos-
ner/Yoo, 2005a; Koskenniemi, 2011) over being credible commitment devices (Alter,
2004; Helfer/Slaughter, 2005), solving cooperation problems (Koremenos, 2007) up to
being a result of discourse and persuasion of cosmopolitan norms (Deitelho , 2009;
Sikkink, 2011).
Nevertheless, there are comparatively few empirical studies that test the theoretical
arguments on committing to international courts in general or the ICC particularly
(Simmons/Danner, 2010). Those that do exist provide valuable, often unexpected
insights in states behavior patterns, such as choosing the degree of judicialization
of international dispute settlement dependent on the complexity of the cooperation
problems to be solved (Koremenos, 2007), or non-democracies ratifying the Rome-
Statute dependent on their experienced recent violence and the strength of their rule
of law and thus needing support in dealing with the past (Simmons/Danner, 2010).
The present work tries to fill in two main research gaps. Almost all theoretical ap-
proaches and empirical studies up until now consider commitment only on the basis of
ratification status. Thus, they haven’t measured or mentioned qualitative di erences
of commitment within the group of states that have ratified an agreement. States seem
to have only two characteristics: being state party to the ICC or not. This binary as-
sumes there would be an alleged homogeneous group of states parties, which provides
no clues for di erences among the commitments of states parties. This is the first sign
of diverging cooperation behavior to the ICC. Instead the group of states that ratified
the Rome Statute seem to be a black box and one has to be puzzled as to why some
of them do not cooperate fully with the ICC while others do.
Secondly, the theoretical reflections on the creation of international courts and tri-
bunals allege that all states have more or less the same incentives in delegating au-
thority to international courts and tribunals; notwithstanding the legal area of the
court or their domestic political situation. Rather they consider the task of the re-
spective court being su cient to delegate regardless of their own interests. There are
di erent incentives for Afghanistan, Germany or the USA to commit to the ICC.
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As an aftere ect, there is often no distinction of the states’ interests towards a certain
legal area with and without a court. Rather, there are identified similar factors for
commitment to international law and delegation to international courts. There is
hardly any systematic research on diverging incentives of states due to the respective
international law that shall be enforced by the court.
We can assume there are major di erences in the incentives of states’ delegation in
terms of trade law compared to terms of human rights or humanitarian law. In the area
of humanitarian law the most import enforcement mechanism is reciprocity. But, in
the area of human rights there are only weak self-enforcing mechanism. The underlying
reason for this is that are di erent actor constellations. In terms of humanitarian law
and human rights. In the area of humanitarian law states are confronted with one
another. In the area of human rights the central relationship revolves around the
states and their own respective citizens. Therefore, establishing an international court
that is able to improve the enforcement of human rights makes a crucial di erence for
the legal area. Further, it provides a real change in the political incentive structure
to stay in compliance with human rights. Thus, we can expect states to behave in a
di erent manner if a new court is established.
The present work attempts to reconcile the two described research gaps of IR. It
aims to conceptualize a broader understanding of commitment to this ICC, beyond
the ratification of the Rome Statute as founding treaty. It theorizes and measures
variation within the group of states parties and thus opens the black box of states
parties to the ICC. Moreover, the di erent extents of commitment to the ICC will
be traced to the inherent logic of incentives that lead them to bind themselves to
international criminal law. It will be shown that divergent motivations to delegate
authority to the ICC are dependent upon the commitment the states have already
made relating to humanitarian law and human rights as being the underlying norms
in the background of the Rome Statute. It will be illustrated that there is a clear
di erence in the delegation logic of states if there is a court or not.
Hence, it becomes apparent that although it is democracies that shows a higher prob-
ability of ratifying the ICC it is democracies that also have a high probability of
qualifying their commitments. This might explain why even states parties to the ICC
do not support the court unconditionally. The states behavior to the ICC depends on
their possibility of solving cooperation problems of international law.
20
1.3 Delegation Dilemma and Constrained and Customized
Commitments
As a consequence of the benefits and risks of becoming a state party to the ICC
the states get caught in the delegation dilemma of belonging to ICC. Not to
become a state party would mean refraining from co-designing the ICC, getting support
in dealing with the past, solving cooperation problems of international relations and
waiving support in improving freedom and security. However, to become a state party
to the ICC would mean the risk of weakening itself, exposing themselves to the danger
of su ering from strategical disadvantages towards states that are not party or that
spoil the ICC. As a result they then have an increased need of protecting their freedom
and security. Although the ICC was established to solve cooperation of international
law, it creates some new cooperation problems and the states get caught in a decision
dilemma in face of their self-binding to the court.
It will be argued that the extent of constraining and customizing commitments towards
the ICC depends upon the states’ possibilities to solve cooperation problems with the
court. Firstly, though there are high rates of ratification of humanitarian law, human
rights or sometimes even international criminal law, it is never a certainty as to who
will comply with them and who not. If states want information on this, they must pay
high costs for monitoring norm compliance. Particularly as the existing monitoring
regime is divers, decentralized and fragmented (Egle, 2016). Investing in monitoring
norm compliance with the most severe human rights for western democracies such
as Germany would mean portfolio investing in several institutions and organizations
such as the United Nations Organization (UNO), European Union (EU), the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), international criminal tribunals, non-governmental
organizations and several more.
Secondly, in a landscape of empty promises und uncertain compliance it is not only
di cult to know how the other states behave but it is also di cult for states to signal
to others, both on the international and the domestic level, that they are willing to
comply. How can transitional states or new democracies signal that they have the will
to comply? The establishment of a court such as the ICC makes it possible to reduce
the costs of monitoring norm compliance, as there is one centralized institution that has
the capability to punish. This can lead to an immense reduction of monitoring costs
for certain states that before supported even several monitoring institutions, such as
the International Court of Justice or regional bodies. Moreover, the ratification of such
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a strong institution with a high risk of subjecting themselves to the same punishment
can be a credible signal to international and domestic actors.
How is this possible? The ICC is not considered a court of human rights! It is a criminal
court that shall prosecutes violations of international criminal law in order to cope
with a violent past and to promote peace and reconciliation. The argument that the
ICC solves cooperation problem with respect to humanitarian law and human rights
is based on the fact that although the ICC, founded in 1998, is a comparatively new
court, the norms behind the core crimes of the Rome Statute – genocide, crimes against
humanity (art. 7), war crimes (art. 8) and the crime of aggression (art. 5, para. 1(a) and
art. 8 bis) – are much older, based on humanitarian law and human rights.
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) ’humanitarian
law’ is defined as:
“a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the e ects of armed conflict.
It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and
restricts the means and methods of warfare. International humanitarian law is also
known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict”.14
Humanitarian law is covered by several treaties such as the Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907 including the “Annex on Laws and Customs of War on Land” or the
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the protection of persons not or no longer taking
part in hostilities, such as civilians, injured combatants or prisoners.
Human Rights as concept is embodied later, after the atrocities of World War II, in the
“Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)” of (1948). While humanitarian law
can be considered as ’charity’ in war, human rights have the aim to secure peace. Both
do have in common the aim of preserving human dignity. From today’s view, human-
itarian law can be considered as lex specialis of human rights, nevertheless they are
describing two areas of international law (Oberleitner, 2013). Norms of international
criminal law as embodied in the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide” (1948), the crime against humanity defined by the work of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) and the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), the crime of aggression in the ius ad bellum, have
made it possible to punish these violations.
The ICC can be considered as a tool to indirectly prosecute some of the negative
obligations of humanitarian law and human rights law within the framework of the four
core crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.
14 ICRC 2014: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-international-humanitarian-law
(01-08-2018).
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The ICC provides a chance for ending impunity for violations of humanitarian law and
human rights law. Therefore, commitment to the ICC depends on commitments to
humanitarian law and human rights law that states have already made. The court
reduces costs of monitoring human rights and humanitarian law. Additionally, it
enhances the credibility of states’ commitments. By this way, the court helps the
states to solve cooperation problems of international law that arise in the landscape
of sovereign states that have to cope with the existence of international law without a
world government as an anchor.
However, the question remains open as to why states, nevertheless, constrain and cus-
tomize their commitments to the ICC? In the present work it will be argued that states
are caught in a delegation dilemma to the ICC. On one hand there are several
reasons for states to become a state party to the ICC. States enjoy the privileges of be-
ing a member of the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC (ASP), e.g. (re)negotiating
future legislation, deciding on budget or electing judges and the chief-prosecutor. For
transitional states and new democracies, it is a chance to cope with the past and
to strengthen peace and democracy. Moreover, the ICC o ers the chance to solve
cooperation problems of international relations.
Notwithstanding those benefits, there are also several reasons for states to be cautious
towards the ICC. Since the court is independent and headed by its own states parties,
it is missing institutional counterparts (Tomuschat, 2010). There are overlapping
executive responsibilities of the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC (ASP), the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the states as individual actors. This
can lead to a certain fear of the states that the ICC would be too weak to cope with
power ambitions of individuals states or so strong that it overstretches its mandate
and undermines the principle of complementarity. The states are aware of the fact
that other states do have diverging interests and preferences to the ICC. The states
parties are still in a state of uncertainty about the behavior of the other states. As
the states have di erent interest structures and as the states know that the others also
have di erent interest structures, they are kept in a state of uncertainty about the
behavior of the others.
As a result, they are caught in the delegation dilemma to the ICC in which
both ratifying and non-ratifying states bear high risks. In order to solve this dilemma
states ratify the Rome Statute and become state party to the ICC, but they constrain
and customize their commitments to the ICC to retain a certain room for political
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maneuver.15 Thereby, the extent of customization is dependent on both the degree
they have committed to humanitarian law and human rights as well as being dependent
on whether they would benefit from a reduction of costs of monitoring humanitarian
law and human rights that would have otherwise occurred in the absence of the ICC.
Seen in this way, the negative attitude of some states towards the ICC (with the USA
as a prominent example, and as democracy also as supposed most puzzling example)
is not surprising, but rather obvious, since the ICC is has been given great power.
1.4 Research Design: Building an Index and Testing Determinants
Making those theoretical arguments testable in an empirical analysis, the present study
uses a two-step y-centered research design measuring and explaining the states’ com-
prehensiveness of commitments to the ICC. In the first methodical step, The Index
of Commitment to the ICC, will be suggested as measuring device for a com-
prehensive commitment to the court. This is done to demonstrate di erent aspects of
commitment and to map variation within the states. Thus, it is possible to create vari-
ation in the states’ extent of commitment with the help of ranking them on a scale from
0 (no commitment) to 12 (comprehensive commitment). This allows the states to be
categorized into six groups of di erent levels of commitment to the ICC: Comprehen-
sive Commitments (group 1), Slightly Customized Commitments (group 2),
Customized Commitments (group 3), Strongly Customized Commitments
(group 4), Weak Commitments (group 5), No or very weak commitment
(group 6). This provides empirical evidence for the concept of constrained and cus-
tomized commitments and deconstructs the dichotomy of states parties and non-party
states to the ICC creating variation in the states’ extent of self-binding to the ICC.
In a second methodical step, the explanatory power of the theoretical argument of
states’ behavior to the ICC dependent on their possibility of reducing costs of moni-
toring and the increasing their commitments to humanitarian law and human rights
law will be tested empirically by means of regression analyses. With an Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression the explanatory power of the theoretical argument on the
states’ positions on the Index of commitment to the ICC will be examined con-
trolling for di erent third variables, such as experiences of repression, armed conflicts
15 The theoretical argument of states constraining and customizing their commitments to the ICC
dependent on their general interest in increasing the monitoring of humanitarian law and human
rights and their individual interest in assessing the consequences of becoming a state party to
the ICC ties onto the concept of constrained independence of (Helfer/Slaughter, 2005) who argue
that states establish independent courts, but afterwards use fine-grained mechanisms to
constrain their independence.
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or the establishment of institutions dealing with the past. Subsequently, a multiple
logistic regression analysis shall be carried out in order to compare the explanatory
power (of former commitments and reduction of monitoring costs) for the position on
the Index of Commitment to the ICC as dependent variable with the states’ rat-
ification of the Rome Statute as dependent variable. This allows for the quantification
of the explanatory power of the theoretical argument giving empirical evidence on the
states having divergent incentives in solving cooperation problems with the ICC.
1.5 Scientific and Political Relevance
The work aims to contribute to the research on commitment behavior of states to
human rights and humanitarian law and on delegation of sovereignty to international
courts within the debate on judicialization of international politics. In that sense the
scientific relevance lies in measuring and explaining state behavior to the ICC beyond
the dichotomy of ratifying or not ratifying the Rome Statute. The theoretical argu-
ments will make it possible to reflect on aspects of constraining the independence of
international courts on the part of the states. With the Index of Commitment to
the ICC, an empirical measurement is provided that makes its possible to examine
commitment to the court for a high number of states. The index may be in principal
transferable in the measurement of all international courts and tribunal with the func-
tions of monitoring and enforcement. This will also provide information pertinent to
future research agenda in comparing states commitment and compliance behavior to
legal regimes with and without international courts in order to measure the benefit of
enforcement mechanisms due to the law that shall be enforced.
Furthermore, there is a high political relevance. The present work shows that it is
– contrary to what is commonly believed – theoretically arguable and empirically
verifiable that states do have incentives for becoming state party to the ICC due to
their opportunity of solving cooperation problems. The Index of Commitment
allows us to appraise the actual strength of self-binding more precisely and thereby
provides better orientation in assessing future compliance behavior in the shape of
both compliance with the core crimes and cooperation with the ICC as an institution.
This can also be understood as appeal to monitor the binding behavior of the states
parties to the ICC more closely. An evaluation of comprehensive commitment on a
regular basis, e.g. through an annual reporting procedure of political and legal experts
would make it possible to measure the current level of commitment and to map the
development of commitment over time. Thus, we could assign changes of commitments
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to changes of politics. This could function to nudge the states towards improvements
in their commitments to the ICC to maintain their credibility.
1.6 Structure of the Work
The study proceeds as follows: In Chapter 2, Following Universal Norms or
Making Rational Decisions? States’ Commitment to International Law
and Courts in Research Literature, light will be shed on the theories and empir-
ical studies on the states behavior towards international law and international courts
in the literature of IR, International Law (IL) and ICL. An overview is given on
theories and explanatory approaches explaining commitment to international law in
general and humanitarian law and human rights in particular (2.1). Additionally, an
overview is provided as to why states delegate authority to international courts and
tribunals although this means a serious intrusion into their sovereignty dependent of
their lack of compliance or compensation for said lack of compliance (2.2). Finally, an
overview will be on the research gaps and it will be argued in what way the present
work is able to close them (2.3).
In Chapter 3, Theory of States’ Constraining and Customizing Commit-
ments to the ICC, the theoretical argument on states constraining and customizing
commitments dependent on their possibility of solving cooperation problems will be
set out. For this purpose, the role of the ICC as guardian of humanitarian law and
human rights (3.1) and the benefits of ratifying the Rome Statute to become a state
party to the ICC will be illustrated (3.2). Afterwards, it will be highlighted why the
states have to fear the ICC to some extent, since it is a stand-alone court and thus
missing institutional counterparts in international relations and there is reason to be
concerned on a politicization and/or a legal overstretching of the ICC (3.3). It will be
shown why this means that some states get caught in a decision dilemma to the ICC
vacillating between the options of ratification and non-ratification. Moreover, it will
be shown how the dilemma can be solved through constraining or customizing their
commitment (3.4) and why the extent of constraining and customizing depends on the
possibility of the states solving cooperation problems of international relations (3.5).
In Chapter 4, An Index as Summary Measurement for Comprehensive Com-
mitment, evidences for the assumption that states customize and constrain their
commitments to the ICC is given. Therefore, the possible ways of states constraining
and customizing their commitments will be modeled (4.1), data set and methods of
data collection and analysis will be set out (4.2). Finally, the results of the Index of
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Commitment to the ICC will be presented thereby illustrating variation in the states’
extent of commitment to the ICC (4.3).
In Chapter 5, Testing the Explanatory Power of Solving International
Cooperation Problems with the ICC, the explanatory power of the states’ in-
centives due to their possibilities of solving cooperation problems of international re-
lations will be examined by means of regression analysis. The possibilities of solving
cooperation problems by reducing costs of monitoring and enhancing credibility of
commitments to humanitarian law and human right will be modeled (5.1). The data
set and methods for data collection and data analyses will be set out (5.2). Finally,
the results of the regression analyses will be presented (5.3) giving empirical evidence
for the theoretical argument of states ratifying the Rome Statute and constraining and
customizing their commitments dependent on the possibilities of solving cooperation
problems due to their interest in governing the international community and due to
their attitude towards humanitarian law and human rights.
In the Chapter 6, Conclusion and Outlook, the theoretical argument and the
empirical findings will be summarized (6.1). It will be shown how the index as empirical
measurement visualizes the variation in states’ behavior to the ICC and expands our
knowledge of states behavior towards to international courts in general. It shows
that it is worthwhile to evaluate dimensions of states commitments to the ICC more
closely and that it is worthwhile to monitor the states’ behavior in order to nudge
them towards compliance with the ICC (6.2). Furthermore, the limits of the empirical
results will be highlighted and several proposed avenues for future research will be
derived from the present (6.3). Finally, why the states behavior of constraining and
customizing commitments can nevertheless lead to strong bonds to the ICC and a
promotion of international judicialization will be discussed (6.4).
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2 Following Universal Norms or Making Rational
Decisions? States’ Commitment to International Law
and Courts in Research Literature
Particularly, in the last two decades, we find numerous theoretical arguments and stud-
ies in the research literature of IR dealing with states’ behavior towards international
law. Both ’legalization of international relations’ and the ’proliferation of courts and
tribunals’ have evolved into their own research areas that are addressed by scholars
of IR and IL. In the case of the ICC there are scholars of the ICL that approach the
topic in the context of international criminal tribunals and political questions of why
states accept their jurisdiction or why they cooperate with the courts.
The most important questions include: why states commit themselves to international
law and why they comply with it. The answers to these questions are as various as
they are numerous and range from their own as well as external persuasion to adapt
to universal norms. There are only a few studies that focus directly on the motives
for states ratifying the Rome Statute of the ICC. In this respect light will be shed on
international courts in general as well as international criminal courts and tribunals
as subsets.
It is surprising that such a large research gap exists regarding this subject matter.
There are hardly any works that di erentiate between states’ behavior to international
law dependent on the existence or non-existence of an international court monitoring
the compliance with the law or enforcement of it. This is so notwithstanding the fact
that it is one important task of the court to promote change in the compliance be-
havior of states. Most of the studies consider either mechanisms of compliance with
international law as a general phenomenon or delegation of authority to international
courts and tribunals in the context of delegating authority to international organi-
zations. We can argue that the viewpoints are coming from di erent scientific areas
and therefore their views overlap one another, but at the same time create a huge
blind spot that leaves the question open as to what di erences exist in the compliance
behavior of states if there is a court or in the absence of a court. Existing literature
often identifies similar factors for both commitment to international law and delega-
tion to international courts. In addition to which there is often no distinction between
di erent types of international courts or di erent areas of international law.
On the empirical level, states parties to an international court such as the ICC are
considered as black box. It has been assumed that states would have all the same
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incentives to delegate authority and to submit themselves to a specific international
court. Many studies follow the premise of states as a homogeneous group having all
the same motives behaving in a certain way towards international courts in general
or the ICC in particular. States parties and non-party states to the international
courts are often considered as monolithic blocks under the assumption that there is
only one possible motive to submit to the court that states can share or not, e.g. to
promote peace with the ICC. As a result, there are missing theoretical assumptions
of an actor-centered perspective showing the benefits and risks of committing to the
ICC dependent on who you are and what you want as a state. This now provides an
opportunity to examine di erent levels of commitment and di erent states’ incentives
empirically.
To illustrate this blind spot, in the following chapter it will be shown how the states’
behavior towards international law and international courts is explained in the view of
IR theory as well as in the interdisciplinary dialogue with IL and ICL. Human rights
law and humanitarian law are the most important sources for the core crimes of the
ICC and thus particular attention will be paid to the legal area of human rights. It
will be di erentiated systematically between commitment to and compliance with and
the role of international courts having been established in order to strengthen states’
compliance with international law.
First, it will be shown how states’ commitment to international law is explained in
research literature (2.1). The problem of anarchy in international relation will be
briefly sketched and di erent theoretical approaches on commitment to law will be
outlined. Moreover, it will be shown whether empirical studies exist that tested the
theoretical arguments. Afterwards, it will be shown why states delegate authority to
international courts and tribunals (2.2). The problem of non-compliance with inter-
national law will be elucidated and will demonstrate why states create international
courts and tribunals and delegate authority to address the problem of non-compliance,
even though this results in a serious intrusion into the sovereignty of the states. It will
be shown that human rights benefit considerably from the establishment of interna-
tional courts and tribunals. They have – in comparison to other areas of international
law – only weak self-enforcing mechanisms. It is worth mentioning here that severe
human rights violations are often committed by states on their own civilians and not
by foreign states.
The present study will try to close the research gaps. It develops both a concept of
comprehensive commitment and a theoretical argument that explains that the states‘
behavior to the ICC is dependent on their attitude to human rights law and human-
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itarian law since those can be considered as the basis of the core crimes defined in
the Rome Statute. It will be argued that there is a huge di erence if international
law is protected by international courts that have been entrusted with the ongoing
care and maintenance of international law. Their e ect is especially strong in the field
of human rights as there are hardly any mechanisms for self-enforcement. Moreover,
with the Index of Commitment to the ICC as an empirical instrument will be
developed for the purpose of opening the black box of states parties to the ICC. This
allows for a better understanding of di erent levels of commitment, beyond mere rat-
ification, showing that states constraint and customization of their commitments are
dependent upon the benefits of solving cooperation problems in international relations.
This o ers an actor-centered perspective on states behavior to international courts.
2.1 Commitment to International Law
2.1.1 The Problem of Anarchy in International Relations
Paradoxically, both international law and international courts are situated in an an-
archistic landscape of international relations where there is no world government. In
case of the ICC not even an international organization exists to ensure the enforce-
ment of international law. Therefore, it is helpful to have a look at the problems of
this anarchistic landscape in international relations.
Why do states cooperate under these conditions of anarchy?16 The replies are manifold
and range from striving for power (Mearsheimer, 1995) and security (Waltz, 1959) over
solving prisoner’s dilemma of anarchy through increasing of predictability and trust
with international institutions (Keohane/Nye, 1977; Keohane, 1984a; Oye, 1986) to
common foreign interests and preferences (Putnam, 1988; Moravcsik, 1997) or common
norms and believes (Wendt, 1992; Katzenstein, 1996; Risse, 2000).
For this reason, international law is considered as a form of cooperation in international
relations that has continuously grown in recent years. The /acUNTS currently lists
about 3,000 multilateral treaties and approximately 55,000 bilateral treaties along
global issue areas like security, economy, environment or referring to common global
territories like oceans, airspace or outer space.17
16 Dickinson (1926) introduced the concept of ’international anarchy’ after World War I in order to
describe the state of international relations in which there is no supranational power that would
be able to set limits to conflicts between states and to be able to enforce global rules. For further
explanations see e.g. Diez et al. (2011, 1 .).
17 See UN Treaty Collection: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/MSDatabase.aspx?clang=_en
(07-12-2016).
30
In the context of the growing debate in IR and IL on the process of legalization of
international politics these are described as uneven legalization (Abbott et al., 2000),
institutionalized asymmetry (Zangl/Zürn, 2004), interlegal fragmentation (Teubner,
2005; Fischer-Lescano/Teubner, 2007), global legal pluralism (Berman, 2007) disor-
der of normative orders (Walker, 2008) or stratified multi-level system (Zürn, 2011).18
Thereby, one of the key issues is: “Why and when do states choose legalized institu-
tional forms when their autonomy would be less constrained by avoiding legalization?”
(Goldstein et al., 2000, 391).19
2.1.2 Theories on States’ Commitment to International Law
In order to better understand why states commit to the Rome Statute of the ICC
we have to answer the general question why states commit to international law un-
derstanding both the general and the specific incentives to bind themselves to such a
strong institution although this means a serious intrusion into their sovereignty (Sim-
mons/Danner, 2010; Katzenstein, 2014) as illustrated in the introduction of this work.
Replying on this pivotal question we find several theses and arguments along the
di erent strands of IR theory; ranging from strengthening power and security over
expressing interests in international relations and promoting democratization up to
and including being a result of norms and beliefs. These assumptions and arguments
shall be briefly illustrated below.
States only commit to international law if it strengthens their power and security. In
the view of realism and neorealism law is considered being only an epiphenomenon
(Morgenthau, 1948), cheap talk (Waltz, 1979) or an obstacle for protecting the own
18 An overview on the interdisciplinary dialogue of IR and IL can be found in e.g. Slaughter (1993);
Slaughter et al. (1998); Simmons (2007); Duno /Pollack (2013) and an overview on IR research
on international law can be found in e.g. (Abbott, 1989; Hafner-Burton et al., 2012).
19 While scholars of IR and IL researched for a long time independent from each other, several
scholars of both disciplines stressed the need of interdisciplinary research on the role of law in
international politics and the unevenness of legalization in a special issue of the political science
journal ’International Organization’ in 2000. Remarkably, at the birth time of IR as an academic
field in 1919 with the establishment of the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics at
Aberystwyth University in Wales, IL and IR were still strongly connected and scholars in both
disciplines argued that a spread of democracy and international international institutions
impeded armed conflicts and power politics in international relations (Slaughter, 1993).
However, this common belief ended with the outbreak of World War II and the emerging
’realism’ in IR and the conviction that the absence of international enforcement mechanisms
international law is not able to constrain the power ambitions of states (Duno /Pollack, 2013)
and international law is an epiphenomenon in international politics (Morgenthau, 1948). At the
latest, since the end of the Cold War and corresponding to the third wave of democratization
(Huntington, 1991), the spread of regional organizations (Solingen, 1998; Katzenstein, 2005) and
the rising globalization of trade and security international law came again to the fore of IR and
IL and triggered inter- and transdisciplinary collaboration.
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power (Mearsheimer, 1995). More recent works claim that states’ behavior towards
international law depends only on the power interests of the states. Some are of
the opinion that increasing reputation through compliance with international law is
neither the only nor the best means to reach foreign policy objectives (Keohane/Nye,
1977). Powerful states can benefit from violating international law when national
security interests are deemed more important in order to protect against perceived
threats (Goldsmith/Posner, 2006). While referring to the World Trade Organization
(WTO), Steinberg (2002) argues that powerful states only support international rule-
making organization to push their agenda on the international level. Weak states hope
to increase their power, since they can immensely profit by stressing their sovereign
equality through international law. He argues that realism in international law is still
alive. States are the central actors of international law. They have their own political
interests and are endowed with material power that they use to enforce said interests
(Steinberg, 2013).
“GATT-WTO decision making rules based on the sovereign equality of states are or-
ganized hypocrisy in the procedural context. (...) Trade rounds may be launched by
law-based bargaining, but powerful states have dominated agenda setting.” (Steinberg,
2002, 365)20
Posner (2014) holds the opinion that human rights treaties are often not able to ad-
dress human rights violations because states fundamentally disagree on how states
should govern. Democracies would have no costs committing to human rights law and
non-democracies would only commit if they are pressured from democratic states that
they are dependent on. Human rights would often hinder economic development or
pragmatic decisions that weak or failed states must make. In this case human rights
enforcement would cause more harm than good. He considers human rights prolifer-
ation as “kind of rule naiveté (...) the view that the good in every country can be
reduced to a set of rules that can then be impartially enforced” (Posner, 2014, 7).
For many states it would be better to start over again, identifying a small number
of specific human rights that have priority over all others in order to create clearer
incentives to comply with them. He argues that the rule naiveté is responsible for the
proliferation of human rights, but conversely reasons why they cannot be enforced.
Moyn (2014, 81f.) even purports that human rights are only a bad replacement for a
real universalism.
20 In this way Steinberg (2002) refers to Krasner (1999) who said that Westphalian sovereignty is
’organized hypocrisy’.
32
“The roots of contemporary human rights are not to be found were pundits and profes-
sors have longed to find them: neither in Greek philosophy nor monotheistic religion,
neither in European natural law nor early modern revolutions, neither in horror against
American slavery nor Hitler’s Judeocide. (...) Human rights came to the world in a
sort of gestalt switch: a cause that had once lacked partisans suddenly attracted them
in droves. While accident played a role in this transformation, as it does in all human
events, what mattered most was the collapse of universalistic schemes and the construc-
tion of human rights as a persuasive, ’moral’ alternative to them.”
Likewise, albeit skeptical, but more normative are critical legal studies that argue
that international law would be a tool for hegemonic power. Those emerged as criti-
cism of liberal theory and use assumption and methods of Critical Theory to analyze
power structures within international law (Purvis, 1991). However, they also criticize
realism for having no normative claims (Koskenniemi, 2011, 89 .). They argue that
international law o ers an opportunity to express hegemonic claims with legal rhetoric.
Humanitarian intervention being one example of this.
“Law’s contribution to security is not in the substantive responses it gives, but in the
process of justification that it imports into institutional policy and in its assumption of
responsibility for the policies chosen. Entering the legal culture compels a move away
from one’s idiosyncratic interests and preferences by insisting on their justification in
terms of the historical practices and proclaimed standards of community.” (Koskenniemi,
2011, 100)
Similarly, there are voices of postcolonial theory arguing that the proliferation of in-
ternational law in general and human rights in special is a form of cultural relativism
ignoring views and need in di erent cultural communities (Dhawan, 2014).
“Critical advocates of human rights in the postcolonial era (...) reject imperial univer-
salism, which categorizes culturally specific understandings of morality as ’savage’ and
’anti-modern’ (...). Instead, human rights advocates argue that a minimal core of val-
ues should be treated as objectively moral and beyond that moral core, an overarching
principle of toleration should be promoted, which recognizes the diversity of cultural
practices.” (Cowell, 2014, 267)
Thus, in the approaches that see states driven by power and security the sovereign
state is much more highly valued than international relations. Commitment to inter-
national law is rather improbable and occurs only if states consider that there is a
possibility of increasing their own power in doing so. International law does not lead
to more equality, but usually strengthens the fittest and weakens the weakest.
33
States commit to international law achieving interests and agenda setting in interna-
tional relations. Scholars of regime theory brought international institutions to the
fore of IR tackling the realist assumptions while still believing in a world of anarchy.
“Regimes can be defined as set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area
of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms
are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific
prescriptions and proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing
practices for making and implementing collective choice.” (Krasner, 1983, 2).
’Regimes’ are able to capture international law within an established political sys-
tem, be it formal or informal (Donnelly, 1986) argues that there are di erent types
of international regimes; declaratory, promotional, implementation and enforcement
regimes. The international human rights regime includes several bodies promoting the
commitment to human rights and monitoring the compliance with human rights law
by means of working groups or communication procedures both on the international
and on the regional level, such as the Inter-American or the African human rights
regimes. While the regime view can be found in neorealism it also can be considered
as a starting point for neoliberal institutionalism as the most important alternative
to the realist approach. States are here considered as unitary egoistic actors seeking
optimal strategies to assert and maximize their own benefits.
One of the central arguments is that states su er from prisoner’s dilemma in interna-
tional relations. States tend to choose non-cooperation over cooperation, since they
cannot be sure how the other side will behave. One-sided cooperation could lead to a
comparative advantage for those that defect even though it would have been the best
for both to cooperate. Thus, it is a dilemma that reflects the tense relationship between
the rationality of groups that have high incentives to cooperate and the rationality of
individuals that have high incentives to defect (Axelrod, 1980, 4).
“The distinguishing feature of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that in the short run, neither
side can benefit itself with a selfish choice enough to make up for the harm done to it
from a selfish choice by the other. Thus if both cooperate, both do fairly well. But if
one defects while the other cooperates, the defecting side gets the highest payo , and
the cooperating side is the sucker and gets the lowest payo . This gives both sides an
incentive to defect.” (Axelrod, 1980, 4)
There are several ways to solve the prisoner’s dilemma through creating iteration of
the game and thus incentives to cooperate in the ’shadow of the future’ through the
mechanisms of ’tit for tat’ and reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984). Negotiating international
34
agreements and committing to international law is thereby one possible way, since in-
ternational law promotes iteration, modifies the payo s, and thus increases certainty
and predictability allowing states to become more likely to cooperate (Abbott, 1989,
362 .). Solving the game is possible by finding the Nash Equilibrium. In this circum-
stance, none of the players has a unilateral incentive to defect because none of the
other choices would bring a higher payo .
Koremenos (2007, 191) is of the opinion that “the law itself must be an equilibrium
in a non-cooperative game”. In an empirical analysis she showed that about 50%
of all international agreements have dispute settlement provisions. She proved that
those agreements that address complex cooperation problems, such as uncertainty or
prisoner’s dilemma incentives to defect, are very likely to include dispute settlement
mechanisms. On the contrary, agreements that address a lesser complex problem are
rather unlikely to include dispute settlement provisions and need them less. She argues
that international law is most e ective if it considers the interests and constraints of
the international actors (Koremenos et al., 2001). Thus, if law is the equilibrium in a
non-cooperative game, it is self-enforcing and does not need enforcing mechanisms like
adjudication. If there are incentives to defect, since the equilibrium is defection, adju-
dication is useful and probable. Thus, in the view of neoliberal institutionalism, states
commit to international law to solve cooperation problems and to create certainty and
predictability.
Putnam (1988) explains the commitment to international law with the concept of
’two-level games’. In his opinion, domestic politics shape international politics and
vice versa. He refers to the concept of win-sets (Shepsle/Weingast, 1987, 90) that
is defined as “the set of alternatives in x that command majority support over x”.
Relating to international law the win-sets result from all possible agreements on the
international level in which a majority on the national level is achievable. The larger
the win-sets, the more probable the ratification of international agreements. Thus,
failed ratification is not an inevitable result of intentional defection. This makes the
mere signature less credible, even though the cost to their reputation may be very high
in the event that the governments fail to ratify (Putnam, 1988, 435 .)
A further important argument of institutionalism is that international law creates le-
gitimacy, reduces transaction and negotiation costs and increases the credibility of
commitments (Abbott/Snidal, 2000, 422). International law may solve cooperation
problems, such as uncertainty about the behavior of the others, distributions problems,
problems of negative externalities or the problem of ’deadlock’ in which each player
prefers not to cooperate. According to Keohane (1984a) international law makes co-
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operation more likely, since it reduces transaction costs through the definition of the
condition for negotiation, improves the quality of information and creates legitimacy.
Abbott/Snidal (2000, 429) build on this argument stressing that legal commitments
can a ect actors on the internal as well as the domestic level. Through the creation of
legal norms common rules and standards are determined and the future becomes less
uncertain, albeit highly dependent upon current political interests and preferences.
“Legalization entails a specific form of discourse, requiring justification and persuasion
in terms of applicable rules and pertinent facts, and emphasizing factors such as text,
precedents, analogies, and practice. Legal discourse largely disqualifies arguments based
solely on interests and preferences.” (Abbott/Snidal, 2000, 429)
The argument of enhancing credibility builds on Fearon (1997) who developed a the-
ory on strategies of states signaling foreign policy interests. A point of departure from
his considerations was – to some extent ironically – the question of how states can
make military threats credible to the state threatened. He sees two possibilities of
communicating willingness: tying one’s own hands or sinking costs to make threats
costlier. Tying one’s own hands in front of a large domestic or international audience,
e.g. by making a public statement, increases the ex-post costs of retraction consider-
ably, whereas sinking costs, e.g. by mobilizing troops or building arms, increases the
ex-ante costs. Both strategies enhance credibility, but it is preferable to use the strat-
egy of hand tying because it is less provoking and possibly cheaper. Especially, if there
will be no need for military use in the end (Fearon, 1997). The argument was taken
up again and again. It twisted from reasons for military threat to reasons for delegat-
ing power to international institutions. Moreover, it can be found in the theoretical
approaches of liberal theory on international relations and international law.
States commit to international law furthering democracy and global society. Moravc-
sik/Legro (1999) raise the question: Is anybody still a realist? They argue that realism
and neorealism are not able to redress anomalies in international politics, such as states’
commitment to international law. Liberal theory can be considered as an alternative
view, since it is able to capture domestic interests and preferences. In liberal theory
the focus is placed not on the level of states, but rather on the relation between states
and civil society, both on the domestic and on the transnational level. Institutionalist
theory is criticized because it does not explain changes of regimes, the domestic and
transnational relations between individuals and states and, most of all, it is not able
to say anything on the importance of the Kantian ’democratic peace’ in international
relations (Slaughter, 1993, 207 .).
36
Human rights are considered the core of international law, since it not rules the rela-
tions between states, but the relations between states and societies, as well.
“From the perspective of Liberal theory, human rights law is the core of international
law (...), but from a normative rather than a positive perspective. Many international
lawyers and policymakers still see human rights law as an exception to the fundamental
proposition of state sovereignty and nonintervention. (...) Yet human rights law is
precisely about structuring state-society relations to ensure at least minimal individual
flourishing. We can justify that function from a moral perspective; Liberal IR theory
would also argue that governments that oppress their citizens are more likely to present
a threat to other governments or to the international system.” (Slaughter, 2000b, 246)
The argument of growing the audience, signaling interests and enhancing credibility
become particularly important in explaining why even repressive states ratify human
rights agreements even when they must fear several negative consequences. Seen in
his light, it does not only solve cooperation problems, but it is a possibility of locking-
in democracy. With recourse to the argument of enhancing credibility, Moravcsik
(2000) explains why states establish human rights regimes although they challenge
both Westphalian state sovereignty as well as democratic legitimacy and states’ self-
determination.
“Why would any government, democratic or dictatorial, favor establishing an e ective
independent international authority, the sole purpose of which is to constrain its domes-
tic sovereignty in such an unprecedentedly invasive and overtly nonmajoritarian way?”
(Moravcsik, 2000, 219)
He is of the opinion that the primary proponents of human rights agreements were
neither great powers nor established liberal democracies, but newly emerged democ-
racies.
“Although established democracies supported certain human rights declarations, they
allied with dictatorships and transitional regimes in opposition to reciprocally binding
human rights enforcement – a seldom-noted tendency for which realists and ideational
theorists have no explanation. The primary proponents of reciprocally binding hu-
man rights obligations were instead the governments of newly established democracies.”
(Moravcsik, 2000, 219f.)
He argues that states choose the tactic of enhancing credibility by delegation of
sovereignty to an independent international institution when the expected reduction of
uncertainty outweighs the expected costs to their sovereignty. In his view new democ-
racies have the greatest interest in protecting the political status against autocratic or
repressive threats.
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“This curious pattern is explicable only if we adopt a di erent theoretical starting point:
the domestic political self-interest of national governments. Establishing an international
human rights regime is an act of political delegation akin to establishing a domestic court
or administrative agency. From a ’republican liberal’ perspective – one related to in-
stitutional variants of ‘democratic peace’ theory as well as to the analysis of ’two-level
games’ and public-choice theories of delegation – creating a quasi-independent judicial
body is a tactic used by governments to ‘lock in’ and consolidate democratic institu-
tions, thereby enhancing their credibility and stability vis-a-vis nondemocratic political
threats. In sum, governments turn to international enforcement when an international
commitment e ectively enforces the policy preferences of a particular government at
a particular point in time against future domestic political alternatives.” (Moravcsik,
2000, 219f.)
In many legal regimes the key actors refuse to commit to international agreements
as in the cases of the USA and the International Criminal Court or USA and China
and the Kyoto-Regime. Others commit with no intention of complying as in the cases
of autocracies and the human rights (Hafner-Burton/Tsutsui, 2005; Simmons, 2009).
Moravcsik (2013, 88) states that international law is the regulation of the interstate
relations and preferences that define problem structures and potential for coopera-
tion. Thus, in the view of liberalism, states commit to international law in order to
strengthen their democracy and their way of behaving democratically in international
relations.
“[A] domestic coalition of social interests that ’benefits’ (ideally or materially) directly
and indirectly from particular regulation of social interdependence is more powerfully
represented in decision-making than the countervailing coalition of losers from coopera-
tion. (...) The greater the potential joint gains and the lower the domestic and transna-
tional distributional concerns, the greater the potential for cooperation.” (Moravcsik,
2013, 87f.)
States commit to international law if this corresponds to their norms and believes. The
mobilization of domestic and transnational actors promoting the states’ commitment
to international law in general and to human rights is also an important argument
in the theoretical approaches of social constructivism. Human rights stand in the
center of this research, since it regulates the relation between states and civil society
and strengthens the rights of the individuals. The window dressing behavior of some
states pretending to behave properly while doing otherwise is limited by the fact that
there are several local and international non-governmental organizations like Amnesty
International that record and report human rights violations and make this information
available for the global public.
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With the ever-increasing importance of non-state actors and structures of norms not
under the states’ control, realistic concepts have become outdated (Deitelho /Zürn,
2016, 194). Approaches of rational institutionalism and liberalism have been tackled.
Social constructivism argues that the ’logic of rationality’ and cost and benefit consid-
erations states behavior towards international law cannot be explained. An example of
this is the norm of universal membership that can be found in many international legal
regimes and leads to such idiosyncrasies such as landlocked states becoming members
of the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Accordingly,
the starting point for considerations is that actors choose institutional designs in a
’logic of appropriateness’ (Wendt, 2006, 408).
Many studies in social constructivism are concerned with the proliferation of norms in
international relations. When referring to human rights, we can find explanatory ap-
proaches as to why states and even non-democratic states commit to human rights. In
social constructivism states commit to international norms such as the human rights
because they are conform enough to their own norms and beliefs (Chayes/Chayes,
1993). They are based on or create legitimacy (Franck, 1990; Hurd, 1999). Or, the
states became persuaded (Deitelho , 2006) or are pressured from transnational advo-
cacy networks (Keck/Sikkink, 1998; Finnemore/Sikkink, 1998; Sikkink, 2017), such as
a Non-Governmental Organization like Amnesty International (Clark, 2001) or jurist
advocacy networks (Alter et al., 2012) like the International Commission of Jurists
(Tolley, 1994). The latest studies on social constructivism argue that the power of
discourse and persuasion are pivotal (Hawkins, 2004; Deitelho , 2009).
Sikkink (2011) developed the term of ’justice cascade’ to take into account that in-
ternational justice and individual criminal accountability spread around the globe. It
reached momentum with the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, Genocide Convention of
1948, Geneva Conventions of 1949, Convention against Torture of 1985, as well as
ICTY and ICTR and the domestic and foreign prosecutions in Greece, Portugal and
Argentina, the combination of which reinforced universal norms. This reached its peak
with the establishment of the ICC. Although all the theoretical approaches on commit-
ment to international law di er strongly in their assumptions and arguments, they do
have in common presuming law as results of expression of power and thus considering
treaties as mirrors of politics.
39
2.1.3 Empirical Studies on States’ Commitment to International Law
There are numerous empirical studies on states’ commitment to international law.
Two kinds of studies can be identified as pivotal in the case of human rights research.
There are qualitative case studies examining the overall proliferation of human rights
in a certain kind of di usion. As well, there are several quantitative studies examining
why states sign and ratify certain international agreements.
Besides, there are plenty of quantitative studies examining ratification of international
agreements. Simmons (2009) who examines the ratification of six core human rights
treaties.21. She argues that legislative and political veto-players as well as domestic
judicial institutions play an important role for states’ decision to ratify human rights
treaties. With the help of history analysis and cox proportionate hazard models she
shows that risk factors for ratification are e.g. being a democracy, being Christian or
having a common law system. Moreover, there are strong regional patterns.
Neumayer (2007), for example, considers commitment not only ratifications, but exam-
ines explanations for states making reservations to human rights treaties. He chooses
the same six human rights treaties and examines the amount of reservations, un-
derstandings and declarations as a dependent variable. With the help of a negative
binominal regression analysis he tests the competing hypotheses that liberal democra-
cies set up either a higher number of reservations or a lower number of reservations,
understandings and declarations. He concludes that in fact liberal democracies have
more reservations, understandings and declarations. Accordingly, he speaks of ’quali-
fied ratifications’ of human rights treaties.
Beyond empirical studies on the commitment of international law in general and hu-
man rights in particular, there are studies on the compliance with international law or
relation to human rights that focus on the gap between commitment and compliance.
The following work attracted widespread attention in the research of IR and IL. Hath-
away (2002) shows in a regression analysis with time-series data of five issue areas –
torture, genocide, civil liberty, political representation of women and fair trials – that
human rights obligations in the absence of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms
are often not fulfilled. Only in very strong democracies can we observe an improvement
in compliance with human rights. This can be explained by the existence of domestic
21 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR); International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC). For the “List of Human Rights Treaties” see p. 240.
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monitoring mechanisms. However, in autocracies that are the main spoilers of human
rights, there is often no change in the level of repression after the ratification of human
rights treaties. Not only is there no single treaty that can be associated with better
human rights practices, there are even several treaties that can be associated with
human rights practices that worsened after ratification. A counterintuitive finding,
she explains that this negative e ect is due to the high-pressure civil actors place on
governments.
“External pressure on countries to demonstrate a commitment to human rights norms
creates strong incentives for countries to engage in favorable expressive behavior by
ratifying human rights treaties. But because human rights treaties are generally only
minimally monitored and enforced, there is little incentive for ratifying countries to
make the costly exchange in actual policy that would be necessary to meet their treaty
commitments.” (Hathaway, 2002, 2020)
Precisely this puzzle drives the research of Hafner-Burton/Tsutsui (2005). They ar-
gue in the same manner that in the absence of enforcement mechanisms human rights
treaties provide the incentive to circumvent their human rights obligations. It is very
attractive for autocratic states to ratify human rights treaties because they have rel-
atively low costs considering missing enforcement mechanisms while they expect high
benefits by increasing their international reputation. Moreover, the ratification of
human rights treaties by autocratic states can increase the number of human rights
violations. With the help of a pooled time-series cross-section regression analysis for
1978-1999 they test their hypotheses for six treaties (CCPR, CESCR, CERD, CAT,
CEDAW and CRC). They find out that states with a higher level of ratification are
not more likely to comply with human rights, but sometimes even less likely. They de-
scribe these phenomenon as ’paradox of empty promises’, arguing that the ratification
of the human rights treaties raises the attention of international and domestic actors
of civil society and those, however, consequently put pressure on the states, which in
turn results in more human rights violations than before.
Buneo De Mesquita et al. (2005) take up the aspect that democracies tend to have
better human rights practices. With the help of ordered logit regression analyses for
1976-2001 they examine which aspects of democracy improve human rights practices.
They conclude that being a democracy increases the probability of better human rights
practices. Not all dimensions of democracy contribute in the same manner to an
improvement in human rights practices, but competition between parties provides
positive e ects. Additionally, they show that a simple increase of democratization
does not inevitably lead to better human rights practices, but rather that particular
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states with very high levels of democracy have better practices. They consider this as
an indicator for the fact that attainment of human rights is a long process for states
and their citizens.
Neumayer (2005) examines human rights performance operationalized as civil rights
practices and personal integrity practices dependent on the ratification of CCPR and
its first optional protocol, CAT as well as opt out provision of article 21 and 22 and
moreover on several regional human rights treaties, such as European, American, Inter-
American and African provision for human rights protection in general and torture in
special. With the help of both fixed-e ects and ordered probit regression analyses he
examines the explanatory power of the level of ratification to the international and
regional treaties. He concludes that it cannot be identified as a simple relationship
between ratification and good performance. He confirms Hathaway (2002) with respect
to better practices in democracies as well as the potential for a possible worsening
in autocracies. Moreover, he confirms Hafner-Burton/Tsutsui (2005) regarding the
positive role of civil society in democracies. However, he makes references to findings
later published on the role of reservations (Neumayer, 2007) in which he points out
that the democracies that seem to be the most willing to comply with the human
rights they committed to, will also have the highest incentives to make reservations to
articles they do not want to be bound to.
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2.2 Delegation of Authority to the International Criminal Court
2.2.1 The Problem of Non-Compliance with International Law
To better understand why states delegate authority to the International Criminal
Court we must ask why they are willing to delegate to international courts in gen-
eral. It will be argued that the motive for delegation is dependent on the problem of
non-compliance without those court. As shown above, states commit to international
law as cheap talk in order to increase power and security (Waltz, 1979; Koskenniemi,
2004), reduce transaction costs and increase their credibility by becoming either a
more trustworthy partner in international trade and politics (Keohane, 1984a; Ab-
bott/Snidal, 2000) or signaling reliability towards the domestic and transnational civil
society ’locking-in democracy’ (Helfer/Slaughter, 1997; Moravcsik, 2000); or as mat-
ter of norms and beliefs and sometimes even cosmopolitan conviction (Keck/Sikkink,
1998; Sikkink, 2011; Goodman/Jinks, 2013).
Now the crucial question is: Why do states go one step further and not only commit
to international law but allow authority to be delegated to international courts and
tribunals although this means a serious intrusion into their sovereignty? This puzzling
behavior can only be understood looking at the benefits for complying with the inter-
national law they committed to. In relation to compliance with international law we
can distinguish the incentives for complying with international law along the two mech-
anisms of self-enforcement and enforcement. Accordingly, there are several di erent
identified conditions and mechanisms in research literature under which states com-
ply with international law: Those include a broad range spanning from international
law being congruent with self-interests of geopolitics (Morgenthau, 1948) or security
(Waltz, 1979) up to and including the mechanisms of reciprocity (Keohane, 1984a),
domestic interests and preferences (Moravcsik, 1997; Milner, 1997), mobilization of
domestic groups (Helfer/Slaughter, 1997; Simmons, 2009), and mobilization of non-
governmental organizations (Finnemore/Sikkink, 1998; Keck/Sikkink, 1998; Sikkink,
2011).
While Henkin (1979) optimistically proclaims that “almost all nations observe al-
most all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost
all of the time”, up to now empirical studies show that states’ commitments to hu-
man rights are often only costless expressions (Hathaway, 2002) or empty promises
(Hafner-Burton/Tsutsui, 2005). There is only empirical evidence that demonstrates
that democracies are more likely to show commitments while still leaving open the
possibility of making reservations and interpretative declarations (Neumayer, 2007).
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Thus, international enforcement courts are created to fill in the vacuum of voluntary
self-commitment to international law and enforcement of international law (Shelton,
2009). Guzman (2008a) is of the view that there are 3 R’s of compliance – reputa-
tion, reciprocity and retaliation – that can lead to compliance with international law
without enforcement mechanisms.
“Reputation can be defined as judgments about an actor’s past behavior used to predict
future behavior (...). ’Reciprocity’ refers to actions, that, like reputation, will often
be taken without the intent to sanction a violator. In response to a violation, states
may withdraw their own compliance with an international agreement because once the
violation takes place the agreement ceases to serve their interests. (...) ’Retaliation’ in
contrast, describes actions that are costly to the retaliating state and intended to punish
the violating party.” (Guzman, 2008a, 33)
The mechanism of retaliation as the oldest among the three, since it is one legitimate
way in international law to react to violations of international law with diplomatic,
economic or military sanctions. In particular, the UNSC frequently makes use of it.
Though the UNSC has a broad authority using sanctions, there is an emerging debate
on the limits of sanctions through the rules of humanitarian law, human rights and the
law on unilateral sanctions and especially the principle of proportionality constrains
coercion and force (O’Connell, 2002).
According to Philippe (2008) in the area of humanitarian law itself, it is often very
hard to use sanctions because they are often ine ective due to overlapping compe-
tencies between national and international authorities that are also allowed to punish
violations of humanitarian law. The establishment of courts and tribunals supersedes
the usage of retaliation or sanctions in response to violations of humanitarian law
(Cassese, 1998).
The mechanism of reciprocity refers to the approaches of rational institutionalism
mentioned above. The institutional framework leads to a repetition of these situations
and the actors themselves are less likely to avoid overplaying their hands knowing that
the same negotiation or situation may repeat itself again when the shoe is on the other
foot (Axelrod, 1984; Keohane, 1984a). In international law there are several legal
regimes functioning consistent with the mechanism of reciprocity, such as the WTO
that regulates the reduction of tari s and non-tari  trade barriers or the Law of the
Sea that regulates the use of the oceans (Parisi/Ghei, 2003). Moreover, the law of war
can be considered as functioning through reciprocity, be it specific or di use, since it
is a fine line in the legitimate and illegitimate use of weapons when attacking military
objectives (Watts, 2009).
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Closely linked is the mechanism of reputation. It can be found in the literature of
rational institutionalism, liberalism and even social constructivism. Reputation can
make a state a trustworthy partner for cooperation in the future and thus again con-
tribute to solving cooperation problems (Axelrod, 1984; Keohane, 1984a). Moreover,
reputation can also be an important signal towards domestic and international actors
locking-in democracy (Simmons, 1998; Moravcsik, 2000). Not the least of which, rep-
utation is often the currency states receive by giving into pressure from transnational
advocacy networks promoting human rights (Keck/Sikkink, 1998; Finnemore/Sikkink,
1998). On the part of realists there are serious concerns about the mechanism of
reputation.Goldsmith/Posner (2006, 88 .) argue that if law itself must be the equi-
librium in a non-cooperative game, we could ask why we need the law anyway. States
only commit to or comply with international law if it meets their interests and pref-
erences. Reputation must be put into perspective since one cannot conclude that
non-compliance in certain areas of international law must lead to non-compliance in
every area. Moreover, non-compliance with international law can also lead to an en-
hanced reputation within their own political society or with certain political partners.
Non-compliance can demonstrate that a state can even protect against threats to na-
tional security or show solidarity with a certain political partner although this leads
to a violation of international law (Goldsmith/Posner, 2006).22
Bueno de Mesquita (2010, 359) is of the opinion that although compliance with in-
ternational law can be an option for establishing reputation one still has to take into
consideration that there are di erent kinds of reputation. States might have a high
reputation in general, but we can also expect them to want to enhance their repu-
tation in certain critical areas and outlive their respective term of o ce. As well,
Downs/Jones (2002) argue that through non-compliance the states’ reliability only
decreases relating to agreements with similar fluctuating reputation costs.
Locating the mechanisms of compliance within the IR theories, we will find ’retaliation’
in approaches of realism and neorealism, ’reciprocity’ in approaches of neoliberal insti-
22 They explain the di erence as follows: “To understand the di erence between the reputation
story and the retaliation story, consider the case of sovereign dept. Suppose state B borrows
money from state A and then defaults on the loan. The retaliation story implies that state B
will be punished, if at all, by state A. State A may retaliate by cutting of trade, or taking
military action, or simply refusing to lend to state B in the future, even though the loan in the
future might seen profitable. No other state will punish state B. The reputation story implies
that state A, and all other states, will update their belief about the likelihood that B would
repay any future loans, and in the future they will refuse to lend to B (or lend at a higher
interest rate) because B is now a higher risk. Lending is no longer attractive because it is too
risky and thus less profitable. Indeed, states might conclude that B is untrustworthy in a range
of possible cooperative relationships, including military alliances and trade.” (Goldsmith/Posner,
2006, 101f.)
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tutionalism and ’reputation’ in both neoliberal institutionalism and (neo-)liberalism.
Involving the arguments of social constructivism, we can add ’internalization” (Co-
hen, 2009) and ’persuasion’ as fourth and fifth mechanism of state compliance with
international law (see table 1)23
Why is it a vital point to understand why states delegate such authority to interna-
tional courts and tribunals? In sum, it can be argued that compliance with inter-
national law is at its worst when sanctions and self-enforcement mechanisms, such as
reciprocity or reputation, are not available (Scott, 2003). Compliance with humanitar-
ian law works reasonably well because of the mechanisms of retaliation and reciprocity
(Watts, 2009). Compliance with human rights law is less likely, as it is the area of
international law that is a ected most by a lack of self-enforcing or self-enforcement
mechanisms.
Human rights are fundamentally di erent than the usual forms of international coop-
eration or common norms of international law. For example, they are not designed
to regulate externalities in the issue area of trade or environment. They are designed
to hold states accountable for domestic activities (Moravcsik, 2000) and they do not
follow the logic of reciprocity as humanitarian law does, since they mainly a ect the
relationship between a state and its citizens. This means that other states often have
no incentives to intervene until a certain level of human rights violations has been
reached. As a result, the violating states have less reason to justify their behavior
than they would have in areas of international law that regulate interaction between
states. Accordingly, as shown in Figure 3, there is still a huge ’gap between com-
mitment and compliance’ (Simmons/Danner, 2010) and many commitments of human
rights agreements remain ’empty promises’ (Hafner-Burton/Tsutsui, 2005).
Both commitment to human rights law and compliance with them are harder to reach
than in other legal areas. Human rights su er from the gap between commitment
and compliance. This can be explained by strategic ratification. Autocracies try to
perform a form of social camouflage on the global public stage knowing full well there
are few possibilities of getting sanctioned for bad human rights practices (Simmons,
2009).
23 This overview of compliance mechanisms is neither complete nor exhaustive, but shall provide an
orientation in the lines of argumentation in IR-theory. For further explanations of IR-theory see
on arguments of neorealism (Steinberg, 2013); rational-choice (Guzman, 2008a); liberalism
(Slaughter, 1993) or social constructivism (Wendt, 2006; Cohen, 2009).
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Mechanism of Probability of IR-theory Explanatory Approaches (Selection)
Compliance Self-Enforcement
retaliation high, but conflictual realism, neorealism Waltz (1959); Mearsheimer (1995)
reciprocity high, but minilateral neoliberal institutionalism Axelrod (1984); Keohane (1984b)
reputation low for humanitarian law and human rights neoliberal institutionalism Downs/Jones (2002); Guzman (2008a)
reputation low for humanitarian law and human rights liberalism Moravcsik (2000); Slaughter (2000b); Simmons (2009)
reputation low for humanitarian law and human rights social constructivism Keck/Sikkink (1998); Finnemore/Sikkink (1998)
persuasion high, but limited on small group social constructivism Hawkins (2004); Deitelho  (2009)
internalization high, but limited on few social constructivism Koh (1997); Goodman/Jinks (2013)
Table 1: Probability of Self-Enforcement Due to Compliance Mechanisms
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Figure 3: Gap between Commitment and Compliance
The empirical studies on the gap of the states’ behavior on commitment and compli-
ance (Hathaway, 2002; Simmons, 2009) show that human rights su er enormously from
spoiling and non-compliance. A higher level of ratification of human rights treaties
without monitoring and enforcement mechanisms does not automatically lead to better
human rights practices, but rather paradoxically sometimes even leads to an aggra-
vation of human rights practices (Hafner-Burton/Tsutsui, 2005). Therefore, first and
foremost human rights needs enforcement mechanisms to fill in the gap between com-
mitment and compliance with humanitarian law and human rights. This is especially
important when addressing severe human rights violations in the form of crimes against
humanity (see Figure 4).
Guzman (2008a, 49 .) is of the opinion that even if there are international courts or
tribunals, they are not adequate to explain how international law shapes cooperation,
since international courts are missing the backing of a state as domestic courts have
it. Nevertheless, international courts and tribunals change the game and the three
R’s of compliance reputation, reciprocity and retaliation. Moreover, he mentions two
important aspects that can make courts e ective. Firstly, international courts can
assist the states to find common understandings relating to international law and thus
assist the states in legal dispute settlement. Secondly, international courts provide
information on which states or individuals have violated international law. Both can
help the states to find an appropriate response on norm violation.
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Figure 4: Establishing Courts Filling ’Partly’ the Gap of Commitment and Compliance
“A court is both an independent body that answers legal questions according to prin-
ciples and rules of law, and the physical place where judicial proceedings occur. The
common design of courtrooms and rituals associated with proceedings reflects the spe-
cific nature and importance of the administration of justice, with the normally high
ceilings and formal décor reflecting and reinforcing the idea of the majesty of the law.
Judges wearing robes sit above and apart from those participating in and observing the
proceedings, while the disputing parties are placed in a position of physical equality
before the panel. All rise when the judges enter and leave the courtroom.” (Shelton,
2009, 2)
According to Shelton (2009) the miscellaneous international courts and tribunals can
have di erent functions in international relations, such as dispute settlement, legal
advice, monitoring compliance or the enforcement of law. In a similar manner Alter
(2012c, 2014) distinguishes between the roles: enforcement, dispute settlement and
constitutional/administrative review. Thus, we can observe a proliferation of interna-
tional courts and tribunals (Romano, 1999; Kingsbury, 1999).
“When future international legal scholars look back at law and organizations at the
end of the twentieth century, they probably will refer to the enormous expansion and
transformation of the international judiciary as the single most important development
of the post-Cold War age.” (Romano, 1999, 709)
According to Romano (1999) an international judicial body is characterized as follows:
“an international judicial body (...) must meet five criteria: First, it must be permanent
(...). Second, it must have been established by an international legal instrument (...).
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Third, in deciding the cases submitted to them, they must resort to international law.
Fourth, they must decide those cases on the basis of rules and procedures, which preexist
the case and usually cannot be modified by the parties. Finally the outcome of the
process must be legally binding.” (Romano, 1999, 713f.)
In this regard there are numerous permanent international and regional courts and
furthermore several temporarily, international criminal tribunals (see in Table 2).24
On the international level, there are the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the International Criminal
Court (ICC). On the regional level there are several ’courts of justice’ monitoring the
common law of the regional organizations, such as EU, Common Market for East-
ern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), East African Community (EAC), Andean Community (AC), Caribbean
Community (CARICOM). Moreover, there are three regional courts monitoring hu-
man rights, the ECHR, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and
the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCtHPR).
Finally, several temporary criminal courts and tribunals dealing with a violent past of
armed conflicts or state repression investigating and prosecuting international crimes,
such as the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity. Those can be distinguished
between Ad-hoc tribunals, hybrid tribunals and the ICC (Ambos, 2011, 131 .). Ad-
hoc Tribunals are constructed as subsidiary body of the UN-Security Council: the
ICTY and ICTR. International tribunals based on a mixed hybrid statutory source
bring together national elements of a crime and those of International Law. These
include the Kosovo War Crimes Tribunal (KWCT) respectively the Kosovo Specialist
Chambers (KSC), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Special Panels for
serious Crimes in Timor-Leste (SPSC), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia (ECCC), the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the Iraqi High
Tribunal (IHT). Both the Ad-hoc Tribunals and the hybrid tribunals are established
for a limited time period.
24 For an overview of international courts and tribunals see e.g. the International Justice Resource
Center: http://www.ijrcenter.org/courts-monitoring-bodies/ (10-12-2018) or the Project on
International Courts and Tribunals: http://www.pict-pcti.org (10-12-2018). There are
moreover several dispute settlement mechanisms such as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of
the WTO. They di er from the international courts as the states themselves have the decision
making power as to whether to bring cases to the DSB or prematurely end the process and
switch to diplomatic actions. The criterion of Romano (1999) that states cannot modify cases is
not provided to dispute settlement bodies.
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Court/Tribunal Organization/States Time Frame
International Courts
International Court of Justice United Nations Organization permanent (1945)
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea stand-alone permanent (1982)
International Criminal Court stand-alone permanent (1998)
Regional Courts of Justice (Selection)
European Court of Justice European Union permanent (1952)
COMESA Court of Justice Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa permanent (1993)
ECOWAS Court of Justice Economic Community of West African States permanent (1993)
EAC Court of Justice East African Community permanent (1999)
AC Court of Justice Andean Community permanent (1979)
CARICOM Court of Justice Caribbean Community permanent (2001)
Regional Human Rights Courts
European Court of Human Rights Council of Europe permanent (1959)
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Organization of American States permanent (1979)
African Court of Human and People’s Rights African Union permanent (1998)
International Criminal Tribunals
International Military Tribunal Allies &Germany temporary (1945-1949)
International Military Tribunal for the Far East Allies & Tokyo temporary (1946-1948)
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia UN Ad-hoc tribunal temporary (1993-today)
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda UN Ad-hoc tribunal temporary (1994-today)
Kosovo War Crimes Tribunal hybrid tribunal UN & Kosovo/Serbia temporary (2000-today)
Special Court for Sierra Leone hybrid tribunal UN & Sierra Leone temporary (2002-today)
Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor hybrid tribunal UN & Timor-Leste temporary (2002-today)
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia hybrid tribunal UN & Cambodia temporary (2003-today)
Special Tribunal for Lebanon hybrid tribunal UN & Lebanon temporary (2009-today)
Table 2: International and Regional Courts and Tribunals
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The landscape of international courts and tribunals can be described as ’judicial glob-
alization’ (Slaughter, 2000a):
“Judicial globalization (...) describes a (...) diverse and messy process of judicial in-
teraction across, above and below boarders, exchanging ideas and cooperating in cases
involving national as much as international law.” (Slaughter, 2000a, 1104)
The judicial globalization is observable in the developing relations of national and
international courts and their judicial decisions in the emerging global community of
courts. Judges meet each other to exchange knowledge and experiences and give advice.
National and International courts often dialogue and cooperate, rather than standing
in a hierarchical relation. They cite the interpretations and rulings of one another
although they have no formal obligation to do so. In the case of the European Court
of Human Rights that is cited frequently by other judicial human rights institutions
like the UN Human Rights Committee or the Inter-American-Court of Human Rights
and a ’judicial comity’ has emerged. Foreign courts and their decision are respected
and not just adapted as an institution of a foreign government.25 Consequently, there
is an increasing cross-fertilization and cooperation between national and international
courts (Slaughter, 2000a).
If we talk about judicialization we not only refer to the expansion of international
courts and tribunals on the international level, but also to the increasing importance of
courts in domestic politics like the supremacy of constitutional courts (Vallinder, 1995;
Shapiro/Stone Sweet, 2002; Hirschl, 2008). Hirschl (2008, 121 .) observes three di er-
ent processes that are identified as judicialization: first, the spread of legal rhetoric into
the political sphere, secondly the expansion of courts determining political outcomes,
and thirdly, courts dealing with mega-politics.
“Over the last two decades, the judicialization of politics has extended well beyond the
now ’standard’ judicialization of policy-making, to encompass questions of pure politics
– electoral processes and outcomes, restorative justice, regime legitimacy, executives
prerogatives, collective identity, and nation-building.” (Hirschl, 2008, 138)
By creating and supporting international courts and tribunals, governments have to
give up authority and autonomy that they usually protect resolutely and instead dele-
gate power to third parties that get the final say about “issues that go to the heart of
international political debate” (Katzenstein, 2014, 151) such as war crimes or crimes
against humanity in the case of the ICC. One can consider it as a real conundrum that
25 A detailed analysis of the influence of the ECHR on the development of the international law one
can be found in Merrills (1993).
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states bind themselves to ICC given the fact that the court leads to a serious intru-
sion into state sovereignty by dispensing justice to states’ nationals (Simmons/Danner,
2010). As mentioned at the beginning, binding themselves to an international court,
especially to an international criminal court results in a serious intrusion into the
sovereignty of a state. The central question is: why do states delegate authority to
international courts and tribunals?
2.2.2 Theories on States’ Delegation to International Courts
To better understand why states commit to the Rome Statute we gather the most
enlightening answers in insight through the research on states motives for delegating
authority to international courts. This research is helpful in grasping the particularities
of becoming a state party to the ICC.
For a long time the central question of neoliberal institutionalism dealt with how and
why states cooperate in the absence of supranational government. The establishment
of international and regional organizations, and sometimes even the creation of courts
raises the question as to why states delegate authority to international courts although
they significantly limit the states’ sovereignty. The response we get is that international
courts and dispute settlement mechanism solve cooperation problems of international
relations.
The conventional assumption of cooperation theory is that a longer shadow of the
future makes cooperation more likely. Nevertheless, Fearon (1998) argues that the
long shadow of the future can lead to the fact that states bargain harder because
they are aware that this shadow may in the future apply to them as well, along with
its consequences. Every fundamental solution regarding cooperation problems begins
with resolving a practical one. This requires the states to bargain over the content
of treaties. That means that states must decide what the contents of agreements are
before they can decide on the monitoring or enforcing of international agreements.
A similar argument makes Koremenos (2007) when examining the question as to why
states create or delegate dispute resolution authority. She demonstrates that about
50% of all agreements in the issue areas of economics, environment, human rights and
security have dispute resolution mechanisms. She distinguishes ’cooperation problems’
between those of interests and those of constraints. Interests can be either enforcement
or distribution of preferences. Constraints are either uncertainty about preferences and
behavior of the others or uncertainty about the consequences of cooperation in the
general relation to the state of the world. She argues that states tend to decide for the
53
creation or delegation of dispute resolution authority if they want to address complex
cooperation problems, such as enforcement problems, uncertainty about the behavior
of the others, uncertainty about the state of the world or commitment problems.
Alter et al. (2012) are of the opinion that international courts can protect states
e.g. through the protection against private actors. However, on the other hand, they
also are of the opinion that international courts can also undermine the states’ ability
to interpret the requirements of an international court. This results in the latter be-
coming rival actors in international relations. As such the delegation of authority to
international courts depends on the states’ intention to delegate (Alter, 2004). In mak-
ing this argument she relies onMajone (2001) who introduced the argument relating to
the delegation of authority to international organizations in general. He argues that
the logic of delegation depends on its rationality and distinguishes between delegating
either “to reduce decision making costs (...) or to enhance the credibility of policy
commitments” (Majone, 2001, 103).
“[W]here the purpose of delegation is to reduce decision-making costs, the key problem
(...) is bureaucratic drift, that is the ability of the agent to enact outcomes di erent from
the policies preferred by those who originally delegated powers. (...) when credibility
is the main reason for delegating powers (...) the best strategy (...) is often to choose
a delegate whose policy preferences di er systematically from the preferences of the
delegating principal. (...) In the first type of delegation the preferences of the principal
and the agent should be aligned as much as possible, and the delegation structure so as
to minimize bureaucratic drift and slippage. (...) Hence the second type of delegation
implies that the delegate should be independent, although the level of independence
may vary with the seriousness of the credibility problem.” (Majone, 2001, 103f.)
Alter (2004) takes up this argument and transfers it to international courts. She
distinguishes states as principals on one side and courts as either agents or trustees on
the other side. She argues that in the case of delegation of authority to international
courts for the purpose of reduce transaction costs a principal takes a trustworthy ’agent’
with similar values and norms into consideration hoping that the agent’s interpretation
of its mandate is similar to that of the principal. To ensure this, the principal will
keep the agent under strict control. In the case of delegating authority in order to
enhance the credibility of the state a ’trustee’ is selected for his reputation with the
expectation that the trustee follows the professional norms for which this reputation
was earned. Under the above-mentioned circumstances, it becomes unnecessary to try
to control the trustee (Alter, 2004, 9 .).
She makes a similar argument later that there is a systematic di erence in delegation
as states make a ’self-binding’ or ’other-binding’ delegation to international courts
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dependent on their expected functions, such as judicial roles dispute adjudication,
enforcement (monitoring police and prosecutors), administrative review or constitu-
tional review. ’Self-binding’ creates high sovereignty costs because the defendants are
probably state actors. ’Other-binding’ creates lower sovereignty costs because the de-
fendants are mainly private actors. Thus, criminal enforcement, administrative review
and constitutional review only work when the court’s jurisdiction is compulsory (Al-
ter, 2008). She concludes that the principals’ control of courts are much weaker at the
international level than it is at the national level, where governments have more tools
limiting courts and judges (Alter, 2006).
“The promise of delegation to ICs [i.e. international courts], or perhaps the nightmare
of some, is that ICs will create a legal and political space where regular politics and the
power disparities in the world do not shape outcomes. If delegation (...) succeeds in
creating this space, (...) interpretations of international rules will be more authoritative
than states auto-interpreting the rules to suit their interests, bringing with it a loss in
state latitude and autonomy.” (Alter, 2006, 337f.)
Thereby, she attributes to international courts a high independence from power polit-
ical influences, since it is very hard for states as political actors to shape the outcomes
in the courts. There is a huge debate in the research literature of IR and IL that deals
with the question as to how independent international courts are and should be from
power political ambitions of states. Important scholars involved are Helfer/Slaughter
(1997, 2005) on one side and Posner/Yoo (2005a,b) on the other side. The debate
can be considered as vital for examining the determinants of states’ commitment to
international courts and tribunals, such as the ICC. It can be argued that states are
afraid of delegating authority to independent courts that are so independent that they
are out of their control. Conversely, they are afraid of delegating authority to interna-
tional courts that are not independent and thus under certain circumstances fall under
the control of opposing states.
Helfer/Slaughter (1997) developed a ’checklist’ for an e ective supranational adju-
dication that includes the following factors: a) factors within the control of states,
such as functional capacity or independent fact-finding procedures, b) factors within
the control of the courts, such as autonomy from political interests or judicial cross-
fertilization and c) factors beyond the control of states or judges, such as the nature
of norm violations or a certain cultural and political homogeneity of the states parties.
They argue that the success of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and ECHR is
due to these courts’ autonomy and independence from power political interests. The
checklist itself reflects these values.
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Posner/Yoo (2005a) are strongly opposed to this view. They argue that international
courts and tribunals are problem-solving devices that become ine ective if they ignore
the interests of the states parties.26
“[I]ndependent tribunals pose a danger to international cooperation because they can
render decisions that conflict with the interest of the state parties. Indeed, states will be
reluctant to use international tribunals unless they have control over the judges. On our
view, independence prevents international tribunals from being e ective.” (Posner/Yoo,
2005a, 7)
In response to this, Helfer/Slaughter (2005) developed the concept of ’constrained inde-
pendence’, arguing that states create independent international courts and tribunals,
but afterwards constrain the independence of the courts:
“[S]tates establish independent international tribunals to enhance the credibility of their
commitments in specific multilateral settings and then use more fine-grained structural,
political, and discursive mechanisms to limit the potential for judicial overreaching.”
(Helfer/Slaughter, 2005, 44)
They criticize Posner and Yoo creating a straw man, as it is the fundamental un-
derpinning of courts that they maintain their judicial independence. In reply to this
Posner/Yoo (2005b)warn of assuming international judges would be independent au-
tomatically. In their view, states are most likely to create international courts and
tribunals for agreements that require an extensive modification of the national law of
the states parties that deal with common problems and public goods or that create
benefits or rights for private actors (Helfer/Slaughter, 2005, 39f.).27
As Helfer/Slaughter (2005) pose the question as to whether international courts and
tribunals are dependent or independent; the courts and tribunals are in the center of
their analysis. Accordingly, they analyze di erent cooperation problems and their in-
fluences on the creation of the institutional design of an international court or tribunal.
In their view courts are constraint independent. They make no claims about variation
in states delegation behavior or their influences on the process of constraint. Neverthe-
less, they see a general motive for delegating authority or rather creating international
courts and tribunals in both the reduction of uncertainty about the behavior of the
other states and the enhancement of credibility of commitments, since international
26 They also express this view in a study of the ICJ arguing that the decisions of the court are
influenced by the power political interests of the sending states of the judges (Posner, 2004).
27 In the case of the ICC we could consider all three factors to have been fulfilled. States have to
implement norms on cooperation and complementarity. The violation of humanitarian law and
human rights is a widespread problem and the Rome Statute a ects individuals.
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courts reduce uncertainty through an empowered monitoring and by correctly label-
ing non-compliance. The costs of non-compliance, given this monitoring function, are
twofold: firstly, the probability of sanctions as a penalty for non-compliance increases,
not only through the work of the tribunal or court itself but also by a multilateral polit-
ical process or even unilateral politics. Secondly, because of the correct identification
of non-compliance, the probability of loss of reputation increases (Helfer/Slaughter,
2005, 35f.).
Furthermore, committing to international courts and tribunals enhances the credibility
of states. Here they take up the argument already discussed in the subsection of
motives for states committing to international law Commitment to International Law
(chapter 2.1). The basic idea of enhancing credibility is the same, but the argument
why it functions is even stronger. They refer to the argument Alter (2004) made saying
that an international court as independent institution acts rather as trustee than as
agent because it is oriented towards professional norms and it is hard to be controlled
by the states as principals (Alter, 2008, 38 .). Helfer/Slaughter (2005, 42 .) assume
that states will choose dependent dispute settlement mechanisms if the cooperation
problem that should be solved is bilateral. Delegation to an independent tribunal is
not necessary in those cases. Showing the will to solve the problem is already a credible
indication when the mode of bilateral solution is chosen. Dependent dispute settlement
can be more e ective when relying on diplomatic non-legal mechanisms. However, if
the cooperation problem to be solved is multilateral, states create independent courts
and tribunals because they act as trustees according to Alter (2004) and enhance the
credibility of states.
Delegating authority to an international court as Helfer/Slaughter (2005) examine it,
refers to the question of which kind of court they choose and is less targeted at the
question why a state as a single actor decides to delegate authority. On the contrary,
Posner/Yoo (2005a) argue that the motive for delegation is the appropriate solution for
certain problems and simultaneously states are able to maintain and maximize their
own interests. GGuzman (2008b, 208 .) is of the opinion that although independence
reduces compliance as the empirical reality show, this is not due to a higher e ective-
ness, but with changed incentive structures and lower costs for states to comply. If
the aim is making commitments to international law more credible then international
tribunals should be independent.
Moreover, there are several explanatory approaches making statements on the states’
delegation of authority to the ICC. Sikkink (2011, 119 .) considers the creation of
the ICC as pivotal example of the spread of human rights prosecutions as part of
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the ’justice cascade’ obtained through the engagement of a transnational network of
lawyers from Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Canada influenced by an epistemic
community of criminal law lawyers and several human rights NGOs. In the change
in the texts between 1994 and 1998 she sees the persuasive discursive power of the
like-minded states and NGOs.
With a similar argument Deitelho  (2009) explains the creation of the ICC and the
costly delegation of states’ authority with a normative shift in the states’ interests.
She is of the view that it is not possible to reduce law on cost-benefit calculations.
She describes institutional change in the view of social constructivism as a result of
persuasion and discourse within the negotiations of the Rome Statute. Those would
have reached two central turning points. One pivotal point would have been in 1996
as there was no longer any remaining objection to the creation of the ICC:
“ The first can be located in the move from the ad hoc committee in 1995 to the
PrepCom in 1996. In contrast to the ad-hoc committee, where especially major powers
argued against an ICC, no state publicly objected to the ICC as such in the PrepCom,
though the type of court envisaged maintained controversial, partly due to di ering
legal systems and cultural contexts. At its heart lay a conflict over the normative basis
of the court, that is, over a potential obligation to pursue international prosecution
including the question of how to instigate proceedings (trigger mechanisms), the role of
the Security Council, and the type of jurisdiction.” (Deitelho , 2009, 49)
The second shift she sees shortly before the Rome Conference:
“A second turning point lies between 1997 and 1998, after the PrepCom sessions and
before the Rome conference. During this period, positions changed dramatically until
the end of 1996, a majority of states pushed for a very conservative ICC model. Led
by the P5, this group called for a court under the control of the Security Council.
This meant that the council would have to approve each case upon investigation (veto
of P5). They also rejected the initial proposals for an ex-o cio prosecutor, and they
disliked automatic jurisdiction but favored several opt-in/opt-out mechanisms or a state
consent regime to establish the court’s jurisdiction. In essence, they wanted a kind of
permanent ad hoc tribunal. The P5 defended this conservative position by arguing that
their particular responsibility for peace and security should justify a special protection
from the ICC.” (Deitelho , 2009, 49f.)
According to Deitelho  (2009) those shifts of positions cannot be explained with ra-
tional arguments, since the material power structure remained the same while the
discourse and structure of the negotiations had changed. The Rome Statute is not a
reflection of rational consensus, but rather of designed compromises a ected by per-
suasion and discourse. International law ensures that the rational for decisions doesn’t
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have to be made over and over again, but there is a consistent logic of justifications
that arise from negotiated compromises.
International law “reflects a framework of legitimacy, defining the range and limits of
political debate, which is not easily circumvented. Law generates a particular form
of legitimacy that some attribute to the form characteristic of law, though the process
through which law is generated seems to be of particular importance. Lawmaking brings
into play the legal system as a whole with its greed-upon principles, and procedures of
due process. Its specific legal discourse devalues arguments based on power and interests
and requires normative justification, based on legal precedent and analogy.” (Deitelho ,
2002, 34f.)
Katzenstein (2014) likewise raises the question why states create an international crim-
inal court, such as the ICC, although they have to make a sacrifice of their sovereignty.
She argues in the tradition of historical analysis that likelihood of creating an interna-
tional criminal court depends on two factors. For one thing the international system
has to be shaken by crisis before states become willing to cooperate. For another thing
states are motivated by the crisis to turn to international legal networks searching for
solutions. In the case of the ICC, she shows that World War I and II and the en-
gagement of international lawyers had made decisive contributions to the creation of
the core crimes overseen by the court. Diametrically opposed, there is the theoretical
argument of Goldsmith (2003). He argues in a realistic manner that an e ective pun-
ishment of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity are unrealistic. One of the
most important reasons she sees is the reluctance of the USA to participate in its cur-
rent formulation. As the ICC depends on the USA’s economic, military and political
support their participation would be necessary. Moreover, the threat of jurisdictional
overlap would hinder the USA engagement in humanitarian intervention resulting in
the ICC being set up for failure from the outset.
“[C]ommitment to equal justice and the ‘rule of law‘ might have produced perverse ef-
fects in several ways. The ICC founders might have assumed that abstract normative
principles, once embodied in international law, will influence nations in favorable di-
rections independent of their power and economic political interests.”Goldsmith (2003,
99)
In his eyes moral commitments are di cult or even impossible to match with the po-
litical reality of international relations. One solution for the ICC would have been
trying human rights abusers in new democracies, while immunizing human rights en-
forcers, such as the USA. Although the positive and negative considerations repeat
many of the old debates of idealism versus realism, we can find some more di eren-
tiated approaches in the strand of liberal theory of international relations. Ginsburg
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(2009) developed the theoretical argument of a ’clash of commitment’ at the ICC, a
commitment to deter mass atrocities is contrary to a commitment not to prosecute
atrocities or to grant amnesty in the context of transitional justice. He emphasizes
that the ratification of the Rome Statute, while considered as a credible commitment
of tying the own hands, must be questioned since becoming a party state to the ICC
makes it more likely to prosecute rebels than to prosecute governments.
2.2.3 Empirical Studies on Delegation to International Courts
In case of the theoretical approaches on commitment to international law, there are
comparatively few empirical studies testing the arguments of states’ motivations on
delegating authority to international courts and tribunals. Those existing studies pay
attention either to the level of the courts themselves and the question why they were
established or to the level of states and the question why they delegate authority to
international courts and tribunals despite this meaning an intrusion into their state
sovereignty.
Koremenos (2007) for instance, who argues in the tradition of neoliberal institution-
alism, follows the theoretical approach on states establishing international dispute
settlement mechanisms dependent on the complexity of the cooperation problems that
ought to be solved. Testing her argument empirically she chooses a random sample of
international agreements in the issue area of security, human rights, environment and
economics and codes them with 375 questions relating to the cooperation problem to
be solved. She develops key dimensions to be able to measure variation in the form of
dispute resolution, such as mediation, arbitration or adjudication. Finally, she tests
di erent hypotheses on the influence of complexity of cooperation problem with the
help of cross-tabulations and probit regression analyses and comes to the result that
states use formal dispute resolutions often when the problem could be eased by such
provisions. In that respect the ICC as an international court was created in order to
that it must solve the complex cooperation problem enforcing international criminal
law.
Katzenstein (2014) gives empirical evidence to support her argument of historical in-
stitutionalism that international courts are created dependent on both the willingness
of cooperation of the states in times of crises and the activation of international legal
networks. She does this by making a historical analysis for the time frame of the
second Hague Conference in 1907 up to the establishment of the ICC with the Rome
Conference in 1998. For the di erent stages in the development of the ICC, she exam-
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ines her assumptions on the influence of states, especially hegemonic states, and the
engagement of international legal networks.
Deitelho  (2009) comes to her assumptions on the establishment of the ICC with the
help of a content analysis of all press releases and summary minutes of the negotiations
on the Rome Statute between 1994-1998. Moreover, she carried out several interviews.
Thus, she gives empirical evidence for her argument based on the assumptions of
social constructivism that the creation of the ICC cannot be explained through states’
interests, but through a change of positions according to a shift of discourse and
persuasion.
Some empirical studies on delegation authority to the ICC can be found mainly in
studies of neoliberal institutionalism. Simmons/Danner (2010) developed the theory
of ’credible commitments’ to the ICC. They argue that it is hard for states to convince
other states that they are going to behave in a certain way that raises high costs in
the short term, although it produces great benefits in the long term. The ICC is
one possible solution for the problem of lack of credibility, since it raises the costs of
reneging and increases both the international and domestic audiences’ attention and
thus makes the states’ commitments more credible.
“Joining the ICC is therefore a form of self-binding commitment, in which states attempt
to persuade other players – rebels, potentially supportive publics – that the government
has voluntarily abandoned the option of engaging in unlimited violence, thus creating
incentives for other actors to alter their behavior as well.” (Simmons/Danner, 2010, 234)
Central explanatory factors for commitment to the ICC are in their view: the state
being a democracy or a non-democracy, the rule of law of a state and the existence
of armed conflicts in recent years. Accordingly, they develop three hypotheses on the
likelihood of states’ ratifying the ICC. First, non-democracies with a low rule of law
and recent civil wars are likely to ratify the ICC. Second, democracies with a high
rule of law and recent civil wars are not likely to ratify the ICC. Third, democracies
with a high rule of law and no recent civil wars are not likely to ratify the ICC. In an
event history analysis for 1998-2007 they test their hypotheses examining time-varying
and constant factors. They come to the results that indeed non-democracies with
recent civil wars are much more likely than e.g. non-democracies without recent civil
wars. Moreover, they show that democracies without recent civil wars tend towards a
ratification of the Rome Statute because they want others to be held accountable for
committing atrocities.
Chapman/Chaudoin (2013) question the results of Simmons/Danner (2009) and crit-
icize the operationalization of the variables, the methodical approach and the robust-
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ness of results. Likewise, they focus on the recent history of the states and their legal
and political institutions. They show that the states that ratified the Rome Statute
di er considerably from those states that did not ratify by relating to their experience
in armed conflicts and the strength of domestic legal and political institutions. They
contradict Simmons/Danner (2009) and their thesis that non-democracies with recent
civil wars and a low rule of law would be more likely to ratify the Rome Statute.
Instead they hold the view that democracies without recent civil wars are most likely
to ratify the Rome Statute while non-democracies with a weak rule of law and recent
civil wars are least likely to ratify the Rome Statute. That they come to di erent
results then Simmons/Danner (2009) in their opinion is reasoned in a di erent oper-
ationalization of the key variables and the fact that it is very hard to interpret both
interactive e ects and hazard ratios.
Dutton (2011) developed a methodical approach examining the determinants of state
commitments to the ICC as well. She argues that states with good human rights
practices and strong domestic enforcement mechanisms are most likely to ratify the
Rome Statute, since the states are most concerned about high costs of non-compliance
and a possible loss of sovereignty. Thereby, she refers to Simmons/Danner (2009)
and argues that it is not convincing that non-democracies with a weak rule of law
are overwhelmingly willing to submit to the ICC. Referring to Hathaway (2002) she
argues that states calculate the costs of commitments to international treaties and
would be less likely to commit to an agreement if they anticipate that they will not
be able to comply. Accordingly, she develops the theoretical argument of ’credible
threats’ saying that state with better human rights practices and stronger domestic
enforcement mechanisms are more likely to ratify the Rome Statute. Using a history
event analysis (1998-2008) and proportional hazard regression she tests her theoretical
expectations and comes to the conclusion that particularly good human rights practices
are able to explain the likelihood of ratification of the Rome Statute.
An entirely di erent approach is taken by Goodli e et al. (2012). They ask why states
bind themselves to the ICC. They explain that the decision to ratify the Rome Statute
was based on interdependent networks with other states, such as security alliances,
trade relations or common memberships in an International Organization (IO). They
argue that the exchange partners of a state may be able to control certain goods
and therefore a state takes care for good relations to its partners. Therefore, they
develop the hypothesis that the higher the dependency the more likely the probability
of succeeding in ratifications or non-ratifications. Operationalizing their assumption,
they measure formal alliances, financial exchange and membership in multiple IOs.
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In an event history analysis for the time between 1998-2004, they test their argument
explaining levels of commitment measured by signature and ratification. They develop
an index of dependence and show that there is a relationship between their index
position and their level of commitment to the ICC. In their view, this shows a kind of
di usion of commitment to the ICC via the mechanism of coercion.
A further empirical study that deals with issues regarding commitment to the ICC
was delivered by Kelley (2007). She is not interested in the explanatory factors for
the ratification of the Rome Statute, but in the question as to why some states con-
cluded a Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA) with the USA. These agreements also
commonly referred to as Art. 98 Agreements shield citizens of the USA from surren-
der to the ICC.28 This places in question the states commitments to the ICC. She
argues that states refuse to sign a BIA if they believe in the ICC and want to support
it. Accordingly, she develops two hypotheses. According to the first hypothesis, like-
minded groups, states with good human rights practices, democracies and militarily
weak states are more likely to ratify the Rome Statute and to refuse signing a BIA.
According to the second hypothesis, states parties with a strong rule of law are less
likely to ratify a BIA than non-states with a strong rule of law. Using a logistic regres-
sion analysis, she showed that democracies, members of a like-minded group and states
with good human rights practices show a higher probability of ratification. Explaining
the signing of BIAs the results do not remain robust and it becomes apparent that
e.g. states with a low rule of law are more likely to sign an BIA if they are state party
to the ICC. In the same manner states with a high rule of law do not necessarily ratify
the Rome Statue. For Kelley (2007, 586) these results show that many states do not
take their commitments very seriously.
28 The negotiation of the non-surrender agreements under the Bush administration can be
considered as an expression of the US-American wish to hold ’human rights abusers’ accountable
while immunizing ’human rights enforcers’ as expressed by Goldsmith (2003).
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2.3 Research Gaps and Contributions to the Literature
2.3.1 Opening the Black Box of States Parties to the ICC
When looking at the conceptualization of commitment to international law or inter-
national court it becomes visible that commitment is mainly understood as the mere
act of ratification – or comparable alternative acts – becoming a state party to the
respective law or courts. Looking at the determinants of such a commitment conceptu-
alized as ratification we find empirical evidence for the fact that especially democracies
tend to ratify human rights treaties (Simmons, 2009; Hathaway, 2002). There are rea-
sonable grounds to question this narrow conception of commitment. For one thing,
particularly in the legal area of human rights there is a common wisdom in literature
of IR an IL that the ratification of human rights treaties does not inevitably lead to
better human rights practices.
Even in autocracies there is often a worsening of human rights performance, since the
pressure of transnational civil-society actors leads to a short-term rise of human rights
violations (Hathaway, 2002; Hafner-Burton/Tsutsui, 2005). Positive e ects of ratifica-
tion levels on human rights performance can only be observed in democracies (Buneo
De Mesquita et al., 2005). Thus, there is a huge gap between commitment to human
rights and compliance with the respective norms. The gap is described as a form
of ’costless expressions’ (Hathaway, 2002), ’empty promises’ (Hafner-Burton/Tsutsui,
2005) or ’window dressing’ (Simmons, 2009). Additionally, and perhaps more decisive,
those studies that conceptualized commitment further reaching than mere ratification
came to the result that democracies in particular tend to make reservations and inter-
pretative declarations (Neumayer, 2007) or show other qualitative di erences in their
commitment behavior (Simmons/Danner, 2009).
It should be put into perspective if it makes sense to measure commitment only in light
of ratification of the founding treaties. In this manner we see only two homogeneous
groups of states; those that have ratified and those that have not. In the case of
international courts and tribunals ratification of the founding treaty can be considered
even less a su cient indicator for comprehensive commitment, since the self-binding
to a court requires even more support of the states parties than just recognizing a
single agreement. Of course, ratifying the founding treaty of an international court to
become a state party is the most pivotal step. In most of the cases there is no regional
or even international government. It is the states themselves that oversee the running
the of court, be it with financial material or human resources.
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Being merely a state party does not demonstrate enough commitment. Empirical
reality shows that there are many cases of non-compliance both with the core norms
and with the procedural norms. The frequent problems of non- cooperation with the
ICC mentioned in the introduction has shown this. The conception of commitment as
mere ratification contributes to a worsening of human rights performance. The states
are considered as ’committed’ as soon as they have ratified the respective agreements,
but do not have to show further indications of commitment. For scientific and political
reasons there is a need to conceptualize commitments more comprehensively in order
to open the black box of states parties to the ICC. Accordingly, the first research
question is:
Research Question 1 – How strong is the commitment of states to the ICC
beyond the ratification of the Rome Statute?
As a result of conceptualizing comprehensive commitments to the ICC variation is
created within the group of states parties. This variation shows that there is a huge
di erence in the extent of commitment, ranging from a very high level over strongly
constrained and customized commitments up to hardly or non-commitment. This
empirical variation not only gives a valuable evaluation of states behavior to the ICC,
but also makes visible the di erent kind of states parties to the ICC. This allows for
the examination of the determinants for the extent of commitment beyond the mere
ratification of the Rome Statute.
2.3.2 Di erent Incentives in Delegating Authority to the ICC
There are several approaches in the literature explaining states’ delegating authority
to international courts and tribunals. They, however, are fairly close to the narratives
of the debates on explaining states’ cooperating in international politics or states’
decision to commit to international law. Interestingly, there is hardly any distinction
in research explaining states’ those states commitment to agreements where oversight
of the courts is provided for and states’ commitment to agreements in which there is
no oversight of a court.
Moreover, there are only very few empirical studies testing explanatory factors for
states’ delegating authority to international courts and tribunals in general and the
ICC in particular (Katzenstein, 2014; Deitelho , 2009; Koremenos, 2007) that has the
consideration inherent that delegation to international institutions is a possibility of
achieving interests at the level of international relations.
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In summary, it is remarkable that most of the theoretical arguments focus on which
kind of dispute settlement mechanism should be or were created for which kind of
cooperation problem. Alter (2004, 9 .) argues that the extent of delegation depends on
the cooperation problem solved. If states want to reduce transaction costs, they choose
’agents’ with similar norms and values. If they want to make their commitment more
credible then they choose ’trustees’ with di erent norms and values. Helfer/Slaughter
(2005, 39f.)are of the opinion that states create courts and tribunals for agreements
that deal with common problems and public goods. Those create benefits or rights
for private actors or require an extensive modification of the national law of the states
parties. Similarly, Koremenos (2007) argues that states choose adjudication if the
cooperation problem is particularly complex.
Although their theoretical approaches di er to some extent, they all ascribe the states
having the same interests and preferences towards a certain international court or
tribunals. It assumes that all states have the need to reduce transaction costs or
enhance their credibility. This is very puzzling since the core issue of every court is to
settle disputes on a legal basis. This results in the almost paradoxical state that those
who must delegate authority – the states themselves – remain static in their incentives.
There are no theoretical assumptions on variation in their interests and preferences.
However, we can expect the solution of cooperation problems does not lead inevitably
to benefits for all states. It might be due to the fact that increasing proliferation of
international courts and tribunals is a phenomenon of the 21th century. For both
legal and political scholars the search for an institutional design that encompasses an
e ective court able that is able to settle disputes is always present.
Arguments regarding the delegation to political institutions, such as those of Fearon
(1997) or Majone (2001), are often transferred in order to explain delegation to courts.
They do not mention di erences in delegation to regimes with and without courts.
We can expect di erences in states commitment to agreements where oversight of the
courts is provided for and states’ commitment to agreements in which there is no
oversight of a court.
Another research gap exists where the issue area of international law is ignored. Schol-
ars of IL or ICL deal with the relationship of the norms on international law that shall
receive criminal responsibility through the establishment of an international criminal
court (Kreß, 2010; Paulus, 2010; Ambos, 2011). Scholars of IR often mention only
aspects of human rights in relation to the ICC while aspects of humanitarian law are
often left open. Astonishingly, there are a plethora of theoretical considerations on the
proliferation of human rights and the respective states’ commitment and compliance
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behavior. There are only a few considerations of states’ behavior to humanitarian law
in the view of IR. This might be explained by the fact that the area of human rights
research emerged in the course of the political promotion of human rights and many
studies make the normative claim supporting global proliferation and monitoring of
human rights. There are hardly any studies in IR that associate the core crimes of
the Rome Statute and the commitment to the ICC with the commitment to human
rights law and humanitarian law. However, there are considerable di erences in the
possibilities of solving cooperation problems.
“From the political science side, if law – whether international, transnational or purely
domestic – does push the behavior of states toward outcome other than those predicted
by power and the pursuit of national interest, then political scientists must revise their
models to take account of legal variables.” (Slaughter, 1993, 206)
According to the assumption that states do have di erent incentives to behave in a
certain manner towards international courts the second research question is:
Research Question 2 – What explains the extent of comprehensive commitment
to the ICC?
In order to find explanatory factors for the variation of states’ commitment to the ICC,
it is important to take the individual levels of commitment into regard. This shows
that a comprehensive commitment depends on states’ individual costs and benefits
due to international norms that are to be enforced by the court. Those are dependent
on the commitments to humanitarian law and human rights law that the states have
already made. Thus, it is not only pivotal how democratic a state is, but the com-
prehensive commitment to the court depends on its possibilities to solve cooperation
problems of international law. In particular democracies constrain and customize their
commitment if they are unable to gain enough benefit from becoming a state party to
the ICC.
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3 Theory of States’ Constraining and Customizing
Commitments to the ICC
In the following chapter it will be argued that states constrain and customize their
commitments to the ICC due to their possibilities solving cooperation problems of
international law. Despite strong incentives to become a state party to the ICC, there
are also strong reasons to be cautious because the states’ fear the ICC could be too weak
and become politicized or even become too strong and thus, overreach its mandate.
The states are caught in a delegation dilemma towards the ICC. No ratification would
mean to waive support in improving freedom and security. However, ratification poses
a high risk of experiencing comparative disadvantages when protecting freedom and
security. Constraining and customizing the commitments to the ICC poses a way out
of the dilemma.
According to the ’justice cascade’ of Sikkink (2011) the universal norm of criminal
accountability spread around the globe promoted through some of the core treaties of
humanitarian law and human rights, such as Genocide Convention of 1948, Geneva
Conventions of 1949 or Convention against Torture of 1987. This reached its peak with
the establishment of the ICC. It will be argued, that although monitoring or even the
enforcement of human rights is not the explicit task of the ICC, states behavior towards
the court is connected with their actual extend of commitment to humanitarian law
and human rights law since the core crimes in the Rome Statute are based on those of
human rights law and humanitarian law. Becoming a state party to the ICC is thus
a possibility of solving cooperation problems of international law such as reducing
cost of monitoring and increasing credibility of commitments to human rights law and
humanitarian law. Constraining and customizing commitments present the possibility
to mitigate the potential risks and to maximize the benefits of becoming a state party
to the Rome Statute.
In pursuit of these arguments, it will be illustrated the extent of which the core crimes
of the ICC are based on the norms of humanitarian law and human rights law and
why the ICC can be considered as their indirect guardian (3.1). Subsequently, the
incentives for states of ratifying the Rome Statute and becoming a party to the ICC
will be described (3.2), such as privileges of being a state party, receiving support
from the ICC and the international community in dealing with a violent past and first
and foremost, the possibility of solving cooperation problems of international relations.
Afterwards, it will be pointed out how self-binding to the ICC can potentially lead to a
certain reduction of room for political maneuver, which could mean a high risk for the
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states (3.3). Since the ICC is a court of complementarity, it misses clear institutional
counterparts at the level of international institutions and is not able to protect the
states. Thus, they have to retain a certain room for political maneuver, particularly,
as the consequences for states of becoming a state party to the ICC are not well
foreseeable: What if the ICC turns out to be too weak in confronting the power of the
states, thereby becoming a gateway for politicization. Sometimes this situation might
even be instrumentalized by those political opponents with whom peace was sought?
What if the ICC turns out to be too strong, so that the principle of complementarity
is eroded. This could result in the states being in danger of losing more autonomy and
self-determination than expected?
Figure 5: States Constraining and Customizing their Commitments to the ICC
It will be shown that states get caught in a delegation dilemma towards the ICC:
ratifying the Rome Statute and becoming a state party to the ICC would mean both
a serious intrusion into their sovereignty and a high risk towards experiencing com-
parative disadvantages towards spoiling states. However, not to ratify would mean
to waive the benefits of the ICC the states unequivocally need. In order to solve the
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delegation dilemma towards the ICC, states constrain and customize their formal
commitments to the ICC (3.4). Thereby, the extent depends on their interest in re-
ducing costs of monitoring humanitarian law and human rights through establishing
the ICC as well as the commitment to treaties of humanitarian law and human rights
law the states have made previously (3.5).
3.1 Guardian of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law
To understand the behavior of the states and the reasons why they benefit from becom-
ing a state party to the ICC, it is worthwhile to look at the norms that will be enforced
and the reasons why the court was established. The ICC has several particular fea-
tures. However, the arguably most important among them is that the ICC is the first
permanent international court in charge of investigating and prosecuting humanitarian
law and the most severe violations of human rights and therefore holding individuals
accountable at the level of international criminal law. Since the ancient Greeks, war
criminals were prosecuted to deal with the worst atrocities of armed conflict. The idea
was recognized that even under circumstances of war, there are fundamental values
and morals that must be respected. Those war tribunals were mainly national or lo-
cal and were often ine ective, even if those that were responsible for the war crimes
remained in power and prosecuted the political opponent (Schabas, 2011, 1f).
With the Hague Conventions (HC) of 1899 and 1907, including their annex “Reg-
ulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land”, the first substantial
codifications of law of war on the international level were established. These defined
the term of combatants, determined permissible means and methods of war and pre-
scribed the behavior towards e.g. ceasefire and prisoners of war. After World War II,
the humanitarian law received its core with the Geneva Conventions (GC) 1949, pro-
tecting the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field (GC I), the wounded, sick
and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea (GC II), the treatment of prisoners
of war (GC III) and the protection of civilian persons in times of war (GC IV).
The codification of the humanitarian law in the shape of the Hague and Geneva Con-
ventions was based on the consideration that in times of armed conflict the possibility
of alleviating the su ering of the civilians and prisoners depends on the behavior of the
combatants treating them in a humanitarian way (Sandoz, 2001, 110). Meanwhile, at
least 25 treaties on the regulation of international and non-international armed con-
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flicts have emerged, including the treaties on the ban of certain types of weapons.29
However, the most path-breaking step towards international criminal law was the cre-
ation of the IMT in 1945 and the IMTFE in 1949 dealing with the atrocities of World
War II. This was not only the birth of the modern international criminal courts, but
they also established the crime against humanity and the groundwork for the crime
against aggression.
Based on the ideas of Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish legal scholar, in 1946 the
United Nations General Assembly (UN-GA) passed Resolution 96, declaring genocide
an international crime, which is incommensurable with the aims and goals of the United
Nations. In 1948, the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide” was adopted.
In the same year, the UDHR was adopted and the concept of human rights was brought
to an international public. Although there is no clear hallmark for a right being
called a ’human right’, there is a widespread consent that human rights shall prevent
individuals against arbitrary behavior of states to their civilians. They also require
the assistance of governments to protect dignity and freedom against the attack of
third parties under the rule of law and the states’ authority. Thus, human rights
can be considered as a “complex set of norms calling not only for remedies against
state interference, but also for proactive state action in favour of indigent members of
society” (Tomuschat, 2014, 5).
In the following years, several international human rights agreements were adopted,
such as the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or the
International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), but
also several conventions on certain human rights such as the CAT of 1984 or the CRC
of 1989. Up to now there are at least 18 human rights treaties30 on the international
level and numerous human rights treaties31 on the regional level, e.g. the “European
Convention on Human Rights” (1950) or the “African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights” (1981). Therefore, we can distinguish between ’human rights’ and ’human
rights law’, whereby the latter refers to legally binding treaties with the aim to promote
the idea of human rights.
29 For an overview of the treaties on humanitarian law and their ratification status, see
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl (15-03-17).
30 For an overview of the international human rights treaties and their ratification status, see
http://indicators.ohchr.org (15-03-17).
31 For an overview of the regional human rights treaties and bodies, see
http://www.ijrcenter.org/regional/ (15-03-17).
71
The rapid di usion of human rights is most of all due to the growing activism of
“Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN)”32 in the 1970s and 1980s. This includes
non-governmental organizations Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)s like Amnesty
International (AI), social movements or research networks (Keck/Sikkink, 1998, 9).
With regard to the rise of international human rights prosecutions, Sikkink (2011, 5)
speaks of a “justice cascade” meaning “that there has been a shift in the legitimacy
of the norm of individual criminal accountability for human rights violations and an
increase in criminal prosecutions on behalf of that norm”.
Important steps thereby were both the promotion of core treaties of humanitarian
law and human rights – such as the Genocide Conventions, the Geneva Conventions
or the Convention against Torture – and the establishment of international, domestic
and foreign criminal tribunals. Looking at the ratification status of human rights
agreements around the globe we can see that some of them have imposing rates of
ratification, such as the CRC of 1989 ratified by 196 states or the CEDAW of 1979
ratified by 189 states.33 Especially the additional protocols have rather bad rates of
ratification. The rates of compliance are bad too notwithstanding this good rate of
ratification (Hathaway, 2002; Hafner-Burton/Tsutsui, 2005). This is in large part due
to weak monitoring and a lack of enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with
international law.
Since the end of Cold War, there have been growing numbers of civil wars and wars
of independence in connection with the ’third wave’ of democratization (Huntington,
1991). This began in Western Europe with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal
1974, continuing in South America and South East Asia and peaked with the collapse of
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The establishment of several states and the transition
from authoritarian military dictatorships to marked-based democracies created the
need for a conscious repossessing of the past to promote peace and reconciliation and,
ultimately, democracy (Merkel, 2004). In this political climate, the phenomenon of
TJ emerged, based upon the assumption that the transition from conflict to peace
and thereby from the perception of threat to the perception of security needs the
reappraisal of past atrocities.
The instruments of TJ can adhere to either an o ender orientated retribution or vic-
tim orientated restoration rationale. There are several domestic and bilateral political
instruments, such as places of remembering, apologies, reparations, lustrations or in-
32 Keck/Sikkink (1998, 2) define “transnational advocacy networks” as “relevant actors working
internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and
dense exchanges of information and services”.
33 State as of 20-02-2017, see http://indicators.ohchr.org (13-03-2017).
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stitutional reforms.34 Moreover, there are instruments that use legal tools to cope
with the past on the domestic or international level, such as amnesty as an conscious
act of collective oblivion (Cobban, 2007; Vinjamuri/Boesenecker, 2007), establishing a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (Rowen, 2017; Hayner, 2010) and, first
and foremost, the temporary creating of an International Criminal Tribunal (ICT)
(Findlay/Henham, 2005; Geiß/Bulinckx, 2006; Cronin-Furman, 2013).
The ICTs can be distinguished according to their legal basis into Ad-hoc and hybrid
criminal tribunals35. The Ad-hoc tribunals ICTY and ICTR were established 1993
respective 1994 as subsidiary bodies of the UNO; whereas hybrid tribunals, such as
the SCSL, the ECCC or the KSC have a mixed national-international legal base and
have both national and international prosecutors and judges at their disposal (Ambos,
2011).
Although all the international criminal courts and tribunals strengthen the awareness
and importance of international criminal law and concurrently humanitarian law and
human rights, they struggle with numerous di culties. Those are e.g. the ambiguous
application of law; lack of democratic legitimization; limited financial, personal and
material resources; lack of witness protection programs and political forces trying to
misuse the courts and tribunals for their own benefit. The ICC as treaty-based per-
manent international court, with its sophisticated institutional design, working com-
plementary to and in cooperation with its states parties, applies the prior experiences
and mistakes of the Ad-hoc and hybrid tribunals and has taken international criminal
law to the next level.36
The court speaks to an international audience and raises awareness for the norms of
international criminal law and can be used by all states worldwide to cope with past
atrocities. The ICC guards well-established, but up to then, toothless norms. In the
34 Literature on the domestic and foreign political TJ-instruments: Places of remembering,
e.g.memorials or museums (Booth, 2001; Barsalou/Baxter, 2007); apologies by the o enders
(Barkan/Karn, 2006; Swart, 2008); reparations in terms of financial or symbolic compensation
(DeGrei , 2006; Lipscomp, 2010); institutional reforms e.g. in internal security or military and
lustration politics like vetting or disarmament (Boed, 1998; David, 2003; Horne, 2012).
35 A further possibility of a non-permanent criminal prosecution is the establishment of a
non-permanent national war crimes tribunal, such as the “Bangladesh International Crimes
Tribunal”.
36 In addition to the ICC, there are both domestic and foreign criminal trials that exist as
permanent possibilities in an evolving three-level-system of international criminal justice
(Ambos, 2011, 93): Domestic criminal trials are based on the prime responsibility of the states
due to the principles of territory and personality, whereas foreign criminal trial are based on the
principal of universal jurisdiction. Examples for this are e.g. the sentence of Rwandan citizen
Onesphore Rwabukombe at the higher regional court in Frankfurt in 2014 because of aiding and
abetting the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 or the indictments against so called
’foreign fighters’.
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view of Teitel (2003) this somehow leads to a normalization of transitional justice and
the ICC became the symbol of this normalization; investigating and prosecuting war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide as a routine matter in international
relations.
“What was historically viewed as a legal phenomenon associated with extraordinary
post-conflict conditions now increasingly appears to be a reflection of ordinary times.
War in a time of peace, political fragmentation, weak states, small wars, and steady
conflict all characterize contemporary political conditions. These contemporary devel-
opments have spurred the attempted normalization of transitional justice, leading ulti-
mately to ambivalent consequences. As a jurisprudence associated with political flux,
transitional justice is related to a higher politicization of the law and to some degree of
compromise in rule-of-law standards.” (Teitel, 2003, 89f.)
This explains why the ICC is accompanied by hopes and expectations and why Kofi
Annan speaks of “a gift of hope to future generations, and a giant step forward in the
march towards universal human rights and the rule of law”37.
Since the ICC is able to investigate and prosecute individuals even in states that are
not party to the ICC, it can be considered as the most powerful one among TJ in-
struments, and perhaps even the most powerful among international courts in general.
For those states that have already committed to humanitarian law and human rights,
it is especially worthwhile to commit to the ICC.
Figure 6: Relationship of First and Secondary Level of International Law
37 UN Press Release L/2890: http://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980720.l2890.html (08-08-17).
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Although the ICC is not created to improve the enforcement of humanitarian law and
human rights (on the primary level of international law) it can have this indirect ef-
fect through creating criminal responsibility for the four core crimes genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression (on the secondary level of
international law). Thus, there is strong reason to believe that the ICC makes a di er-
ence in international relations, increasing compliance and enhancing the credibility of
commitments made to the norms of humanitarian law and human rights. Particularly
for states that are not willing to improve their human rights practices, the ICC can
present a serious opportunity to bring justice and to end impunity of atrocities.
When we analyze the incentives for individual states to behave in a certain way towards
the ICC, we have to ask: Qui bono? What are the possible benefits of supporting the
ICC? What are the possible costs and risks? Which states would benefit of committing
to the ICC and which would have a disadvantage in doing so? In order to answers
these questions, in the following subsection, the existing privileges of states being a
state party according to the institutional design of the Rome Statute, will be presented.
Moreover, the role of international criminal courts in dealing with past atrocities in the
context of transitional justice will be explained. Finally, the subsection will drill down
on the answers of how the ICC can solve existing cooperation problems in international
relations and, as a consequence, why states want to become a state party.
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3.2 Why States Want the ICC – Incentives to Ratify the Rome
Statute
3.2.1 Privileges of Being a State Party to the ICC
Looking at the preamble of the Rome Statute, it is apparent that the ICC is accompa-
nied by the inherent hope of ending global impunity and of strengthening international
peace and security. States parties agree that they are:
“[c]onscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together
in a shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any
time, [m]indful that during this century millions of children, women and men have
been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity,
[r]ecognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the
world, (...) [d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes
and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes”.
The downside of this agreement is that there are certain costs of sovereignty that the
states have to pay when becoming a party to the ICC. We can consider sovereignty costs
as rather low when states make commitments that constrain their behavior. States
tend to accept those commitment, if they expect to get better collective outcomes.
On the contrary, sovereignty costs are rather high when the agreements a ect the
relationship between states and their territories or states and their citizens, as the
hallmarks of Westphalian sovereignty (Abbott/Snidal, 2000, 437).
“Of course, ordinary restrictions on domestic policies can have such e ects in contem-
porary welfare states, but these are heightened and generalized when, for example, an
international human rights regime circumscribe a state’s ability to regulate its citizens.
Similarly, the United States has correctly been concerned that an International Criminal
Court might claim jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers participating in international peace-
keeping activities or other foreign endeavors.” (Abbott/Snidal, 2000, 437)
Seen in this way, we can consider the sovereignty costs towards the ICC as very high
for at least three main reasons. Firstly, the ICC is able to investigate and prosecute
individual persons. One of many explanations why the USA declines to become a state
party to the ICC is because the court would have jurisdiction over soldiers active in for-
eign assignments. Secondly, the ICC is able to trigger investigations without referral of
states, either if the Prosecutor initiates investigations proprio motu, after preliminary
examination has been conducted based on information received from states, NGOs or
UN organs and has decided that there is a reasonable basis for investigations (art. 15),
or if there is a referral of a situation by the UN-Security Council (art. 13(b)) according
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to chapter VII of the UN-Charter. Thirdly, the ICC is able to investigate and prosecute
individuals of states that are not party to the Rome Statute, if the crimes committed
occurred in the territory (i.e. land, vessel or aircraft) of a state party (art. 12, para. 2
(a)), in a state that has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court (art. 12, para. 3) or
if the crime is referred to the ICC by the UNSC to the ICC Prosecutor pursuant to
chapter VII of the UN charter (art. 13(b)). This is one possible explanation why the
USA discourages other states from becoming a party to the ICC.
We can regard the costs of sovereignty as rather low if we take into account that
the consequences of investigation and prosecution foreseeable because the jurisdiction
of the ICC has a restricted mandate. Firstly, the ICC only has jurisdiction over
crimes that have been committed by natural persons (jurisdiction ratione personae,
art. 25) implying that the ICC is not able to make judgments, which a ect a state or a
government, as is the case at the International Court of Justice or the European Court
of Justice. At this point in time, the Democratic Republic of Congo (ICC-01/04) has
the highest number of arrest warrants. There are currently seven warrants of arrest.38
During the work of ICTY and ICTR a trend evolved in which only civilian and military
leaders as the ’big fishes’ were investigated and prosecuted, while the investigations
of lower-ranking perpetrators as ’small fries’ remained under the national jurisdiction
(O’Brien, 2012). The president of the UN Security Council of 23 July 200239 announced
that the ICTY should concentrate on the prosecution of the leaders:
“The Council recognizes (...) that the ICTY should concentrate its work on the pros-
ecution and trial of the civilian, military and paramilitary leaders suspected of being
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, rather than on minor actors.”
In Sierra Leone for example, it was laid out in art. 1 of the Statute of the SCSL, that:
“The Special Court shall (...) have the power to prosecute persons who bear the great-
est responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra
Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, includ-
ing those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of
and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”
In the Rome Statute it is laid out in art. 1: “The jurisdiction of the Court shall be
limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole.”
38 See ICC: https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc (08-08-17).
39 See “Statements made by the President of the Security Council in 2002”, S/PRST/2002/21,
para. 3, UN: https://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/statements/2002.shtml (08-08-17).
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Whereas there is no clear limitation on those with the greatest responsibility relating to
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide (O’Brien, 2012, 528), there is a clear
leadership clause for the crime of aggression (Ambos, 2010, 658), that is considered in
art. 8bis(1) as crime “by a person in a position e ectively to exercise control over or
to direct the political or military action of a state, of an act of aggression”.
Especially in case of the ICC, there are only investigations and prosecutions against
the main responsible persons. Furthermore, the ICC can proceed against both states
actors and rebel groups. Empirical data shows that almost half of the indicted persons
are rebel leaders. One can argue that its always harder to prosecute rebels since they
have no access to information as states o cials would have in the cases of being
indicted (Simmons/Jo, 2016, 454). This means that being state party to the ICC
provides access to information, even if, or especially when, there are investigations
and prosecutions against members of the own political group.
Secondly, the ICC is able to investigate states that are not a party to the ICC. This
might be considered a serious intrusion into the sovereignty and self determination of
the states. It means that the costs of sovereignty in becoming a state party are not
much higher than in not becoming a state party, at least when seen in respect to the
possibility of becoming a subject of investigation and prosecution. It could be argued
that this raises an incentive for states to become a party in order to assert influence
of the shape of the rules and procedures of the ICC because, in fact, they anticipate
the possibility of coming under scrutiny themselves.
A third incentive in this regard is that the states parties can influence the time frame
of jurisdiction. The period of time for which the ICC can investigate and prosecute
crimes committed is well-defined and therefore the states whose crimes come under
the jurisdiction of the ICC are able to anticipate if and when the investigation and
prosecution takes place. The ICC is able to become active only in a situation after
the entry into force of the Rome Statute for the respective state party (jurisdiction
ratione temporis, art. 11, para. 1), unless there is already a jurisdiction that a state
has accepted by means of a declaration under art. 12(3) beforehand.40
An example of this is the ratification the Rome Statute be State of Palestine on 2
January 2015. The Statute entered into force for it on 1 April 2015. Previously, it had
40 A second option to change the time period of jurisdiction is to use the transitional provision of
art. 124 as opt-out, meaning that the state does not accept the jurisdiction for a time period of
seven years. Up to now, this opportunity was taken up only by France and Colombia. France
withdrew in 2008 and Colombia’s time period of seven years ended in 2009, see Tabak (2009). At
the review conference in Kampala, one issue discussed was the deletion of art. 124, However, the
Conference decided to retain the article, see Clark (2010).
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accepted the Statute under 12(3) since June 2014.41 So it would have been possible
to perform preliminary examinations without the state having previously ratified the
Rome Statute.
Fourthly, notwithstanding whether a state is party to the ICC or not, the ICC is a
court of last resort. The preamble stipulates that:
“[A]ll States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations, [e]mphasizing in this connection that nothing in this
Statute shall be taken as authorizing any State Party to intervene in an armed conflict
or in the internal a airs of any State, (...) [e]mphasizing that the International Criminal
Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal juris-
dictions, [r]esolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international
justice”.
The ICC is complementary to the national jurisdiction of the states, it has to respect
the sovereignty and autonomy of states and is only able to become active if a state is
“unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution” (art. 17,
para. 1a).
Fifthly, the ICC has jurisdiction only over the most fatal crimes that can occur in inter-
national politics: crime of genocide (art. 5, para. 1a), crimes against humanity (art. 5,
para. 1b), war crimes (art. 5, para. 1c) and the crime of aggression (art. 5, para. 1d).
As mentioned above the norms behind the core crimes, such as human rights or hu-
manitarian law are much older than the ICC and are banned already at the primary
level of international law. The Rome Statute brings di erent primary rules of conduct
together and defines individual criminal responsibility. This makes it possible to en-
force rules that have long standing in international law. The four core crimes integrate
several legal regimes and historical experiences. The oldest among them are the war
crimes. Their codification is one central component of the ius in bello (law in war)
which attempts to humanize war. The law of war covers the Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907 on permissible means and methods of warfare as well as the “Annex
on Laws and Customs of War on Land”, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the pro-
tection of persons not or no longer taking part in hostilities, such as civilians, injured
combatants or prisoners42 as well as the Protocols I-III additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions and customary law applicable in international armed conflict. In the Rome
Statute war crimes are defined as:
41 However, up to 2018 there were only three submissions under article 12(3): Ukraine and both
Ivory Coast and the State of Palestine before they became states parties to the ICC.
42 Up until 2018 196 states ratified the Geneva Convention I-IV.
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“(a) grave breaches of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 (...), (b) [o]ther serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the
established framework of international law, (...) (c) [i]n the case of an armed conflict
not of an international character, serious violations of article 3 common to the four
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (...) and (e) [o]ther serious violations of the laws
and customs applicable in armed conflict not of an international character, within the
established framework of international law.” (art. 8 Rome Statute)
Although the list of war crimes in the Rome Statute is long, by far not all of the
existing war crimes of humanitarian law were integrated. Only such war crimes were
selected that are part of the international customary law and can be derived from
the idea of criminal responsibility (Dörmann, 2003). At the first review conference in
Kampala 2010 the state parties agreed on a definition of the crime of aggression43
as follows:
“planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position e ectively to
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of
aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of
the Charter of the United Nations.”
The idea behind the crime of aggression is almost as old as the war crimes themselves.
Whereas the war crimes are part of the ius in bello, the crime of aggression draws
on the ius ad bellum, the law to war. In the “Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes” of 1924 was enshrined that “every State which resorts to war
in violation of the undertakings contained in the Covenant or in the present Protocol
is an aggressor”.44 In doing so war of aggression was declared to be a crime for the
first time.45
What later came to be called ’crime of aggression’ was prosecuted for the first time
in the Nuremberg Trials as crimes against peace. In the “Charter of the International
Military Tribunal – Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of
the major war criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement)” crimes against
peace were defined as:
“planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation
of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing” (art. 6(3) London Agreement)
43 For further explanations on the compromise of Kampala and both definition and jurisdiction of
the crime of aggression, see: (Barriga, 2010; Ambos, 2010; Solera, 2010). For the pros and cons
of prosecuting acts of aggression in international criminal law, see: (Paulus, 2010; Kreß, 2010).
44 League of Nations, Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 2 October 1924.
45 For a detailed discussion on the doctrinal debate on the crime of aggression see Jeßberger (2017).
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In the “Report of Robert H. Jackson United States Representative to the International
Conference on Military Trials” (Jackson, 1945, 294) the definition of aggression as
suggested by the American Delegation is emphasized:46
“No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or
justification for such actions, but exercise of the right of legitimate self-defense, that
is to say, resistance to an act of aggression, or action to assist a State which has been
subjected to aggression, shall not constitute a war of aggression.”
Art. 2(3) UN-Charta says: “All Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice,
are not endangered.” In 1974 the UN-General Assembly adopted the Resolution 3314
and defined an act of aggression as:
“the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of
the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.” (art. 1, UN-Res. 3314)
“Clearly, the biggest challenge defying the adoption of a legally sound definition of
aggression comes from the political unwillingness of the di erent actors to accept not
only the idea of a workable definition of aggression, but of having a definition of the
crime aggression tout court. Some States, both developing and developed, feel uneasy
about further limiting their ability to wage war when the circumstances, domestic or
international, so require.” (Solera, 2010, 823)
The crime of aggression is in a certain tension with humanitarian interventions and
the responsibility to protect. States that participate in humanitarian intervention are
concerned that their intervention could be misinterpreted and seen as acts of aggres-
sion (Paulus, 2010). The ius contra bellum and ius in bellum have co-existed on the
primary level of international law for a long time. There is hardly any reason why
this co-existence should not work on the secondary level of criminal responsibility in
international law (Kreß, 2010) therefore this objection to intervention while present is
unconvincing.
Another concern about the crime of aggression stems from the fact that it requires an
act of aggression as violation of the UN charter and thus requires state responsibility
as prerequisite. Insofar that the jurisdiction of the ICC refers to the ’criminal respon-
sibility of individuals’ and not the ’responsibility of a state’, there is a conflict of dual
obligation. If a crime is committed by a state o cial or a state agent there can be a
case of state responsibility (Akande/Tzanakopoulos, 2017, 33).
46 For further discussion on negotiations of USA, Great Britain, France and Russia at the London
Conference 1945, see Clark (2007).
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The crime against humanity, however, is less controversial and even more often the
justification for humanitarian intervention. In the Rome Statute in article 7 it is defined
as “any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of funda-
mental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization,
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any
act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great su ering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
The origins of the crimes against humanity can be traced back to the Nuremberg trials.
They were designed to cover the atrocities of the German Nazi-Regime. In the London
Agreement crimes against humanity were defined in art. 6(c) as:
“murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political,
racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated.”
They are distinguished by the fact that they are not only crimes committed against
certain people, but so cruel and odious that they can be understood as crimes against
humanity as a whole. Hannah Arendt commented on the Eichman Trial in Jerusalem:
“Had the court in Jerusalem understood that there were distinctions between discrimina-
tion, expulsion, and genocide, it would immediately have become clear that the supreme
crime it was confronted with, the physical extermination of the Jewish people, was a
crime against humanity, perpetrated upon the body of the Jewish people, and that only
the choice of victims, not the nature of the crime, could be derived from the long history
of Jew-hatred and anti-Semitism.” (Arendt, 1963)
82
This view was reinforced in the judgment of the case Prosecutor v.Drazen Erdemovic
the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY remarked:47
“Crimes against humanity are especially odious forms of misbehavior and in addition
from part of a widespread and systematic practice or policy. Because of their heinousness
and magnitude they constitute an egregious attack on human dignity, on the very notion
of humaneness. They consequently a ect, or should a ect, each and every member of
mankind, whatever his or her nationality, ethnic group and location.”
While the humanitarian law benefits from the logic of reciprocity (Watts, 2009), human
rights hardly have inherent self-enforcing incentives, beyond the persuasion of being
’morally right’ (Deitelho , 2006) or increasing one’s reputation by committing to them
(Moravcsik, 2000).48 The creation of the crimes against humanity can be regarded
as the most important of the ICC’s core crimes. Beyond the creation of criminal
responsibility for the most severe violation of human rights, it is stated in the Rome
Statute that the interpretation and application of law has be consistent with human
rights.
“The application and interpretation of law (...) must be consistent with internationally
recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds
such as gender [... ], age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.” (art. 21, para 3)
The fourth core crime is the crime of genocide in article 6, defined as:
“any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”
Whereas crimes against humanity focus on a very cruel killing of a large number of
individuals, the crime of genocide focuses on the killing and destruction of a certain
group of people. So, while crimes against humanity is intended to protect the indi-
vidual, the crime of genocide is intended to protect the group. This thought and the
conception of the crime of genocide goes back on Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish legal
47 Prosecutor v.Drazen Erdemovic, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah
15-07-1999. For further examination see Akhavan (2012).
48 For more details on the di erent incentives structures to comply with human rights and
humanitarian law see “The Problem of Non-Compliance with International Law” on p. 43.
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scholar, who wanted to find a term that describes the atrocities against the Armenians
committed by Turkey during World War I as well as those against the Jewish during
the Nazi-Regime in World War II (Lemkin, 1944). Based on his considerations, in the
1st session of the United Nations General assembly, which in 1946 passed the Reso-
lution 96, genocide was declared as an international crime, that is in-commensurable
with the aims and goals of the United Nations. On 9 December 1948 the “Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” was adopted. States
that are party49 to the agreement commit themselves to prevent and to punish acts of
genocide according to the collective law of state responsibility (Werle, 2007; Ambos,
2011).
For many years the genocide convention remained without impact on the international
politics, since there existed no possibility of enforcement. This changed with the
establishment of the Ad-hoc tribunals ICTY and ICTR. In 1999, the ICTR pronounced
a judgment in accordance with the genocide convention (Schabas, 2000).
In summary, we can say that most of the states worldwide, at the latest after peace
and security were restored after World War II, are bound to comply with the norms
behind the core crimes; humanitarian law, human rights, prohibition of genocide and
prohibition of aggression. Those are part of the ius cogens in international law. Addi-
tionally, some of the corresponding core agreements have high ratification rates, such
as the Geneva Convention I-IV with 147 or the Genocide Convention with 196 states
parties.
Up to the establishment of the Ad-hoc and hybrid tribunals it was di cult to enforce
them and even when they were enforced then only to a limited degree in relation
to time and place of the criminal prosecution. Combining ius ad bellum and ius in
bello with the prohibition of the most severe crimes against humanity as core crimes
in an international court and creating individual responsibility making it possible to
investigate and prosecute can be considered a stroke of genius. This explains why
many consider the establishment of the ICC as one of the biggest civilizing advances
of the 20th century.
49 Up to 2018, there are 149 states i.e. several more than parties to the ICC.
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3.2.2 Support in Dealing with the Past
“All those who truly believe in international justice have pinned their hopes on the ICC.”
(Cassese, 2006, 441)
The establishment of ICTs is one of many possibilities in the context of transitional
justice of coping with a past characterized by war and atrocities .
“Transitional justice can be defined as the conception of justice associated with periods
of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of
repressive predecessor regime.” (Teitel, 2003, 69)
Teitel (2003) distinguishes three phases in the genealogy of transitional justice: The
first ’postwar phase’ takes place in the 1940s and 1950s. With the establishment of
the IMT at Nuremberg in 1945 and the IMTFE in Tokyo the foundation was laid for
a legal repossessing of armed conflicts with an international criminal law.
The second ’post-Cold War phase’ accompanies the ’third wave’ of democratization
(Huntington, 1991) in the 1970s and 1980s. It began in Western Europe with the
Carnation Revolution in Portugal 1974, moved to South America and East Asia and
peaked with the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The establishment of
several states and the transition from authoritarian military dictatorships to market-
based democracies creates the need for a conscious reevaluation of the past to promote
peace and reconciliation and, ultimately, democracy (Merkel, 2004). In this political
climate the term of ’Transitional Justice’ emerged, based upon the assumption that
the transition from conflict to peace and thereby from the perception of threat to the
perception of security needs the reappraisal of past atrocities. In this time, several
prominent TJ-institutions were established, such as the “National Commission on the
Disappearance of Persons” in Argentina in 1983, the “International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia” in 1993 or the “Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
South Africa” in 1994. While the IMT and the IMTFE had a ’retributive’ character
aiming to punish crimes (Moore, 1992) the purpose of those newer TJ-instruments was
to be ’restorative’ by constructing an alternative history (Zehr, 2002).
The third is the ’steady-state phase’ with a huge expansion and normalization of tran-
sitional justice. In the course of this, the establishment of the ICC can be considered
an indicator of normalization of transitional justice by means of the investigation and
prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. It turns into a
routine matter in international relations (Teitel, 2003, 90).
Meanwhile, there is a broad spectrum of TJ-instruments that comprise both o ender
orientated retribution and victim-orientated restoration of the social order pursuing
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to promote reconciliation, nation-building, democratization and peace. Accordingly,
in the context of dealing with the violent past of a (post-)conflict there are several
hopes and expectations in international criminal tribunals:50 a) ending global impunity
and revolutionizing accountability (Sriram, 2003; Drumbl, 2007), b) peaceful conflict
resolution (Moore, 1992; Akhavan, 2009), c) restoring of justice and reconciliation
(Minow, 1998; Cobban, 2006), d) promoting democratization by strengthening the
rule of law (Kritz, 1996; Olsen et al., 2010), d) prevention of future atrocities via
deterrence e ects (Wippman, 1999; Ku/Nzelibe, 2006; Wei en, 2012; Dancy, 2017).
Those e ects are attributed to mechanisms of action like avoiding the apportioning of
collective blame through the individualization of guilt, preventing collective myths of
victimization, breaking cycles of violence and the positive e ects of criminal justice on
societal conflict structures (Nitsche, 2007).
The establishment of international criminal tribunals provides financial, technical and
material support to states from the international community intended to help them
overcome the limitations of their own national jurisdiction in dealing with past atroc-
ities on their own.
“Today, many governments are either too weak (unable) or too involved in crimes (un-
willing) to investigate and prosecute. Therefore, there is a need for an international
tribunal to punish past and deter future crimes. Furthermore, the idea of universal ju-
risdiction is constantly gaining momentum, and even reluctant states might find that it
is in their interest to cooperate with, rather than object to, the ICC.” (Popovski, 2000,
406)
Olsen et al. (2010) examine the success of TJ-instruments on human rights and democ-
racy. They argue that certain combinations of instruments, such as trials and in-
struments, achieve the best e ects. Zero-sum solutions, as mostly discussed in the
literature, lead to more harm than good.
Independent from the reason or underlying incentives that give the states cause to an
international criminal court, the ICC can be considered a powerful tool among the TJ
instruments. It is the only instrument that works permanently on a legal basis and
can be used by all states worldwide and addresses both international and domestic
audiences and raises awareness. The ICC may be regarded an attempt to learn from
the mistakes of the ICTs and to create an improved institutional design.
The establishment of the Ad-hoc tribunals ICTY and ICTR was genuine improvements
to the Military Tribunals IMT and IMTFE. They are neither courts of victor’s justice
nor created by the conflict parties, but on behalf of the international community by
50 For an overview of the landscape of ICTs see e.g.Geiß/Bulinckx (2006).
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the UNSC. Nevertheless, they received a lot of criticism. When the ICTY started its
work, there was strong resistance from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a federal
state constructed by the republics of Serbia and Montenegro from the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. During the first proceedings51 the defense argued
several times that the tribunal was unlawful, since an international tribunal could
not be independent, if it was established by a political organ, such as the UNSC and
respected the primacy of national courts (Aksar, 2005).
According to Jorda (2004, 575) both ICTY and ICTR followed the strategy of delocal-
ization, i.e. bringing to trial the high political and military leaders at an international
tribunal and leaving lower level defendants to the domestic courts. It would take too
much time to prosecute every violation. This should have the positive side e ect that
states have to bring their domestic legislation into line with the most important prin-
ciples of human rights and humanitarian law. The ICTY was blamed in certain cases
for “be tempting, as it could enable victors, even well-intentioned ones, to impose
’tailor-made’ justice” (Jorda, 2004, 573).
The institution design of the ICC is a result of the experiences and mistakes of the
Ad-hoc and hybrid tribunals. An international court that is treaty-based instead of
being established by UNSC resolutions to has a higher political legitimization, since
the states have the possibility of expressing their sovereign will during the negotiations
and the act of ratification (Aksar, 2005). The ICC is a permanent court, and all of its
states parties can refer situations to the court any time. Thereby, “the international
community attempted to cut the cord that linked international criminal justice to the
critique of which previously plagued it” (Kreß, 2010, 1143).
Finally, the principal of complementarity provides a greater decision-making scope for
the states. The impact of the ICC as a mechanism of deterrence can be regarded as
crucial in reaching its intended purpose. The potential prosecution through criminal
tribunals can deter further atrocities since it reduces the cost-benefit calculations for
both governments and rebel groups. Without the possibility of prosecutions, it is
often a tactical decision to extend combat operations on civil population to maximize
the possibility of winning an armed conflict. Thus, criminal prosecution makes it less
attractive as a tactical instrument (Cronin-Furman, 2013, 443f.).
According to Dancy (2017) both the ratification of the Statute of Rome and the inter-
vention of the ICC during preliminary examinations can lead either to ’compellence’
in the sense of a direct action leading to the termination of an ongoing civil war or
51 See e.g.Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, The Prosecutor
versus Dusko Tadic, Case No. It-94-1-T, decision of 2 October 1995.
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to specific deterrence or general deterrence in the sense of preventing atrocities and
war. Although the mandate of the ICC is not linked to an explicitly task of deterring
armed conflicts, it could have an impact on armed violence. He sees three reasons for
this: firstly, the ICC is permanent and thus can spring into action at every time. Sec-
ondly, the ICC often begins its investigations during conflict situations and thus can
act as ’first responder’. Thirdly, he assumes that deterrence of atrocity has a positive
influence on lasting peace (Dancy, 2017, 629).
Simmons/Jo (2016) see besides ’prosecutorial deterrence’ moreover an important fac-
tor in ’social deterrence’ that is “a consequence of the broader social milieu in which
actors operate: it occurs when potential perpetrators calculate the informal conse-
quences of law-breaking” (Simmons/Jo, 2016, 444). Those consequences can be social
mobilization of domestic communities or changes in foreign material assistance. Relat-
ing to this, Dancy/Montal (2017, 657) consider the ICC as the ’shamer-in-chief’, since
the court multiplies the impact of media reports or the activism of nongovernmental
organizations and thus “brings with it a kind of international opprobrium that is virtu-
ally unparalleled”. The expected costs attached to the investigations and prosecutions
by the ICC can cause states to reevaluate their human rights practice (Appel, 2018,
5).
In sum, the ICC brings a range of possibilities for states to receive support in dealing
with the past, promoting peace or even encouraging reconciliation. Even if prosecu-
tions fail to deter atrocities, they reinforce international norms and promote a national
and international political culture that finds atrocities unacceptable (Akhavan, 1998;
Wippman, 1999). Prosecutions trigger changes in the domestic legal structure that
promote this (Simmons/Jo, 2016). There are several problems and dilemmas of TJ
(Leebaw, 2008) revolving around the debates on ’punish or pardon’ or ’peace versus
justice’. The ICC provides solutions by remaining a permanent independent institu-
tion that promotes international norms that are only complementary to the existing
national jurisdiction.
3.2.3 Solving Cooperation Problems with the ICC
In the view of IR theory one of the most important reasons for the commitment
to international agreements, the compliance with international law and delegation of
sovereignty to international courts and tribunals is the hope to solve political cooper-
ation problems of international relations.52
52 See in the illustration of research literature on p. 43.
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Cooperation is defined in terms of “actors adjust their behavior to the actual or an-
ticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination” (Keohane,
1984a, 50f.). Cooperation problems appear if states get caught in a prisoner’s dilemma
that “embodies the tension between individual rationality (reflected in the incentive
of both sides to be selfish) and group rationality (reflected in the higher payo  to both
sides for mutual cooperation over mutual defection)” (Axelrod, 1980, 4).
The conclusion of legal agreements themselves can be considered as possible solutions
of cooperation problems, since they provide legitimacy and enhance mutual confidence.
International law can be considered as one possible form of communication and coop-
eration trying to agree on common norms and making promises about future behavior.
International agreements codify common norms and create legitimacy of behavior and
states then adhere to international rules even without control and coercion (Hurd,
1999). In situations that are legally regulated it is di cult to position arguments that
are based only on preferences and interests. Thus, enhancing legitimacy leads to a
reduction of decision-making costs. Political problems do not have to be negotiated
repeatedly. They do not have to be balanced politically since there are argumentative
figures and normative justifications (Abbott/Snidal, 2000).
Tying one’s own hands towards the audience of domestic and international actors
enhances the credibility of a state (Fearon, 1997). Newly formed democracies gain
from this strategy by signaling that their political course should be taken seriously
(Moravcsik, 2000). States develop a self-interest in complying with international law
since the reduction of decision-making costs and the enhancement of credibility makes
political situations more predictable, negotiating partners more trustworthy and solves
the cooperation problems of anarchy (such as prisoner’s dilemma, chicken game, battle
of the sexes or tragedy of the commons).
While those mechanisms of self-enforcement via reciprocity and reputation work well
in some areas of international law, such as free trade agreements (Parisi/Ghei, 2003)
or the law of war (Watts, 2009), some other areas of international law, such as human
rights, have weaker incentives for self-enforcement. Because there are often only infor-
mal mechanisms of monitoring and a low probability of being sanctioned, there are a
lot of violations of human rights (Hathaway, 2002) which illustrates the gap between
commitment and compliance (Simmons, 2009).
We can say that international law solves cooperation problems, but it also creates new
ones. There are incentives for autocratic states to commit to human rights as ’empty
promises’ or mere ’window dressing’ (Hafner-Burton/Tsutsui, 2005). This creates a
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certain uncertainty about the credibility of commitments to human rights and increases
the costs for monitoring norm compliance.
With the establishment of international courts several cooperation problems of interna-
tional law can be solved. Relating to the ICC as an enforcement court for humanitarian
law and human rights, two central mechanisms of solving cooperation problems can
be identified: a) reducing costs of monitoring humanitarian law and human rights and
b) enhancing the credibility of commitments to humanitarian law and human rights.
Reducing Costs of Monitoring with the ICC (Mechanism 1)
International courts and tribunals create the opportunity of reducing monitoring costs.
According to Helfer/Slaughter (2005, 35f.) international courts and tribunals highlight
non-compliance and thereby decrease uncertainty about the conduct of other states.
Non-compliance, in turn, creates high costs. Firstly, the probability of sanctions as
a penalty for non-compliance rises, not only due to the existence of the tribunal or
court itself, but also due to the multilateral political process or even unilateral poli-
tics. Secondly, a positive finding of non-compliance increases the probability of a loss
of reputation. Thus, the courts create high incentives for compliance. The mere exis-
tence of the courts makes an e ective monitoring possible. In the past this had been
very di cult. Previously, the rules were in place, but there was no e ective means of
enforcing them.
What are the norms specifically monitored by the ICC and enshrined in the Rome
Statute? The ICC is able to exercise jurisdiction over four core crimes that are regarded
as “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”
(art. 5):
(a) The crime of genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity;
(c) War crimes;
(d) The crime of aggression.
Although those four core crime are newly defined as ’crimes’ in the Rome Statute, the
norms of international law and the crimes themselves are older. The respective norms
for which a criminal responsibility was defined are the law to war (ius ad bellum), the
law of war (ius in bello) and the prohibition of most serious human rights violations:
(a) The Genocide Convention from 1948;
(b) Prohibition of most serious human rights violations;
(c) (Hague Conventions and) Geneva Convention I-IV from 1949;
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Figure 7: Monitoring Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Int. Criminal Law
(d) UN-imperative of peaceful settlement of disputes (Ch.IV UN-Charter) and UN-
imperative to refrain from acts of aggression and use of force (UN-Resolution 3314).
With the establishment of the ICC as the only permanent international court able to
investigate and prosecute individuals, the hope for enforcing international criminal law
and deterring future violations of humanitarian law and human rights improves. It
not only increases norm compliance, but integrates a system of international law that
was previously decentralized and unevenly enforced (see Figure 7).53
The oldest existing institution still monitoring humanitarian law and human rights is
the International Court of Justice ICJ that was established in 1945 with the Charter of
the United Nations. Its main functions are the legal settlement of disputes between the
states parties to the United Nations (jurisdiction in contentious cases) and the legal
advisory for the UN as international institutions (advisory jurisdiction). According to
art. 36 of the ICJ Statute, the court is able to decide on all cases, which the states
parties to the UN refer to it. The states parties can recognize the ICJ as a dispute
settlement mechanism either by recognizing its compulsory jurisdiction or by making
special provisions in other treaties and conventions.
To that e ect, there are many multilateral agreements that submit to the ICJ’s ju-
risdiction, such as the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
53 For a list on the several criminal courts and the regional human rights courts see Table 2 on p. 51.
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of Genocide” of 1948. Up to 2017 the ICJ had tried about 150 contentious cases and
held about 25 advisory proceedings; e.g. in 1993 a trial on the “Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)”, in 1999 several trials on the legality on the
use of force in connection with the violent break up of the former Yugoslavia or on
armed activities on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo54.
As discussed in the subsection above on dealing with the past, Ad-hoc and hybrid
criminal tribunals as well as domestic criminal tribunals were established to investigate
and to prosecute international criminal law, such as war crimes or crimes against
humanity. Therefore, they create criminal responsibility for individuals.
A further possibility of investigating and to prosecuting violations of international
criminal law on the domestic level is based on the ’principle of universal jurisdiction’
that applies independent of nationality and where the crimes were committed. Ac-
cording to Ambos (2011, 58 .) the principal of universal jurisdiction can be justified
by the fact that crimes such as genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity a ect
not only those states in which the crimes occur or to whom victims and o enders
belong, but the community of states and humankind as a whole. Their fundamental
values are shaken to the core. Those state that investigate and prosecute those crimes
become trustees of the community of states as a whole.
Several new emerging possibilities for monitoring human rights violations are o ered
by the regional human rights courts, of which there are three worldwide: the ECHR,
the AfCtHPR and the IACtHR. Many of the international or regional organizations
have internal mechanisms for monitoring compliance with human rights law. We can
consider it a step forward that there are so many possibilities to bring violations of
humanitarian law and/or human rights to court. However, the ubiquity of monitoring
and the concurrency of di erent judicial bodies able to try violations of humanitarian
law and human rights can lead to problems like forum shopping or a clash of legal
decisions.
All of the judicial institutions mentioned above struggle with serious problems. The
International Court of Justice is repeatedly confronted with harsh criticism because
many judgments were never put into practice, such as in the La Grand Case. The
judges are accused of not being impartial and deciding instead in favor of their home
countries (Posner, 2004). Notwithstanding the empirical evidence supporting those
54 For detailed information on the list of cases referred ti the ICJ since 1946, see:
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2 (12-06-2017).
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criticisms, we can state that the ICJ is in a very di cult position. In principle, it is
available to every state for every issue on international law.
The regional human rights courts deal primarily with human rights violations in times
of peace. Since they are regional, they are only available for a limited group of states.55
The concurrency of those monitoring mechanisms creates high cost, especially for those
states that are involved or particularly active in multiple institutions. Seen in this
light, the establishment of the ICC centralizes the previously decentralized monitoring
of humanitarian law and human rights. It makes it possible to enforce their norms
on a permanent international level. For the states engaged in international relations
this leads to a reduction of monitoring costs that occur normally as a consequence of
participating in multiple monitoring strategies concurrently. Those states that were
politically and financially involved in several of the monitoring institutions can benefit
considerably from the ICC. They can save expenses in the long run. Conversely, the
ICC as an institution can benefit in the processes of both normative development and
institutional learning.
Appel (2018) is of the opinion that we can expect an improvement in human rights
practice through the ICC since it poses costs to leaders, such as losing domestic and
international support that benefits them militarily and economically. This can be
observed empirically. Although states with a good human rights practice are more
likely to ratify the Rome Statute, it can be observed that the human rights practice of
states parties continue to improve. This is not the case for non-party states to the ICC.
Enhancing Credibility with the ICC (Mechanism 2)
Apart from the intended purpose of creating an international institution that mon-
itors and enforces the norms behind the core crimes of the ICC, we can expect states
to delegate sovereignty to the ICC to enhance the credibility of their commitment to
those norms. Therefore, they are able to solve the cooperation problem of a lack of
credibility.
“On way legalization enhances credibility is by constraining self-serving auto-interpretation.
Precision of individual commitments, coherence between individual commitments and
broader legal principles, and accepted modes of legal discourse and argument all help
limit such opportunistic behavior. Granting interpretative authority to courts or other
legal institutions further constraints auto-interpretation.” (Abbott/Snidal, 2000, 427)
55 The ECHR has 47 states parties (states of the European Council), the AfCtHPR has 30 states
parties and the IACtHR 23 states parties (Organization of American States (OAS)).
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Majone (2001) is of the opinion that “the most important reasons for delegating pow-
ers (...) are two: to reduce decision-making costs, for example by taking advantage of
executive branch expertise, or to enhance the credibility of policy commitments”. He
argues that the strategy to delegate to certain agents is dependent on the respective
reason for delegation. When reducing decision making costs the problem of bureau-
cratic drift can arise, i.e. the outcomes of delegation can deviate from the initial reason
for delegating power. Therefore, principals should delegate to agents with similar pol-
icy preferences. Following the logic of enhancing credibility, principles should delegate
to an agent with dissimilar policy preferences (Majone, 2001, 103f).
Astonishingly, the strongest proponents of human rights agreements are often neither
great powers nor established liberal democracies, but newly emerged democracies.
These have the strongest need and thus the greatest interest in protecting their new
political status quo against the threats of autocratic or repressive forces. They com-
mit to human rights agreements to signal their interests and increase their credibility
(Moravcsik, 2000, 219f.).
Simmons (2009) builds on this assumption and argues that governments would not gain
much benefits from disingenuous commitment to arbitrary international agreements.
Even if their monitoring is weak, there are several actors in international relations,
like other governments, or international civil actors that care about the compliance of
the norms and collect information on the compliance behavior.
“[E]xpressive support does not occur in a political vacuum. It triggers political conse-
quences by raising the consciousness of potential stakeholders and giving them a salient
moral and legal claim on the realization of that right. In the absence on any intention of
of following through, the risks of such position-taking – the demands and expectations
it is unlikely to stimulate – are likely to equal or perhaps even to exceed what can only
be short-term benefits. It is possible that governments miscalculate the extent to which
they will end up being held accountable (...), but they run risk of apolitical backlash in
response to blatant inconsistency.” (Simmons, 2009, 60)
In a broad empirical analysis, she tested several influencing factors on the ratification
behavior of states towards human rights agreements. Contrary to the conventional
wisdom that governments with the closest preferences to the agreement would be
most likely to ratify, she demonstrated that newly transitioned democracies are most
eager to commit to human rights agreements. She considers this as an indicator for
the thesis that not only political preferences are important factors for commitment,
but also the historical context.
She describes the same e ects for the states’ commitment to the Rome Statute. We
can observe that many autocratic or transformative states ratified the Rome Statute.
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Simmons/Danner (2010) assume that states are often unable to commit themselves
credibly and thus have di culties in reaching cooperative solutions. Political promises
are often not enough to make the political vis-a-vis believe one would behave in the
way promised. What is needed is to increase the costs of defection in a cooperative
game. If a court is able to prosecute violations of the negotiated norms like the ICC,
it becomes possible to show that their own hands are tied. Thus, credibility becomes
enhanced both on the international and the domestic level:
“What kinds of ex post costs might a government face for reneging? Legally, ratification
to the ICC statute is a commitment made formally to the international community. As
such it can trigger a potentially costly investigation, prosecution, and punishment of
government o cials or agents. But ratification also involves domestic audience costs by
raising expectations among the general populace weary of violence that the government
is committed to di using the conflict and seeking peaceful solutions. The frustration
of these expectations by the commission of atrocities is likely to cost the government
popular support.” (Simmons/Danner, 2010, 234)
Simmons/Danner (2010) see the commitment to the ICC by becoming a state party
being dependent on two central determinants: the existence of a recent violent history
and a certain weakness of the state’s rule of law.56
Beyond the concrete support transformative states get from TJ-activities, the com-
mitment to strong TJ-instruments, such as the ICC, is a possibility of increasing their
political commitment. This is a chance to prove themselves as trustworthy in the
international system, showing themselves to be a reliable partner for future cooper-
ation in trade and politics. It is a signal towards domestic actors, be it opponents
or proponents. Ratifying international agreements influences the political agenda, the
litigation of domestic courts and thereby the mobilization of civil society. Simmons
(2009, 108) draws the conclusion that international law matters, and human rights
change politics. They even goes so far to say that governments ratify human rights
agreements because they intend to comply with them. And in the case of the ICC
the states can use their commitments to step forward making peace by enhancing the
credibility of commitments.
56 Simmons/Danner (2010) distinguish between three groups of states with di erent incentive
structures: a) States with a violent recent history, but a weak domestic rule of law to come to
terms with the past by themselves (e.g. Peru or Afghanistan or) that are likely to ratify the
Rome Statute because they need the support of the ICC; b) states with a violent recent history
and a strong domestic rule of law coping with it by themselves (e.g. USA or India) that are not
likely to ratify the Rome Statute because they are able to come to terms with the past by their
own; c) states without a violent recent history and a strong rule of law (e.g. Norway, Sweden or
Germany) that are likely to ratify because they do not have to fear negative consequences.
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“The ICC is not the obvious place to engage in purely symbolic gestures; governments
have plenty of opportunities to make symbolic gestures in international law by ratifying
the numerous treaties devoid of external enforcement provisions.” (Simmons/Danner,
2010, 254)
In sum, we can regard the ratification of the Rome Statute as a great deal. Almost
all states are nevertheless bound to the international law behind the core crimes (UN-
requirement of peaceful settlement of disputes, law of war, human rights law and
prohibition of genocide). The institutional design of the Rome Statute sets clear limits
on the jurisdiction of the ICC and the consequences of being a state party to the ICC
are foreseeable.57 The principle of complementarity makes the ICC a solution of last
resort and provides that there will only be investigations and prosecutions if the states
are unwilling or unable to carry out proceedings on the national level. The costs of
sovereignty are rather low, while there can be great benefits of increasing international
and national security, such as the privileges of being states parties, getting support in
dealing with the past, and above all solving cooperation of international law.
In the worst-case scenario, a state has to surrender a few of its citizens that committed
one or more of the worst crimes of humankind, which are neither tolerated politically
nor permitted legally. The ICC promises nothing less than protecting peace, secu-
rity and well-being in international relations, while respecting state sovereignty and
national criminal jurisdiction functioning as a last resort.
The costs incurred of a political sovereign delegating power to the ICC seem rather
small at first glance, while the benefits seem highly promising. The ICC presents
a real opportunity to end global impunity and prevent severe violations of human
rights, humanitarian law and acts of aggression. Viewed in this light, it becomes less
surprising that states bind themselves to the ICC, in particular those states that need
the support of the ICC dealing with a violent past. Put in a nutshell: the establishment
of an enforcement court cuts monitoring costs, reduces the probability of future norm
violations and increases and reduces the uncertainty of the behavior of other states
in international relations. This is most probable if the main function of a court is to
enforce international law. However, the extent to which states commit to the ICC
varies very widely. This is based on the fact that in spite of all benefits, there are
reasons nevertheless why states have to fear the ICC.
57 For some legal scholars the narrow definitions of the core crimes, in particular of the crime of
aggression, raises the concern that a behavior of states that does not fall within the a criminal
responsibility would be automatically legal. Therefore, the primary rules of conduct through
international law and secondary rules of criminal responsibility should be clearly distinguished;
see e.g. Paulus (2010).
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3.3 Why States Have to Fear the ICC – Obstacles in Ratifying
3.3.1 Missing Institutional Counterparts
In contrast to the previous considerations, the following thesis can be proposed: Since
the ICC is not able to protect the states from violations of humanitarian law or human
rights, or at least war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity or the crime of
aggression, states do not bind themselves comprehensively to the ICC. Instead, they
selectively delegate small parts of their authority to the ICC in order to retain enough
power and authority to protect themselves from other states.
Before illustrating this in detail, the question why is the ICC not able to protect the
states must be answered. It is the job of the ICC to protect the states from war crimes,
genocide, crimes against humanity or aggression. But it is rather a court of last resort
according to the principle of complementarity. Another plausible answer is that the
ICC would not be able to protect the states, since it stands alone in international
relations missing those institutional counterparts a court needs in order to do its work
in a system of separation of powers.
On the international level several international and regional bodies are labeled as
’courts’, having both their formal characteristics and their symbolic attributes. Ac-
cording to Shelton (2009, 4 .), international courts have the guarantee of independence
and the control of their procedures. Nevertheless, they di er strongly in their functions
and their inherent powers compared to national courts.
Those judicial powers are: a) the compétence de la compétence meaning that courts
have to decide about the legality of the dispute and thus the exercise of jurisdiction58;
b) courts should have the power to issue interim measures in respect to the subject of
the dispute; c) courts should have the capacity to generate and appreciate facts, since
a good fact-finding mechanisms enhances the legitimacy and the credibility of a court
and many international courts have the power to write their own rules of evidence and
procedure.59; d) courts should have the power to raise relevant questions of law to
develop international law in the context of the specific cases (deciding the merits); e)
the judgments and sentences of international courts should be legally binding for the
parties and courts should be able to refer to previous interpretations and judgments
(finality and binding nature judgments). The Rome Statute stipulates: “The Court
may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions” (art. 21,
para. 2 Rome Statute).
58 An overview of the jurisdiction of international courts is to find in Amerasinghe (2002), esp. ch. 5.
59 In the case of the ICC the power to write the rules of evidence remained at the states themselves.
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The miscellaneous international courts and tribunals can have di erent functions in
international relations. The enforcement of law is only one among them. Others
would include dispute settlement (e.g. the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO), legal
advice (e.g. the International Court of Justice) or monitoring compliance (e.g. Regional
Human Rights Courts). Although there is an overlap between the functions and some
courts fulfill more than one of them, each has one dominant function that influences
its mandate. Taking into account what the function of a court is, we can better
assess what power it has and which challenges it has to overcome (Shelton, 2009, 8 .).
International Courts that have the function of dispute settlement, such as the ICJ,
ITLOS or the DSB of the WTO, are supposed to inhibit escalation of conflicts and
the use of self-help and reprisals to further international peace and security.60
They have to provide fair opportunities for the states parties and give advice for the
settlement of the dispute on the basis of the agreed legal rules. At most dispute
settlement bodies, the parties can voluntarily end the litigation, provided that they
agreed to do so (Shelton, 2009, 9).
International courts that monitor and support compliance, such as the regional human
rights courts ECHR, IACtHR and AfCtHPR, are supposed to interpret and apply
particular agreements. They decide cases that are brought before them and safeguard
and develop the respective norms and rules. Their aim is to prevent future violations
and to raise the protection of human rights rather than to redress single violations.
The cases before compliance courts are maintained up to the end, regardless if the
parties want to do so.
Most international courts have the competence of giving legal advice. The ICJ is even
able to give legal advice to any legal question, since “the jurisdiction of the Court
comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for
in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions on force” (art 36,
para. 1 ICJ Statute).61 The ICJ is supposed to identify, interpret and apply interna-
tional rules and principles giving assistance to international legal issues (Shelton, 2009,
13f).
60 Establishing an international court is not the only possibility of settling international disputes
peacefully. Other forums are e.g. arbitrary tribunals like the ’London Court of International
Arbitration’ since 1891 or the ’International Chamber of Commerce’ since 1919; installing mixed
claim commission like the ’Iran-US Claims Tribunal’ since 1981; or establishing fact-finding
commissions e.g. in the context of human rights like the ’International Commission of Inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic’ since 2011 or the ’South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission’ 1996-1998 in the context of transitional justice.
61 According to art. 36 ICJ-Statute states can recognize the jurisdiction of the ICC in general
(compulsory jurisdiction) as 72 states have done (state of 01-17), or they can determine its
jurisdiction in particular agreements (treaty based jurisdiction).
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Courts with the function of enforcement are supposed to determine innocence or guilt
of persons that are accused of having committed certain crimes, such as the ad-hoc
Tribunals ICTY and ICTR, the hybrid criminal tribunals like the SCSL or SPSC or
the ICC. This aims to enforce certain norms of international law and prevent future
violations by the e ect of deterrence. Therefore, crimes deriving from those norms
have to be defined in detail and the court has to ensure that the jurisdiction is not
frustrated and the judicial character is maintained (Shelton, 2009, 12f).
International law can be regarded as a huge hodgepodge of agreements, charters, con-
ventions, covenants, declarations, protocols and treaties. International law does not
inevitably need coercion or the use of force (by means of e.g. retaliation and retor-
sion) to ensure compliance. Compliance can be achieved through several mechanisms,
such as reciprocity (Keohane, 1984a), reputation (Simmons, 1998; Moravcsik, 2000)
or persuasion (Deitelho , 2006). If there is the decision to establish an international
court to investigate and prosecute at the level of individual criminal responsibility, we
can assume those mechanisms are not su cient to ensure norm compliance. The law
requires a court to make enforcement possible. However, if enforcement is necessary
to guarantee the compliance of law, then force is necessary to enable the function of
enforcement.
We can consider the ICC as enforcement court. With the definition of the four core
crimes – war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression – it
creates a criminal responsibility for several already existing norms on the primary level
of international law, such as the UN-requirement of peaceful settlement of disputes,
the law of war, human rights and the prohibition of genocide. Of course, monitor-
ing norm compliance is also an important function that the ICC fulfills. However,
all possible ways of triggering investigation and prosecution require arguments and
information about probable core crimes committed. Those are provided – dependent
on how jurisdiction is triggered – from the states concerned, the UNSC or the civil
society. We could say that the ICC initiates and furthers the monitoring of the norms
indirectly, while it fulfills the function of enforcement of the norms directly.
The preamble of the Rome Statute states that the ICC is created “to guarantee lasting
respect for and the enforcement of international justice”. The enforcement of inter-
national law requires not only the judicial power to interpret the legal norms and to
decide on penalty in cases of norm violations, but also an executive power that is able
to enforce rulings and sentences. This can be considered a transfer of the domestic
logic. Criminal courts are part of a democratic system of separation of powers, at the
level of international relations.
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That courts function as part of a rule of law in order to end the state of war and
achieve peace and security in international relations is borrowed from the thoughts
on states and the social contract (Doyle/Carlson, 2008). Thomas Hobbes stressed the
links between anarchy and insecurity, and respectively, between state and security. He
considered individuals as self-interested actors, driven by ’competition, distrust, and
glory’, living in a state of nature in which a ’war of all against all’ prevails. This state
endures even in times of the absence of actual war, since all have to protect their own
liberty and safety against possible attacks of the others (Leviathan, Part I, Ch.13).
The only way out of this hostile state of nature is the delegation of “power and strength
on one (...) so as to turn all their wills into a single will (...) [the] great LEVIATHAN”
(Leviathan, Part I, Ch.17) for the purpose of creating security (Leviathan, Part I,
Ch.21). He further states: “And covenants without the sword are merely words, with
no strength to secure a man at all” (Leviathan, Part I, Chapter 17).
According to Doyle/Carlson (2008, 652 .) this thought can be transferred on the inter-
national level, where states are considered as self-interested actors that are driven by
competing for material goods and prestige and the fear that the others may conquer
their territory. In a Hobbesian world states seldom experience security, but live with
the permanent threat of war. They end in war if one is much stronger than another
or if one does not recognize the power and prestige of the other. Compliance with
international rules is possible, especially in the shape of the ius ad bellum to protect
against war and the ius in bello to regulate war. States comply with it if they have to
fear retaliation or they have common interests with other states. However, the greatest
problem is that weak states are not protected from strong states in the absence of a
global Leviathan.
Due to the liberal thought of John Locke, the father of modern constitutional states,
individuals are rational, equal and independent, living in an peaceful state of nature,
being determined and restricted only by the natural law (para 4) that requires not “to
harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions” (para. 6). Thus, everybody is
engaged and obliged to sustain him or herself and the humankind as a whole (para. 6).
As long as the individuals comply with the natural law, a peaceful cohabitation is pos-
sible even without political rule. However, not everybody complies with that natural
law and therefore individuals have the rights to punish violations (para. 8). This right
to self-defense can lead to a state of war (para. 16). A society can only exist, if there
is the power to protect the property of individuals and if all individuals have given up
their natural power and thus their right to punish crimes by themselves (para. 87).
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“Those who are united into one Body, and have a common establish’d Law and Judi-
cature to appeal to, with Authority to decide Controversies between them, and punish
O enders, are in Civil Society one with another.” (para. 87) (Locke, 1967 [1689], 342)
Thus in a society there is legislative, judicial and executive power:
“And herein we have the original of the Legislative and Executive Power of Civil Society,
which is to judge by standing Laws, how far O enses are to be punished, when committed
within the Commonwealth; and also to determine, by occasional Judgments founded
on the present Circumstances of the Fact, how far Injuries from without are to be
vindicated; and in both these to employ all the force of all Members, when there shall
be need.” (para. 88) (Locke, 1967 [1689], 343)
Legislative power is defined as follows:
“The Legislative Power is that, which has a right to direct how the Force of the Com-
monwealth shall be employ’d for preserving the Community and the Members of it.”
(para. 143) (Locke, 1967 [1689], 382)
Furthermore, he stresses the importance of the executive power.
“But because the Laws, that are at once, and in a short time made, have a constant and
lasting force, and need a perpetual Execution, or an attendance thereunto; therefore ’tis
necessary there should be a Power always in being, which should see to the Execution
of the Laws that are made, and remain in force.And thus the Legislative and Executive
Power come often to be separated.” (para. 144) (Locke, 1967 [1689], 382f.)
The protection requires a functioning system of separation of powers. However, obvi-
ously, in international relations, such a separation of powers does not exist. Although
an ’international criminal court’ – a term that suggests applying to all states world-
wide – was established there is no international executive power, in which all states
worldwide are represented.62
The need to secure property and freedom seems to have shifted from a an inner-state
level to an international level, enhancing the legalization of international relations.
Nevertheless, the institutionalization of an international security is still in its infancy.
This is reflected in the paradox that especially in institutions that are strongly legal-
ized or judicialized, states tend to fall back into demonstrations of power. This can
be rooted in the fact that international courts, such as the ICC, are missing insti-
tutional counterparts in international relations. Tomuschat (2010) stresses that the
62 Regional Organizations are exceptions, since they have separation of powers in their institutional
design. The EU e.g. has a separation of legislative (EU-Parliament and Council of the EU),
judiciary (European Court of Justice) and executive (European Commission) powers.
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absence of such counterparts weakens the institutional structure of international courts
and gateways for hijacking for political interests can arise. Whereas the cooperation
with the legislative power (making law) and the executive power (enforcing law) is
essential for international courts (dispensing law) to fulfill their role, and lastly to act
independently they should not engage in politics.
Helfer/Slaughter (2005) for example admit, too, that their argument that delegation
enhances credibility is circular, as there is no global authority to enforce a state’s
promise to cooperate:
“It might be argued, however, that our claim – that delegation to independent tribunals
enhances credibility of international commitments – is circular. Just as there is no
coercive authority to enforce a state’s initial promise to cooperate, there is also no such
authority to compel adherence to the judgments of a tribunal which interprets that
promise.” (Helfer/Slaughter, 2005, 35)
In the case of the ICC, we cannot say, there is no executive power. There are institu-
tional counterparts, such as the Assembly of States Parties and the Security Council of
the United Nations. Nevertheless, we can consider the executive power to be distorted
to some extent, insofar as it is not always obvious, who the main executive power is.
It is decisive, who makes political decisions with respect to the ICC.
According to article 112 of the Statute of Rome the Assembly of the States Parties
accompanies and supports the work of the ICC. It is composed of one representative per
state, who may be accompanied by advisory sta  (art. 112 (1) Statute of Rome). The
tasks of this board are e.g. deciding the budget for the Court, deciding the number of
judges, deciding about cases of non-cooperation and the supervision of the Presidency,
the prosecutor and the Registrar of the Court (art. 112 (2). The Assembly has its own
“Bureau consisting of a President, two Vice-Presidents and 18 members elected by the
Assembly for three-year terms” (art. 112 (3) a Statute of Rome).
TheAssembly of States Parties is the legislative body of the ICC and has moreover
the management oversight. According to article 112, the ASP consists of both one
representative for every state party and their respective deputies and advisers. States
that did not ratify, but signed the Rome Statute, are allowed to send observers to the
ASP. It has a bureau consisting of a president and two vice presidents as well as 18
elected members.
Its’ responsibilities include the management oversight, considering reports and ac-
tivities of the Bureau, considering and adopting recommendation of the Preparatory
Commission, deciding the budget of the court, deciding about the number of judges
and considering cases of non-cooperation (art. 112 para. 2). The ASP meets about
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once a year and each state has one vote. The aim is to reach decision by consen-
sus. If this cannot be reached, decisions require a two-thirds majority of the present
states, whereas the quorum is reached with an absolute majority of the states (art. 117
para. 7).63
The relationship of the ICC and the UN-Security Council is much more complex.
The UNSC has several privileges and obligations towards the ICC. 64 The preamble
of the Rome Statute stipulates that the ICC acts according to the UN-Charter. The
states parties are:
“[r]ea rming the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in
particular that all States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations” (Preamble ICC-Statute, para. 7)
According to article 13 (b) (exercise of jurisdiction) the ASP has the right to refer sit-
uations to the ICC and thereby initiate investigations as took place in the situations
of Sudan/Darfur (UN-Resolution S/RES/1593 in 2005) and Libya (UN-Resolution
S/RES/1970 in 2011). During the process of negotiating the institutional design, it
was highly disputed to authorize the UNSC with this possibility (Pinchon, 2011, 8):
Proponents of the UNSC’s right to refer regarded it as a chance to have an alter-
native to the establishment of ad-hoc tribunals (Arsanjani, 1999), while opponents
feared that those rights would undermine the credibility and independence of the ICC
(Williams/Schabas, 2008).
According to article 16 (deferral of investigation or prosecution) the UNSC is allowed to
request the ICC (under chapter VII UN-Charter) to defer investigations or prosecutions
for a period of 12 months. The background of article 16 is the concern of the UNSC
that the jurisdiction of the ICC could clash with ongoing conflict resolutions with UN
peace-keeping missions. Accordingly, it was discussed to exclude the jurisdiction of the
ICC over situations under consideration by the UNSC. Since many states feared this
would undermine the ICC, a compromise was reached that provided that the UNSC
can adopt a resolution to request a 12 month deferral from the ICC (Arsanjani, 1999,
26f.).
In 2004 the UN-ICC Relationship Agreement (UN-ICC RA) was concluded. Herein,
it is emphasized that the ICC acts as an independent institution and both institutions
recognize the status and mandate of each other (art. 2 UN-ICC RA). They agree
63 In the case of payment arrears for at least two years a state has no vote (art. 117 para. 8).
64 The UNSC is composed by the five permanent veto powers (France, Russia, China, USA, Great
Britain) as well as ten non-permanent members that are elected for two years.
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to cooperate closely and consult each other on matters of common interests (art. 3
UN-ICC RA). If a state party or a non-state party that has entered into an ad-hoc
agreement fails to cooperate, the ICC may inform the UNSC, if it has brought the
matter to the court, according to article 87 (requests for cooperation). As laid down
in article 115 (funds of the court and the ASP), the ICC receives grants from the
UNSC, subject to the approval of the UN-GA, in those cases that are referred to the
ICC by the UNSC. Since the adoption of the Kampala Amendment, the rights of the
UNSC within the ICC was even broadened to some extent. The crime of aggression is
defined as:
“the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position e ectively
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act
of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation
of the Charter of the United Nations.” (art. 8bis Rome Statute)
For the exercise of jurisdiction over a crime of aggression referred to the ICC, by state
referral or proprio motu, it is laid down that the UNSC can make a determination of
an act of aggression.
“Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an
investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, he or she shall first ascertain whether
the Security Council has made a determination of an act of aggression committed by
the State concerned. The Prosecutor shall notify the Secretary-General of the United
Nations of the situation before the Court, including any relevant information and doc-
uments.” (art. 8bis, para. 6 Rome Statute)
If such a determination has been made, the ICC is able to start its investigations
(art. 8bis, para. 7). If no determination is made after six month, the ICC can proceed
investigation nevertheless (art. 8bis, para. 8) and it is stressed that: “A determination
of act of aggression by an organ outside the Court shall be without prejudice to the
Court’s own findings under this Statute” (art. 8bis, para. 9 Rome Statute). Thus, a
crime of aggression has to be in concordance with the UN charter and to some extent
one can consider the ICC Chief-Prosecutor to be supervised by the UNSC, which can
be considered to be an executive authority.
We can conclude that the legislative power lies in the hand of the ASP. Nevertheless,
the behavior of the UNSC in the case of the Resolution 1422 shows that the UNSC
snatches legislative decisions, too (Heselhaus, 2002, 914). We can assume that the
ASP accepts this because the ICC is dependent of the support of the UN, especially
of the UNSC, to enforce legal decisions and to hold states accountable to cooperate
with the ICC (art. 87 ICC-Statute). In this sense, the UNSC is to some extent part of
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the executive power of the ICC, too. Particularly insofar as it has to make political
decisions to maintain international peace and security in international relations while
the ICC itself is bound by legal interpretations of the Rome Statute.65
A huge part of executive power lies to some extent still in the hand of the states
(parties) themselves. This can be explained with several aspects: Firstly, the Rome
Statute emphasizes the complementary character of the ICC and thereby recognizes the
sovereignty of the states. Secondly, the Rome Statute recognize the principles of the
United Nations, particularly the territorial integrity and the political independence
of the states. Thirdly, the states play an important role in the enforcement of the
sentences and rulings of the ICC, such as the terms of imprisonment in the prisons
of the states parties (art. 103 of the Rome Statute). In the logic of the law following
the Lockean thinking, only the executive power is allowed to use force to sanction
violations of law. However, as shown above, we cannot clearly say in which hand the
executive power lies, but in a sense it is spread amongst ASP, UNSC and the states
themselves. The former judge and president of the ICTY Jorda is of the opinion:
“International society is and shall remain, above all, a society of sovereign states, and
respect for this sovereignty is the price to pay for the promotion of any international
institutional mechanism, a fortiori a judicial one.” (Jorda, 2004, 580)
It becomes clearer that states tend to constrain their commitments to the ICC as
they try to keep up strategic spaces to react on unforeseen events, especially since
every state know, that states parties do have diverging interests towards the ICC, as
they have di erent benefits of becoming state party to the ICC. We can consider the
establishment of international courts as an attempt of transferring the international
relations into a liberal system, with the striving for peace, security and rule of law.
Still, in the sense of Hobbes, we are missing a global Leviathan in international rela-
tions. Outside of the EU, a supranational enforcement is non-existent. While there
is enforcement to some extent, as in the UNSC, political ambitions and problems of
collective action are often so strong that “enforcement [is] late, inadequate, or lacking
completely” (Simmons, 2008, 200).
In the Lockean thinking of liberalism we can assume states only commit and obey to
international law if the power guarding it is able to respect the states and to protect
their autonomy and security.
65 “In order to ensure prompt and e ective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,
and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on
their behalf” (art. 24(1) UN Charter).
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“For all Power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end,
whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be
forfeited, and the Power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who may place
it anew where they shall think best: for their safety and security. And thus the Com-
munity perpetually retains a Supream Power of saving themselves from the attempts
and designs of any Body, even of their Legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish,
or so wicked, as to lay and carry on designs against the Liberties and Properties of the
Subject.” (para. 149) (Locke, 1967 [1689], 385)
When becoming a state party to an international court such as the ICC, states have
to delegate sovereignty. If the court is not able to protect them, the risk becomes too
high and they have to retain a space for political space strategy for self-defense in both
domestic and foreign politics. In that respect, the benefits of delegating power to the
ICC are limited. Since the ICC is a court of last resort, states cannot expect the ICC
to protect their autonomy, safety and property reliably and su ciently. Most of the
states cannot a ord to delegate sovereignty to the ICC unreserved, since they need to
retain a political space that is big enough to be able to protect themselves for the case
that the ICC cannot or will not help them.
We can resume that submission needs democratic incentives or autocratic force. If
a political power is not able to protect those it is superior to, the inferior does not
have su cient incentives to submit comprehensively and to obey to the law. For the
ICC this means that the court itself is not able to protect the state from war crimes,
genocide, crimes against humanity or aggression. Furthermore, it is missing clear
institutional counterparts, especially an executive that would be able to ensure such
a protection, following instead the principle of complementarity. And exactly because
of this, the states do not have enough reasons to submit comprehensively.
This is aggravated by the instable situation of the ICC, which can not only lead
to uncertainty of protection on the part of the court, but also the ICC itself can
be perceived as a risk of security, if it turns out to be too weak to shield trials of
politicization of particular interests of powerful states, or if it turns out to be too
strong for the states in order to ensure the complementarity. The court’s paradox
occurs especially in institutions in which states that have strong judicial institutions
fall back into a demonstration of power.
Thus, the states have to fear that the ICC is too weak to cope with those power
ambitions and particular interests or becomes too strong towards the sovereignty of
the states, acting as an own political player and in the worst case, going out of control
of the states (see Figure 8).
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Figure 8: Fear of Politicization and Juristocracy
3.3.2 What if the ICC is too Weak? Fear of Politicization
Even though the ICC is a court of high independence, it has to overcome the challenge
of cooperating with and concurrently bearing up against the UN-Security Council,
against the governments of the ASP and their domestic veto-players and especially
against the states that are not party to the ICC. Being aware of this charged rela-
tionship, many states worry about the power and performance of the court, and most
of all, its ability to protect itself against politicization in the sense of (mis)using its
institutional design for political particular interests. What if the ICC is too week to
withstand the manifold interests and preferences of political actors in international
relations?
Three consequences or at least indicators of the ICC being too weak are broadly
debated in the political academic discourse: a) the tactical (mis)use of the ICC to
get rid of political opponents, b) the selective (non-)cooperation of the states for own
political interests, c) the self-empowerment of the UNSC as gatekeeper of the ICC.
Additionally, a subsequent discourse related to the above mentioned tactical (mis)use
of the ICC falls under hijacking the argument of politicization shielding oneself against
the ICC.
There is fear of politicization of the ICC if there is a case of a) tactical (mis-
)use to delegitimize the political opposition. This fear, however, is not new.
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Even during the time of the ancient Greeks war criminals were prosecuted. Those
war tribunals were mainly national or local and often ine ective, even if those that
were responsible for the war crimes remained in power and prosecuted the political
opponents (Schabas, 2011, 1f). To this day, a certain fear of ’victor’s justice’ remains
and there are still several political and academic voices that express the concern of
exploiting international criminal courts tactically to get rid of political opponents.
Subotic (2009) speaks of the phenomenon of ’hijacking justice’, meaning that TJ-
instruments have become such a popular way of coping with past atrocities, that
some states use them to get rid of political opponents or to gain membership in an
IO or Regional Organization (RO), such as the EU. She argues that those who truly
believe in social change and international norms often have no influence on the political
decisions of such (post-)conflict states, while those actors which have influence often
act strategically for their own political purpose. As an example, she refers to the ICTY
and the Srebrenica massacre. Most of the people in the former Yugoslavia would have
considered it as victor’s justice to hold international trials against some individuals.
Most of the perpetrators still live free. People would have only agreed because this
was a condition for EU candidacy.66
Claude Jorda, former judge at the ICTY said:
“This is the specificity, as well as the ambiguity, of international courts that refuse vic-
tors’ justice: a delicate balance must be struck between political realism and absolute
justice. From this perspective, the truth is evident: international courts must accommo-
date themselves to the political environment, whether we like it or not.” (Jorda, 2004,
579)
However, the concern of victor’s justice must be taken into perspective, since there is
huge debate on whether only the ’big fish’, meaning civilian or military leaders shall
be prosecuted or also the ’small fries’, meaning the lower-ranking perpetrators. Since
the ICTY was in the beginning of its work criticized for prosecuting too many lower
ranking perpetrators, both ICTY and ICTR have been urged to concentrate on the
’big fish’ (O’Brien, 2012). Thus, we have to take into account that the feelings of
being blamed or wronged as a nation arises from the fact that often only the leading
military and civilian personnel are accused, due to the development of the principle
at all international criminal courts, that not every violation of severe human rights or
humanitarian law lead to international criminal responsibility. But rather only the big
66 Subotic (2009) thereby referred to a report of the International Crisis Group from 2000, “War
Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska: Who Are the People in Your Neighborhood”, see:
https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/bosnia-and-herzegovina/
war-criminals-bosnias-republika-srpska (17-02-2017).
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fishes are prosecuted. Thereby there is a certain clash of the perspectives of the victims
and the considerations on the restrictions of feasibility of international criminal law.
Although there are good reasons for prosecuting only chiefly responsible persons and
limiting the jurisdiction to a certain time frame, according to Jetschke (2011), this
can create some unintended incentives for di erent domestic actors to choose between
di erent instruments of transitional justice. As a consequence it is possible to observe
that amnesties are likely if the superior conflict group is in government, while criminal
trials are most likely if the former inferior conflict group is in government. In the case
of the ad-hoc and hybrid tribunals, we can observe that the probability of establishing
criminal trials is highest if the former defeated party is in government, while granting
amnesties is probable if the superior party is in government.
During the development of the institutional design of the Rome Statute, one central
issue was to try to prevent victor’s justice and contain the potential danger of a
strategical establishment of a court to get rid of undesirable opponents. This was done
by establishing a permanent court and by having di erent possibilities of triggering
investigations and prosecutions. Indeed, if we have a look at those cases that came to
the ICC by state-referral (art. 14), we can observe a clear pattern.
Cassese (2006) stresses that in all situations that are referred by states, the conflicts
concerned are domestic and most of the crimes were committed by rebels, such as in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic and Mali.
However, in those situations that are referred by the UNSC (e.g.Darfur/Sudan) or
initiated proprio motu by the Chief-Prosecutor of the ICC (Kenya, Libya, Ivory Coast)
there are investigations even against states o cials. He argues that states are unlikely
to accuse o cials of other states. He refers to Alberico Gentili, a scholar of civil and
international law in the 17th century, who said: “diaboulus non vexat”, i.e. the devil
does not torment the devil, which again refers to Aristotle’s “canis caninam non est”,
i.e. a dog does not eat a dog (Cassese, 2006, 435). Thus, we see a tactical usage by
the states to cope with domestic opponents. We must admit that this would speak in
favor of the ICC strengthening the position of states, if they must struggle with civil
wars or civil commotions, they could not deal with by themselves.
A second concern about politicization (as result of the ICC being too weak) is b)
selective (non-)cooperation of states for political reasons. In an interview in
2014, the former Chief-Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda said:
“[W]e should at all costs prevent the Court from being politicized. We should contin-
uously and always be guided by the evidence and the Rome Statute legal framework.
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These alone, not any other consideration, guide the O ce’s actions.” (Bensouda, 2014,
3)
There, she referred to the fact that since the ICC concentrates on the persons respon-
sible mainly for crimes committed, often heads of state or heads of militia are accused,
such as Thomas Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), former leader of the militia UPC (Union
des Partrioes Congolaise); Muammar al-Gaddafi, former President of Libya (ICC-
01/11-01/11); Laurent Gbagbo, former President of Ivory Coast (ICC-02/1101/15) or
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, President of Kenya (ICC-01/09-02/11). However, because of
their position and their political power, those persons are often protected by the army
or the state apparatus and it is hard to gather information and evidence. Lastly, it is
very di cult to obtain their surrender as in the case of Omar al-Bashir in Darfur (ICC-
02/05-01/09). We can consider coping with the politically motivated noncooperation
of the states concerned as a serious challenge.
A third concern about politicization (as result of the ICC being too weak) is the c) (self-
)empowerment of the UNSC as gatekeeper of the ICC. As mentioned above, the ICC
as the judicial power with the ASP as the legislative power is missing a clear executive
counterpart. Unless the states can be considered as the executive power, the UNSC is
at least a part of the executive power. It is able to refer situations to the ICC, even if
the states are not party to the Rome Statute. Moreover, the UNSC may mobilize the
pressure of the UN in cases of noncooperation that are seen in the obstruction of the
ICC’s investigations and prosecutions or the non-recognition of sentences.
We can say that the UNSC plays a paramount role in the ICC regime. On one hand,
the ICC needs the support of the UNSC to increase the legitimization of investigations
and prosecutions to put pressure on the enforcement of the rulings. One the other,
the ICC is a potential gateway for politicization. Since three (China, Russia and the
USA) of the five veto-powers have not ratified the Statute of Rome, it provides a certain
wiggle room not only for the world powers, but also for non-party states of the ICC. A
possible broadening of the rights of the UNSC, as could arise from jurisdictional rules
of the crime of aggression, is widely considered as problematic.
Paulus (2010) warns against the expansion of the prerogative of the UNSC within the
ICC-regime referring to the jurisdiction of the crime of aggression:
“[D]o we really want to make prosecution of one of the gravest crimes dependent on a
political body in which the great powers have veto power to shield themselves and their
allies entirely from prosecution? As the brief history of the ICC has shown, the Security
Council will not refrain from using its prerogatives under Chapter VII and article 103 of
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the Charter to claim precedence over the ICC, as has already happened when it shielded
UN forces from the jurisdiction of the Court.” (Paulus, 2010, 1125)
He refers inter alia to S/Res/1422 from 2002, where the UNSC requested the ICC
to defer from investigation and prosecution, if o cials or personnel from a non-party
state of the ICC act in UN peace-keeping operations.
“1.Requests, consistent with the provisions of article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the
ICC, if a case arises involving current or former o cials or personnel from a contributing
State not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations
established or authorized operation, shall for a twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002
not commence or proceed with investigation or prosecution of any such case, unless the
Security Council decides otherwise;
2. Expresses the intention to renew the request in paragraph 1 under the same conditions
each 1 July for further 12-month periods for as long as may be necessary”. S/Res/1422
The background of the resolution was the veto of the USA against the prolongation of
the UN operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the justification that the USA would
not risk a politically motivated prosecution of their military personnel. The Resolution
1422 could be considered as ’blank immunity’ for non-party states operating in UN
peacekeeping mission, since those do not have to request the ICC in a particular case,
but are excluded in any arising case. This is notwithstanding the fact that there is a
concrete danger that non-party states would not take part in a certain UN mission.
After the enactment of the Resolution 1422, the USA withdrew its signature of the
Rome Statute pursuing to not violate the prohibition of obstructing the execution of
the agreement (Heselhaus, 2002).
With regard to the jurisdiction of the crime of aggression, there is the concern that the
UNSC uses its prerogatives to decide if there will be investigations and prosecutions
or not, since it is allowed to determine a crime of aggression. However, this is no
condition for exercising jurisdiction (Ambos, 2010, 664 .), but rather a ’jurisdictional
filter’ (Barriga/Grover, 2011, 523). The major role of the UNSC concerning trigger-
ing investigations and prosecutions Kreß (2010) acknowledges the critique of Paulus
(2010):
With the birth of the ICC, the international community attempted to cut the cord that
linked international criminal justice to the critique of ’victor’s justice’ and ’policy in
the disguise of law’ which previously plagued it. Adherence to the principal of equal
application of law must now be considered as a minimum requirement of legitimacy for a
system of permanent international justice. To subject the ICC to the veto power of the
permanent members of the Security Council falls foul of meeting this basic requirement
(Kreß, 2010, 1143).
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A further discourse, as variation of politicization can be identified that can be described
as hijacking the fear of politicization in order to protect themselves against the ICC
or even as justifying the narrative to fight the ICC. The aforementioned concerns
about politicizing the ICC by unintended e ects of the institutional design, such as
the tactical usage of investigations, the non-cooperation for political reasons and the
gate-keeping of the UNSC must be clearly di erentiated from political debates that
increase those concerns hyperbolically in order to blame the ICC as a Trojan horse of
politicization and, thus, as a danger for international relations.
There are several examples in which, ironically, heads of states that are opposed to the
ICC accuse the court of being highly politicized and therefore not worth supporting.
However, those accusations did not come up in political fundamental debates, but in
certain political situations, in which there is reason to argue that they act like this to
undermine the ICC in order to avert negative consequences for the own state or the
own political group. Respectively, we can consider those narratives as an instrument
to undermine the legitimization of the ICC, justifying their evasive behavior regarding
the ICC.
One example is that the USA blames the ICC of being a threat for peacekeeping
operations and humanitarian interventions. As discussed above, the USA justified
its veto during the debates on a prolongation of the UN peacekeeping operation in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (UN-MIBH) with the concern that US-soldiers could be in risk of
politically motivated prosecution by the ICC (Heselhaus, 2002, 907). However, at this
time (spring 2002), the USA had only one troop deployed for UN peacekeeping and
this was stationed in Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNMEE) and not in Bosnia-Herzegovina in
UN-MIBH.67
In general, we can observe that the USA are surely the largest donor for UN peace-
keeping operations. For the time frame of June 2016 until July 2017, the USA donated
28.57% of the $7,81 billion budget for peacekeeping operations.68 Interestingly, the
number of troops deployed to UN peacekeeping operations is in general relatively
small.69
67 See country contributions detailed by mission, available under: http:
//www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml
(26-01-17).
68 Among the main contributors are: 1. United States (28.57%), 2. China (10.29%), 3. Japan
(9.68%), 4.Germany (6.39%), 5. France (6.31%), 6.United Kingdom (5.80%), 7. Russian
Federation (4.01%), 8. Italy (3.75%), 9. Canada (2.92%), 10. Spain (2.44%). See
A/70/331/Add. 1, Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235 and 55/23, available
under: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/331/Add.1 (26-01-17).
69 In the annual statistics of the UN peacekeeping the contributions per country are calculated for
military and civilian police. To rank only the troops deployed data has to be garnered directly
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In July 2005, the USA contributed 10 troops of 59,329 that were stationed worldwide
in UN peacekeeping operations and thereby ranked 53th. In July 2010 it was 16 troops
of 83,899 worldwide (rank 64) and in July 2015 it was 28 troops of 91,151 worldwide
(rank 74). In the same month in which after all the prolongation of UN-MIBH was
decided in S/Res/1423 on 12 July 2002, the Rome Statute entered into force and the
ICC started its work. Viewed in this light, the US concern on politicized prosecutions
of US soldiers seemed to be a justification narrative blaming the ICC, for whatever
the true reasons were.
Another example, that is even harsher, is the accusation from some African states that
the ICC is a ’(neo-)colonial instrument of imperialism’. This allegation was supported
by the fact that all eight situations under investigation between 2002 and 2012 took
place in African States70. We can put this into a global comparative perspective in
that the African continent su ers notably from many armed conflicts.
Further, among the African states many more ratified the Rome Statute than Asian
States. Half of the situations were referred by the states themselves. There are indeed
several e orts of the ICC outside the African continent, such as in Columbia since
2004, Iraq/UK 2006 or Afghanistan since 2007. In those cases the ICC carries out
only preliminary examinations and until now those e orts were less well known to
the global public. Perhaps this is why the allegation of the ICC being (neo-)colonial
instrument of imperialism attracted widespread attention.
Several states of the African Union have criticized the ICC of being a tool of Western
powers. In a speech to the AU on 12 October 2013, Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta
urged the African states to withdraw from the ICC. He called the ICC a ’tool of
Western powers’ and emphasized that the true friends of Kenya would be the USA,
China, India, Russia, Brazil and South Africa. Most of these states are not parties to
the ICC, except for Brazil and South Africa. Kenyatta was supported by several other
African leaders, particularly from President Kagame of Rwanda, President Museveni
of Uganda, and Prime Minister Desalegn of Ethiopia.71
These heads of states all are autocratic, all have a very violent recent past. Rwanda
and Ethiopia States are not even party to the ICC. Thus, we can see that the blaming
of the ICC was rather used as a justification narrative for acts of non-cooperation or
from the monthly listed statistics. This is broken down into civilian police, military observers
and troops.
70 DR Congo (ICC-01/04), Uganda (ICC-02/04), Darfur/Sudan (ICC-02/05), CAR I (ICC-01/05),
Kenya (ICC-01/09), Libya (ICC-01/11), Ivory Coast (ICC-02/11) and Mali (ICC-01/12).
71 See Makau W. Mutua in the New York Times, 5 November 2013:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/opinion/kenya-tests-international-justice.html
(24-01-17).
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even to lay the groundwork for legitimization of a possible future withdrawal from the
ICC.
A further example of seeking to avoid the negative consequences of investigations and
prosecutions is the allegation from some voices in Israel that the ICC would promote
terrorism and be used as a ’tool of legal warfare’. On 1 January 2015, the State of
Palestine accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC under art. 12(3) over crimes committed
in the Palestinian territory including East Jerusalem since June 2014 and then acceded
to the Rome Statute, now being a regular state party to the ICC.72
This step was criticized from many sides as a threat to the peace-building process
between Israel and Palestine. Israel reacted with outrage and Foreign Minister Lieber-
mann requested several states to cancel the financing of the ICC. According to news-
paper reports, he called the ICC a political institution that no longer has a right to
exist. Prime Minister Netanjahu described the decision of the ICC initiating prelim-
inary examinations as absurd immediately following the terrorist murder of Jewish
civilians in Paris.73
The White House under Obama expressed the opinion that Palestinians would not
be eligible to join the ICC because they would not constitute a state. Establishing
a permanent state would be a violation of the Oslo Accords.74 In TheTrumpet, an
US-magazine of the Philadelphia Church of God the spokesman of the Israeli Foreign
Ministry, Emmanuel Nahshon, was cited:
“The Palestinians have started a legal warfare, which is not useful to peace, and we
call upon the Palestinians and also upon the important members of the international
community to make sure that this will not happen. At the end of the day the Palestinians
may easily find themselves on the bench of the accused at this international tribunal
since the Palestinian Authority is now in a national unity government with a terror
organization.” Emmanuel Nahshon75
However, we have to take the argument from Nahshon into perspective, because a
state referral (be it under art. 14 or under art. 12(3)) is only possible if there is a state.
72 Making those two steps in two succeeding days is reasoned with the fact that the declaration
under article 12(3) was written yet on 13 June 2014, first day of the third Gaza war.
73 See ’Die ZEIT’, 18 January 2015: http:
//www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2015-01/nahostkonflikt-israel-boykott-strafgerichtshof
(25-01-2017).
74 See Palestinians and the International Criminal Court, New York Times, 24 June 2015:
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/world/middleeast/
palestinians-and-the-international-criminal-court-what-you-need-to-know.html
(08-08-2017).
75 See the speech of Emmanuel Nahshon available in ’The Trumpet’ at: https://www.thetrumpet.
com/article/12355.19.0.0/israel-palestinians-started-legal-warfare-by-joining-icc
(08-08-2017).
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When taking the view that Palestine is not considered a state, then the ICC would not
be able to initiate a preliminary examination. In that sense, the referral of Palestine
can be considered an instrumentalization of the ICC as it strengthens the narrative of
Palestine being a sovereign state. This however leads us to another fear towards the
ICC, raising the question: What if the ICC becomes too strong?
3.3.3 What if the ICC is too Strong? Fear of Juristocracy
There is fear that the ICC could become a puppet on a string in the hands of political
forces. In the worst case scenario, their very own political opposition could act as
puppeteer, and thereby instrumentalize the ICC. Conversely, what if the ICC becomes
too strong and starts to act as an own political player that makes its own decisions
and, in the worst case, goes beyond the control of the Assembly of States Parties?
These considerations must not necessarily contradict the points above, e.g. the mis-
use of the ICC weakening the opposition. They do have in the first instance another
point of departure for their arguments. Rather than worrying that the ICC is too
weak, they consider the court an unassailable, powerful actor in international rela-
tions. In the last three decades, we find, mainly in the literature on constitutional
courts, but increasingly also in the literature on regional and international courts,
the concept of a ’judicialization of politics’, i.e.more and more courts restrain the
scope for action in politics or even make politics (Vallinder, 1995; Stone Sweet, 1999;
Shapiro/Stone Sweet, 2002). Already in 1981, Shapiro describes a growth of political
jurisprudence, meaning that courts deviate from the prototype of a court. He speaks of
’uncourtlike courts’ behaving ’like other political actors’ (Shapiro, 1981, 1). Likewise,
Vallinder (1995) finds that ’the courts go marching in’.
In the context of the debate on the concept of ’global governance’, law becomes one
central instrument alongside power, economy and civil society. The increasing im-
portance of law leads to a process of global constitutionalization beyond the state,
and thus to an, albeit incomplete, global rule of law (Zangl/Zürn, 2004; Zangl, 2009).
Hirschl (2008) is of the opinion that beyond the judicialization of constitutional courts
there is an increasing judicialization of mega-politics. He sees three phenomena being
described by the concept of judicialization: the spread of legal discourse and jargon
into the political sphere, the expansion of judges and courts determining public policy
outcomes and the emergence of judges and courts dealing with mega-politics, meaning
political debates that influence whole polities.
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“[T]he judicialization of politics is often treated as obvious byproduct of the global
convergence toward constitutional supremacy and the prevalence of rights discourse.
What is more, the judicialization of politics is often used indiscriminately to refer to
what in fact are several distinct phenomena, these range from judicial activism and
rights jurisprudence to debates over judicial appointment and the politicization of the
judiciary – the inevitable flip side of judizialization.” (Hirschl, 2008, 120)
In the issue area of transitional or restorative justice for example, he sees the Ad-hoc
and hybrid tribunals as well as the ICC as important examples of a judicialization of
mega-politics in international relations. Moreover, he refers to domestic institutions as
the quasi-judicial truth commissions, e.g. in the post-apartheid era in South Africa or
the newly created constitutional courts in in the post-communist era of Europe playing
an important role in restorative and transitional justice. In the Czech Republic for
example, the constitutional court decided in 1993 that the entire Communist era was
illegal (Hirschl, 2008, 127f.). He describes this phenomenon as ’juristocracy’, meaning
the new global constitutionalism and the judicialization of ’mega-politics’ (Hirschl,
2004, 169 .).
There is a danger, that Guzman (2013) calls the ’Frankenstein Problem’. It means that
states create international organizations to promote both international cooperation and
own political interests. However, the organization could become too strong and the
risk arises of it doing harm that outweighs the potential benefits it o ers.
“States, then, face what I term the ’Frankenstein problem’ when they create IOs. By
creating a new entity states hope to address some common problem. Once created,
however, the new entity has a life of its own and cannot be fully controlled by individual
states. Importantly, there is a direct trade-o  between the need to give the IO enough
authority to be e ective and the desire to guard against the risk that it will become a
monster.” (Guzman, 2013, 1000)
In case of the ICC, we can identify at least three aspects of a possible ’juristocracy’
becoming a Frankenstein: raising the fear of the states (parties) that the ICC could
become ’too strong’ and thus overstretch its actual tasks: d) international courts dom-
inating the political agenda setting, e) positive or negative lawmaking by international
courts, and f) the increase of the power of the ICC-Chief-Prosecutor.
Firstly, there is the concern about d) international courts dominating the agenda
setting. In the case of the ICC, this refers to appropriate tools of peace-building,
peacekeeping and democratization and the potential use of di erent instruments of
transitional justice. In the field of research of transitional justice, there is a controver-
sial debate on the establishment of courts and tribunals instead of granting amnesties.
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We can expect the ICC to have deterrent e ects in stopping ongoing civil wars, pre-
venting the future outbreak of war and atrocities76 as well as providing support in
dealing with the past.77 Nevertheless, there are critical voices claiming that the ICC
in becoming too strong could displace other ways of building peace or dealing with a
violent past. There is a peace-versus-justice-debate on being cautious with too many
criminal prosecutions as local needs have to be considered (Hazan, 2006) as well as
leaving room for tactical concessions during peace negotiations.
Snyder/Vinjamuri (2003) go one step further and argue that the prosecution of atroc-
ities is a risk leading to new atrocities because it pays insu cient attention to local
political situations. Since international criminal courts often su er from the lack of
cooperation of both the powerful international key states and the states were the atroc-
ities happened, it is questionable if the strategy of prosecution is successful. They con-
sider amnesties as more e ective in facilitating peace-building and political reforms.
While the prosecution of past abuses inflame the conflicts, amnesties are an appropri-
ate tool to allow a peaceful negotiation between the conflict groups, making it possible
to arrive at justice later. This follows their formula: “Justice does not lead; it fol-
lows” (Snyder/Vinjamuri, 2003, 6), meaning that a political order must be established
upon the bargaining of the political groups and administrative institutions have to be
created to enable law enforcement.
Ginsburg (2009) shares the view, emphasizing however, that it is better to make prag-
matic decisions to build peace and security, instead of blundering into a trap of moral
hazards that occur if states follow the incentive to avoid peace deals because of the fear
of being prosecuted: “In a world with 194 sovereigns it may sometimes be preferable
to leave the decision to the local actor rather than require blanket prosecution in every
available case.” (Ginsburg, 2009, 509). Sands (2016, 381) summarized it as follows:
“[It] poses a serious challenge to our system of international law confronted with a
tangible tension: on the one hand, people are killed because they happen to be members
of a certain group; on the other, the recognition of that fact by the law tends to make
more likely the possibility of conflict between groups, by reinforcing the sense of group
identity.”
In the worst case the ICC encourage leaders to fight harder. This is reasoned in the
fact that negotiating a peace agreement can mean a risk of being punished for the
atrocity committed and thereby continuing to fight and prolonging the conflict can
become a rational alternative (Dancy/Montal, 2017, 656).
76 Interestingly, between 1998 and 2017 there began 79 new armed conflicts in non-party states and
only 13 in party states of the ICC (Dancy, 2017, 650 .).
77 For the benefits of the ICC in dealing with the past see on p. 85.
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There are scholarly debates as to which TJ-instrument is better for achieving peace
and if international criminal tribunals lead to deterrence of future crimes. However, we
have to recognize that in the view of the states it can be a problem if the agenda setting
of peace-building and transitional justice is dominated by international criminal law.
Sometimes other TJ-instruments seem more desirable for either normative reasons or
because of rational benefits.
Furthermore, there are concerns about the extent to which courts influence policy out-
comes and the legitimization of the judicial power through e) international courts
as (negative or positive) lawmakers. In the case of international criminal law,
the development of the legal norms took place concurrently starting in Nuremberg and
continuing until Rome. Danner (2006) argues that only states have the authority to
make law, but with the proliferation of international courts and the growth of their
importance, courts and judges tend to make law. She sees one pivotal indicator in
the fact that UNSC decides to enforce the law of war as interpreted by temporarily
restricted international criminal tribunals.
“The interaction between international criminal law and the laws of war suggests the
importance of international judicial lawmaking, illustrates the powerful role that tem-
porary institutions can play in the development of international norms, and underscores
the importance of theoretical models of international relations that account for changes
in states’ preferences over time. (...) [S]tates often tacitly delegate lawmaking authority
(...), [but] (...) do not acknowledge this delegation, however, in order both to perpetuate
the fiction of state hegemony over international norm generation and to provide a shield
behind which international courts can make law without su ering paralyzing political
pressure that would negate their ability to do so.” (Danner, 2006, 3 .)
She holds the view that judicial lawmaking is most likely when the norms behind it are
old and the political conditions have changed, and it is less probable that there will be
a treaty revision. Between 1945 and 1997 the USA can be considered as a dominant
proponent of enforcing international criminal law. In a speech, US President Bill
Clinton said:
“At Nuremberg, the international community declared that those responsible for crimes
against humanity will be held accountable without the usual defenses a orded to people
in times of war. (...) In the years since Nuremberg, the hope that convicting those guilty
of making aggressive war would deter future wars and prevent future crimes against
humanity, including genocide, frankly, has gone unfulfilled too often. (...) No peace will
endure for long without justice. (...) Only justice can lift the burden of collective guilt.
(...) Only justice can assign responsibility to the guilty and allow everyone else to get
on with the hard work of rebuilding and reconciliation.” (Clinton, 1996, 10 .)
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However, since the USA was outvoted in 1997, they became one of the hardest oppo-
nents to the ICC. Actually, they wanted a court within the legal regime of the United
Nations, that is subordinate to the UNSC. Thus, the hostility of the United States to
the ICC cannot be explained su ciently with the argument of protecting their own
nationals from prosecutions. After all, ICTY, ICTR and SCSL had jurisdiction over
US-nationals. According to Schabas (2004), the reason they reject the ICC is simply
that it is not subject to the power of the US as a permanent member of the UNSC. In
2000, Clinton made a statement at the US signing of the Rome Statute, saying:
“We do so to rea rm our strong support for international accountability and for bringing
to justice perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. We do
so as well because we wish to remain engaged in making the ICC an instrument of
impartial and e ective justice in the years to come. (...) In signing, however, we are
not abandoning our concerns about significant flaws in the Treaty. (...) Signature
will enhance our ability to further protect U.S. o cials from unfounded charges and to
achieve the human rights and accountability objectives of the ICC.” (Clinton, 2000)
It might be a further explanation for the US objections to the ICC that international
courts like the ICC shape international norms and politics on their own and they
fear the ICC becoming too strong. It is seen as an institution that could become a
danger for the US hegemonic claims, setting the global agenda and deciding over the
appropriateness of norms and the admissibility of ways and means, as we can see in
the selectivity of humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention (Moyn, 2014, 35 .).
Moreover, there is the problem of ’dual obligation’. Although the ICC has jurisdiction
to determine ’criminal responsibility of individuals’ and not the ’responsibility of a
state’ it makes indirectly statements on state responsibility, in particular if a crime is
committed by a state o cial or a state agent (Akande/Tzanakopoulos, 2017, 33):
“[A]ll the ’core crimes’ are not addressed merely to individuals but are also related to
the same (or substantially similar) obligations imposed on states. The prohibition on
genocide is addressed both to individuals and to states; war crimes are serious violations
of international humanitarian law, which is clearly binding on states; and crimes against
humanity are derived essentially from human rights law.”
This means for the states that they have to be cautious that the investigation or
prosecution of individual civilians does not lead to major state responsibility and thus
to larger consequences.
A further attribute of the independence of international courts is ’compétence de la
compétence’, i.e. a court is able to decide in case of doubt on the own jurisdiction
(Shelton, 2009). In the Rome Statute, the compétence de la compétence is laid down
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in article 18 [Preliminary rulings regarding admissibility] and article 19 [Challenges to
the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case].
One can consider the ’compétence de la compétence’ of the ICC insofar as restricted,
as it is not able to determine its own rules and procedures. Usually a court has the
right to determine its own rules on procedures rather than writing its own rules of
evidence. In the case of the ICC, the states decided that, although the court is able
to determine its own rules of evidence, the power to determine the rules of procedure
remains with the states themselves. Interestingly, the predecessor ICTY had the right
to determine those by itself.78
This could be an indication of minimizing the ’strategical space’ of the court (Steinberg,
2004) or of ’constrained independence’, according to Helfer/Slaughter (2005). That
is reasoned in the fear the ICC could overstretch its mandate. We can consider the
development of law even through the courts themselves as necessary for a legal regime.
“More generally, the judicial function is to apply existing, recognized rules or principles
of law to the questions before it, but these rules and principles have to be developed,
adapted, modified, and interpreted in the context of specific cases because all systems of
law are incomplete. In the drafting of international agreements, states sometimes decide
to reduce the negotiation costs and risk of defection by allowing deliberate ambiguities
to remain in the text.” (Shelton, 2009, 6f.)
There are also concerns on f) the expansion of privileges of the chief-prosecutor
and the possibility of civil society sending communications. There is a broader
debate in the literature on judges of both constitutional courts and international courts
becoming too strong. In the context of constitutional courts, many scholar consider
“judges as ’players’ in the policy game because of the separation of powers” (Shep-
sle, 2010), being important veto-players (Hönnige/Brouard, 2017). Many scholars see
the reason for judicial politics in the behavior of the judges as similar to politicians.
Stone Sweet (2002) states for the judges of the US Supreme Court:
“Since the Court generally deals with the ’trouble cases’, it is typically called upon to
decide precisely those questions for which neither the existing body of law nor the ither
agencies of government have been able to provide a solution.” (Stone Sweet, 2002, 25)
Shepsle (2010) is of the opinion:
78 Article 15 of the ICTY Statute says: “The judges of the International Tribunal shall adopt rules
of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and
appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other
appropriate matters.” (Shelton, 2009, 6).
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“As central players in important political institutions, judges are politicians; yet their
links to ’constituencies’ are attenuated by the fact that, through lifetime tenure, they
don’t need to have their contracts renewed by those constituencies at regular intervals.”
(Shepsle, 2010, 474)
Although the term of o ce at international courts is usually limited, judges are often
accused of pursuing a political agenda, mostly those of their home states, at the
international level. Posner/Figueiredo (2005) are of the opinion that despite of the
rise of states parties and possibilities of legal action, the usage of the ICJ became
increasingly rare. They argue that this is caused by the fact that the ICJ is strongly
influenced by the political interests of those states which dispatch the judges:
“[I]f judges identify with their countries, they may find it di cult to maintain impartial-
ity. International Courts of Justice judges are not only nationals who would normally
have strong emotional ties with their countries; they also have sent their careers in
national service as diplomats, legal advisors, administrators, and politicians.” (Pos-
ner/Figueiredo, 2005, 608)
In the contrary reading, we could argue that it would be very hard for the judges of
the ICC to act according to their nations of origin own interest, not to mention that
there are hardly any arguments for why they should want to do so. We can expect
them to be acting as servants of the international law itself. Particularly, lawyers that
work at international courts as judges or even as chief prosecutors usually look back
on a long career at di erent international courts. Nevertheless, we cannot deny that
there are some decision-makers at the governments of the states (parties) that have
concern that particular judges gain to much influence.
“International judges clearly do face political limitations, but the biggest constraint is
neither the lack of a world state, nor the lack of string coercive tools. Indeed, it really is
not clear that adding either of these features would change the reality that international
judges, like all judges, are legally and politically constrained.” (Alter, 2014, 8)
If there is any gateway for legal overstretch through judges in the case of the ICC, it
is the possibility of triggering investigations proprio motu (art. 15) or according of an
UNSC referral (art. 13b). Of course, we can argue that the initiation of investigations
by the Prosecutor is no legal overstretch, since this capability is set out clearly in the
Rome Statute. An UNSC referral is more problematic. This should only occur if there
is a grave breach of international peace. However, notwithstanding the question of
how far a legal overstretch of the ICC takes place or could take place, we can expect
states being concerned about this potential danger.
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In his statement on the US signature of the Rome Statute President Clinton explained
the objections of the USA indirectly with the strength of the Chief-Prosecutor:
“In particular, we are concerned that when the Court comes into existence , it will not
only exercise authority over personnel of states that have ratified the Treaty, but also
claim jurisdiction over personnel of states that have not. With signature, however, we
will be in signature, we will not.” (Clinton, 2000)
According to Schabas (2004) the USA is opposed to this because the Rome negotiations
did not result in the level of control that they wanted, especially more control through
the UNSC. This is one of the reasons that states fear that the ICC would become too
strong.
“Though the Court must not appear to be a paper tiger, as it takes its first steps, the
Prosecutor’s criminal justice policy must be tactfully made clear, such that the Court
seems neither the zealous guardian of a political balance not of its jurisdiction, nor the
intransigent censor of an as-yet unspecified world order.” (Jorda, 2004, 580)
The fear of the ICC becoming to strong through the role of the Chief-Prosecutor is
to some extent aggravated by the fact that the Chief Prosecutor is only possible to
trigger investigations proprio motu “on the basis of information on crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court” (art. 15 para. 1).
After examining the information he or she received “from States, organs of the United
Nations, intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable sources
that he or she deems appropriate, and may receive written or oral testimony at the
seat of the Court” (art. 15 para. 2). It can be argued that political costs of commit-
ting to international agreements can be considered as especially high if the agreement
empowers the citizens of the state to mobilize against their own state, either through
implications for the national legal system or by having established a channel for raising
audience (Simmons, 2009, 67f.). The threshold condition of receiving ’communications’
from i.a. non-governmental organization makes the ICC even more powerful towards
the states and the principle of complementarity is undermined to some extent.
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3.4 States Constrain and Customize their Commitments to the ICC
3.4.1 The Delegation Dilemma of States: Ratification or Not?
The considerations above have shown that there are both strong opportunities and high
risks when ratifying the Rome Statute and becoming a state party to the ICC. There
are several strong incentives for di erent kinds of states to become a state party to the
ICC. The first permanent criminal court can be considered a milestone in international
relations. It strengthened the monitoring and enforcement of humanitarian law and
human rights law by creating criminal responsibility for their most serious violations
by determining innocence or guilt of the individuals accused and in preventing future
violations by the e ect of deterrence (Shelton, 2009) for those crimes that “threaten the
peace, security and well-being in international relations” (Preamble Rome Statute).
The states which are usually already bound by large parts of humanitarian law and
human rights, receive several privileges when becoming a state party to the ICC, such
as the participation in the development and running of the court. For (post-)conflict
states the ICC is a chance to receive help and support in dealing with past atrocities
to establish or strengthen peace and democratization (Hughes/Thakur, 2007).
International criminal courts and tribunals are created to increase the enforcement of
humanitarian law and human rights (Schabas, 2011) and thereby cut-down monitoring
costs for the compliance with international law (Alter, 2004; Helfer/Slaughter, 2005)
that were previously monitored by the ICJ or the Ad-hoc and hybrid criminal courts
and tribunals. Democratic states can gain from this development since they often
have a higher general interest in the improvement of international peace and security
and they often are important financing states of international monitoring institutions.
But also for autocratic states and, even more so, states that are transforming from
autocracy to democracy, it would be a chance to increase the credibility of the states’
commitments to (re-)build peace and security and deal with past atrocities (Moravcsik,
2000; Simmons, 2009). Therefore, the ICC is able to increase international and national
security.
These strong opportunities might explain why most of the states have ratified the Rome
Statute and are states parties to the ICC, among them even many non-democratic
states, such as Afghanistan, Tunisia, Cambodia or the Republic of Congo. Nonetheless,
there are several reasons to be cautious towards the ICC. Becoming a state party to
the ICC brings with it some serious risks.
The ICC is the only international court in international relations that does not belong
to an established international organization. Since it is an enforcement court and not
123
an institution for mere dispute settlement or monitoring, it needs a strong executive
power to enforce its rulings and decisions. Even though the Assembly of States Par-
ties is the legislative power to the ICC and to some extent also takes over executive
functions, the ICC is still missing clear institutional counterparts (Tomuschat, 2010).
This leads to a certain instability in international relations and even more to a high
uncertainty for the states assessing the consequences of becoming a state party to the
ICC.
What if the ICC is too weak to withstand the manifold interests and preferences of
political actors in international relations and becomes a gateway for politicization?
There is a certain danger of a tactical misuse of the ICC’s jurisdiction in order to
get rid of political opponents. Many states choose a selective cooperation or non-
cooperation depending on their own political interests. Moreover, there is a certain
danger of the UNSC (with 3 of 5 non-party states) becoming a gatekeeper of the ICC.
What if the ICC becomes too strong, so that the principle of complementarity is eroded,
and the states become in danger of losing more autonomy and self-determination that
expected? The ICC can be considered as part of a larger growing judicialization
(Stone Sweet, 1999; Shapiro/Stone Sweet, 2002) or even ’juristocracy’ (Hirschl, 2004)
in international relations.
In the context of transitional justice and international security ICTs and the ICC
are decisive in shaping the agenda-setting of dealing with a violent past. Alternative
instruments like reprieves and pardons or even amnesties lose their relevancy. Criminal
courts play an important role in the development of international criminal law and in
some way are even contributing to negative or positive lawmaking (Danner, 2006) and,
sooner or later, the power of the ICC-Chief-Prosecutor has to be increased to balance
the di cult position of the court in international relations.
The ratification of the Rome Statute is related to certain risks for the states, which
raises concerns about unforeseen consequences in the long run. It might be true that
’hands-tying’ by becoming a state party to the ICC enhances the credibility of commit-
ments of (post-)conflict states willing to strengthen peace and democracy (Moravcsik,
2000; Simmons, 2009). This sends positive signals to domestic and international actors.
At the same time, many states su er from political instability and are in danger of
becoming even more vulnerable by delegating sovereignty to the ICC when tying their
own hands. In the worst case, they expose themselves to comparative disadvantages
towards their political opponents that did not bind themselves to the ICC.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that the states know that each state must cope
with those trade-o s. It is unclear how the other states will behave towards the ICC
124
Figure 9: Delegation Dilemma of States towards the ICC
and how far the court is able to withstand the strategical and tactical behavior of
the states. Thus, there is a certain mistrust of the other states as well as uncertainty
towards the ICC itself. This might explain why some states did not ratify the Rome
Statute or why many states at least selectively refuse to cooperate with the ICC.
As a result of the concurrency of strong opportunities and high risks, states get caught
in the delegation dilemma towards the ICC. Not ratifying would result in wa-
vering of the privileges of being a state party and perhaps forfeiting support in dealing
with the past, which is needed to strengthen freedom and security. However, ratifi-
cation could mean a high risk of comparative disadvantages and a loss of room for
strategical maneuver that is strongly needed to protect freedom and security and to
fix the broken window of impunity. This is aggravated by the fact that the more the
states need help and support of the ICC, the more they are exposed to the risk of
making themselves vulnerable towards political opponents. In the end, it comes down
to the classic balancing act between freedom and security.
3.4.2 Constraining Courts Solving the Delegation Dilemma
Solving the dilemma of delegating sovereignty to the ICC, states ratify the Rome
Statute to become a state party to the ICC (improving their freedom and security),
but constrain and customize their commitments to retain a certain room for political
maneuver (protecting the own freedom and security).
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Although it would be very worthwhile to delegate sovereignty to an international in-
stitution increasing peace and security, the states have to maintain some extent of
freedom to be able to protect themselves, since the ICC would not be able to compre-
hensively protect their security. We could say, since the benefits of delegating power
to the ICC are limited, the states respond in kind by limiting their delegation, too.
From the cradle to the grave, states are involved in creating and running international
courts. Often law and power are seen as two ends of a spectrum embodied in states
and courts as antagonists in international relations. It is the states that decide about
the creation of a court and its institutional design. It is the states that have to submit
to the courts voluntarily and that decide about the national implementation. It is the
states that finance the courts. It is the states that have to cooperate with the courts
that carry out investigations and prosecutions. Finally, it is the states that decide how
they handle the rulings of the court.
In several studies there can be found indication of the thesis that states constrain
and customize their commitments to international courts and tribunals. Alter (2004,
38) argues that because of the fact that states cannot control the decision making of
independent international courts they may use “tactics to avoid unwanted (...) rulings”.
Helfer/Slaughter (2005) who established the concept of “constrained independence”
developed a model of how states limit the scope of action of international courts
and tribunals. Correspondingly, states create independent international tribunals in
order to solve international cooperation problems and to enhance the credibility of
the states themselves. However, there is the danger of legal overstretching by the
independent decision makers at those courts. Hence, states try to minimize their cost
and to maximize their benefits by using mechanisms “to limit the potential for judicial
excesses” (Helfer/Slaughter, 2005, 7).
“A tribunal that (...) [is] highly independent on the basis of its formal attributes may,
in practice, be subject to political and discursive constraints that limit its potential for
overreaching”. (Helfer/Slaughter, 2005, 32)
They rely on the concept of ’strategic space’ of Steinberg (2004). He shows in the
example of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body that lawmaking is only possibly within
certain discursive, constitutional and political constraints.79
According to Helfer/Slaughter (2005), on the one hand, there are states constraining
international courts and tribunals via political and structural mechanisms and, on
the other hand, there is the global community constraining international courts and
79 Further studies on political constraints of international legal institutions are e.g. Alter (2000);
Carruba et al. (2008); Carruba (2012).
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tribunals via discursive mechanisms. The mechanisms for state regulation can be
distinguished between ex-ante and ex-post-mechanisms. Structural mechanisms ex
ante are e.g. reservations to substantive rules or rules to regulate access and procedure.
Structural mechanisms ex post are e.g. reinterpretation of substantive rules or the delay
in implementing a decision. Political mechanisms ex ante are e.g. inadequate funding or
resources and political mechanisms ex post are e.g. non-compliance or forum shopping.
Discursive mechanisms are e.g. interpretative methodologies (Helfer/Slaughter, 2005,
46 .).
In a similar manner, Simmons (2009, 89) takes into account that states are able to
’customize’ their commitments by making reservations and interpretative declarations
and argues: “Treaty ratification is not the end of the commitment story. Governments
have options to ‘customize‘ their commitments through the use of reservations and
declarations”.
Systematizing those arguments, we can distinguish between collective constraints of
international courts. States limit the scope of action for the respective court as a
whole and they make individual constraints of commitments to international courts
by limiting their own individual degree of binding to the respective court. There
are at least the following collective constraints on the independence of an
international court:
- creating an international court
- influencing the institutional design
- cooperating with the court
- supporting the court on the political level
From the first beginning, states are involved in writing and negotiating the institutional
design of the court (Koremenos, 2007). Although this process takes a lot of time, as
in the case of the ICC, which was first discussed after World War II, one can retrace
the institutional imprints of single powerful states (Katzenstein, 2014). A prominent
example for this is the USA, which advocated e.g. for the principle of complementarity
or the checks and balances of the Prosecutor’s power (Brown, 1999, 861) and later
withdrew their signature of the Rome Statute, as they did not succeed in making the
role of the UNSC more powerful within the ICC-regime (Schabas, 2004).80
80 John Boltan, a conservative republican and former US-American embassy at the UNO putted in
a nutshell saying: “[N]ever before has the United States been asked to place [the power of law
enforcement] outside the complete control of our government without our consent”, quoted from
(Schabas, 2004, 719).
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Once an institutional design is negotiated and founding treaties are adopted, states
have to submit to the courts voluntarily and can decide on the national implementation
of the respective legal norms. It is the states that finance the courts and, finally, it is
the states that have to cooperate with the courts, so that those are able to carry out
investigations and prosecutions.
How do states react towards independent international courts? States are used to
choose international agreements selectively and customize their commitment to inter-
national law. Although international courts and tribunals need the assistance of expert
and advocacy networks, too – maybe even more than ever – it is the states that decide
on the creation of a court. If we compare successful and failed trials of establishing a
court, we can see that the success or failure is often dependent on the existence of a
crisis and the action of hegemonic states in overcoming the crisis (Katzenstein, 2014).
“ Crises unsettle the international legal order. Eager to restore it, governments become
more willing to cooperate with one another and to overcome their prior reluctance about
creating an international court. Crises also provide new opportunities for legal networks
to advocate for the creation of international courts.” (Katzenstein, 2014, 151)
As mentioned above, states create courts because they need them for solving problems.
But as they are the creators of the courts, they decide about their shape. In the
case of the ICC, we could ask why the creation of the court was successful in 1998,
although the USA was strongly opposed to the court. Helfer/Slaughter (2005) consider
certain possibilities of designing international courts and tribunals to constrain their
independence. In the following, the institutional design of the ICC emphasizes the
possibilities for states to use the flexibility of customizing commitment for their own
benefit.
When establishing an international ad-hoc or permanent tribunal according to (Aksar,
2005, 18) there are four conceivably possible ways: a) concluding an international
agreement, b) adopting a resolution in the General Assembly of the UN, c) adopting a
resolution in the Security Council of the UN under Chapter VII (“Action with Respect
to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and acts of Aggression”) or d) amending
the UN Charter.
While the ad-hoc tribunals ICTY and ICTR were created through resolutions of the
Security Council of the UN81, the ICC was established by means of an international
agreement, namely the Rome Statute of the ICC. A treaty-based establishment has
the advantage that states can exercise their sovereign will in the negotiation and the
81 The ICTY was established by UN Security Council Resolution 827 of May 1993 and the ICTR by
Security Council Resolution 955 of November 1994.
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conclusion of the agreement. Moreover, the sovereignty of states is taken into account
by the fact that the court or tribunal has only jurisdiction over states that willingly
became party to the statute.
In the case of the Rome Statute, we can see that the USA were quite involved in the
development process. Hence, the institutional design is markedly shaped by the USA.
“The U.S. imprint is, in fact, all over the statute: in ensuring due process in trials, in
the priority given to national courts, in the checks and balances on the powers of the
prosecutor. These are some of the remarkable achievements of the U.S. delegation to
Rome, ably lead by Ambassador David Sche er.” (Brown, 1999, 861)
“While awaiting instructions on sensitive political issues such as the jurisdictional regime,
U.S. delegates in Rome nonetheless worked tireless on the technical details of the Statute.
These delegates, especially those from the Justice Department, identified and helped find
solutions for a number of problems in the text of the draft ICC Statute. As a result of
their e orts, and the consensus they built with delegates from other States sharing the
same fundamental values and perspectives, the Rome Statute bears the strong imprint
of the U.S. legal system.” (Brown, 1999, 861)
Besides those collective constraints on international courts, every state has the possibil-
ity of constraining or customize its formal commitment to an international court with
regard to e.g.making reservations or interpretative declarations or the non-ratification
of additional and amending agreements. As the present work is driven by the ques-
tion as to why states behave contradictorily towards the ICC, the focus will be on the
individual constraints of commitments aimed at retaining room for political maneuver.
3.4.3 States Customizing and Constraining their Commitments
As shown above, the trade-o  between freedom and security on the domestic and the
international level can grow into a dilemma, which states try to solve by constraining
and customizing their commitment to the ICC. From contract theory we know that
each party to a contract wants the others to commit, while preserving flexibility, leaving
room for maneuver for itself to cope with unforeseen consequences. This creates an
irreducible tension between two objectives:
“In order to motivate (and protect) investments in the cooperative enterprise, each
investing party would like to ensure the commitment of the others. But subsequent
events may render inflexible commitments inconsistent with the contractual objective
maximizing the joint surplus.” (Scott, 2003, 61)
Each contract is a promise for a certain future behavior, although the future is un-
known. Thus, every commitment to a contract entails risks, since the consequences
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might be much more costly than expected. One conceivable solution would be to wait
until the parties know more about the future and the acquired benefits of entering
into the contract. However, a promise that is without costs would lose its value (Scott,
2003, 63 .).
Transferring this to the ICC we can say that states want the others to bind themselves
honestly and completely to the Rome Statute, while retaining their flexibility and
independent, since it is unclear what the consequences of tying their own hands could
be. Claude Jorda, former judge and president of the ICTY said as early as 2004:
“States reticent to ratify the Statute will certainly find reasons here to ratify or abstain,
depending on the Court’s ability to assure the confidentiality of information touching
on national security. For other states, this will determine their greater or lesser degree
of cooperation. ” (Jorda, 2004, 580)
Further he predicted:
“But, a close reading of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure indicates the extent to
which the States Parties - in the end, many fewer than there are signatories - wished to
protect themselves from any unpleasant surprises, not to mention the avoidance schemes
of certain states not party to the Treaty.” (Jorda, 2004, 584)
The states use all possible means at their disposal to constrain and customize their
commitments to solve the delegation dilemma to the ICC. In doing so they are able
to ratify the Rome Statute and become a state party to the ICC and still retain room
for political maneuver.
An actor-centered perspective on the states will be chosen for the present work in
order to analyze political constraints of the ICC and to measure variation in states
behavior. This includes but is not limited to the following individual constraints
of states’ commitments to international courts:
- becoming a state party
- making declarations and reservations
- joining additional and amending agreements
- implementing into national law
- complying to the guarded norms
- triggering investigations
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We can expect the states to vary strongly in their behavior on the dimensions of
commitment to the ICC. Although states ratify the Rome Statute (Dim1), they
can make (interpretative) declarations regarding certain articles of the Rome Statute
(Dim2), they can refuse to ratify additional or amending agreements, such as the
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the ICC (APIC) or the amendment
to the crime of aggression (Dim3). They can delay the implementation of legisla-
tion on complementarity or cooperation (Dim4) and they can refrain from triggering
investigations and prosecutions (Dim5).82
As a matter of course, the degree of formal commitment to the ICC does not neces-
sarily tell something about the actual compliance behavior of the state, be it future
violations of the core crimes or the state’s willingness to cooperate with the ICC. Both
the states’ real interest in binding themselves to the Rome Statute as well as the mere
’window dressing’ are able to coexist with one another and are not necessarily contra-
dictory. There are several further possibilities of influencing the work of the ICC and to
support or undermine the ICC, such as delaying support or selective non-cooperation
(Wartanian, 2005; Hillebrecht/Straus, 2017), refusal to pay fees (Romano, 1998) or
political undermining, such as the negotiation of bilateral non-surrender agreements
(Kelley, 2007).
In a political view, we can understand the di erent levels of formal commitment to the
ICC as an attempt to retain room to maneuver that is available for all states, whether
this will be factually needed or not, since there is reason to retain a certain room for
maneuver for most of the states, be they democracies or non-democracies.83
The most visible and still most important act of commitment to a court is joining
the founding treaty and becoming a state party to the international court. In
accordance with the VCLT, which rules the law of treaties between states, there are
several possibilities of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty:
“The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange
of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or
by any other means if so agreed.” (art. 11 VCLT)
In the political science literature on international law, those acts of self-binding are
referred to as commitment to international law, which is often researched in relation to
82 According to the model of Helfer/Slaughter (2005) the individual constraints on the commitment
of the state would be appropriate to the formal/structural mechanisms ex ante (ratification of
Rome Statute and the amending agreements, declarations and reservations) and ex post
(triggering jurisdiction).
83 In order to improve readability henceforth the ’level of formal commitment’ will be termed as
’level of commitment’.
131
compliance with the law compliance with the law (Simmons, 2009; Shelton, 2000; Risse
et al., 2013). The phenomenon that states often do not comply with the norms they
voluntarily bind themselves to, if often designated as a “gap between commitment and
compliance” (Simmons, 2009), as a form of window dressing (Hafner-Burton/Tsutsui,
2005) in that the states adorn themselves with the borrowed plumes of human rights
without the real intend to follow through.
The underlying puzzle of the present work outlined at the beginning shows for the case
of the ICC, as in many other law regimes, this problem is persistent, too, despite the
existence of a court. Therefore, the concept of commitment to international law that
is monitored or even enforced by a court has to be broadened by the following aspects.
A further important aspect of commitment to the law of a court is the consent to be
bound by the additional and amending agreements. According to the VCLT
“[a] treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties” (art. 39 VCLT). Such
amendments must be e ected with the same formalities applied to the original forma-
tion of the treaty. Every state party to the treaties being amended has the entitlement
to be party by the amendment and every state that does not accept the amendment
is not bound to it (art. 40 VCLT).
This means, the states parties of an international agreement are possibly not all bound
to the same scope of norms. However, controversial norms can be often found in
amendments rather than in the constitutional treaty itself.84
There is the possibility of modifying through making reservations and inter-
pretative declarations.85
According to the VCLT, it is possible to express reservations to an international agree-
ment, i.e. “a unilateral statement, however, phrased or named, made by a state, when
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports
84 An example for this are the Protocols I and II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 that added rules on permitted methods and means in warfare and on protection of
human rights in international and non-international armed conflicts. There are only 41 of 195
states that have bound themselves both to the Geneva Convention and all its additional
protocols. The USA for example ratified only the Geneva Conventions I-IV and the Additional
Protocol III on the “Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem”, but not AP I on the
“Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts” or APII on the “Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflicts”, what could be considered as reason for a legality of the
detention camps in Guantanamo Bay. For a discussion on this see the debate between (Vöneky
et al., 2004; Bellinger, 2006; Vöneky, 2007; Bellinger/Padmanabhan, 2011).
85 Definitions and rules of the use of reservations are laid down in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT) and the “Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties” of the
International Law Commission from 1993. The Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties
from the ICC was initiated in 1993 to fill the gaps and lacks of the VCLT, for detailed
explanations see Fitzmaurice (2006).
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to exclude or to modify the legal e ect of certain provisions of the treaty in their
application to that state” (art. 2(1)(d) VCLT).86
Simmons (2009, 98) states that “[t]he nature of reservations they [i.e. states] make can
have significant impact on the precise nature of the legal obligation each government
commits to undertake”.87 States try to exclude themselves from certain legal e ects
of the agreements. Especially in human rights treaties it is a widespread practice to
make reservations. Human rights treaties can be considered a global public good that
impose duties on states without granting direct expressed benefits.
Reservations have to be distinguished from mere political statements, so called inter-
pretative declarations that are defined as “unilateral statement[s], however phrased
or named, made by a State or an international organization, whereby that State or
that organization purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope of a treaty or of
certain of its provisions” (International Law Commission, 2011). A declaration can be
considered as a reservation, too, if the state party thereby recognizably wants to be
bound only in the sense of the stated declarations. Often it is very di cult to distin-
guish clearly between mere interpretative declarations and conditional interpretative
declaration (Herdegen, 2013).
Reservations to multilateral agreements cause two major problems: there is a need to
clarify the permissibility of a reservation regarding the pursued limitation of obligation
and, moreover, there is a need to clarify the legal consequences if some states accept
the reservation and others do not. The e ects of an indispensable reservation are
disputed. The UN Human Rights Committee and the ECHR are of the opinion that
inadmissible reservations to human rights treaties mean that the state concerned is
basically bound to the full extent. The USA, Great Britain and France criticized this
harshly, arguing that full contractual obligation would not be covered by the reserving
state any longer (Herdegen, 2013, 127f.).
86 Reservations can be di erentiated in reservations ratione materiae, ratione temporis and ratione
loci. Contend-related reservations shall diminish the legal obligation or exclude the State from
legal obligation. Time-related reservations shall limit the obligation temporarily and thereby
cutting past events. Territorial reservations shall exclude certain territories from application of
the human rights treaty (Giegerich, 1995, 718 .).
87 However, the possibility making reservations is limited by the fact that all other state parties
have to agree to them the special conditions. According to the International Law Commission
(2011, 235) objection “means a unilateral statement, however, phrased or named, made by a
State or an international organization in response to a reservation formulated by another State
or international organization, whereby the former State or organization purports to preclude the
reservation from having its intended e ects or otherwise opposes the reservation”.
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States that make reservations, declarations and objections to human rights treaties
shows very well the dilemma in which states find themselves in relationship to inter-
national courts. This argument is even to be found in the legal literature:
“In the contemporary world, the political pressure to participate in international law
is so high that hardly any state is able to evade the most important human rights
agreements. Because of the fact that the texts of human rights treaties are throughout
negotiated within the UN or regional organizations and the finial content of the texts
are often decided in majority or consensus, without a formal vote, there is nor always a
compromise for special interests of individual states. Such outvoted states try to evade
single contractual obligations by making reservations.” (Giegerich, 1995, 721)88
Furthermore, the implementation of norms of international agreements
into national law can be considered as an important success and as a funda-
mental aspect of committing to the agreements concerned. The implementation of
international agreements into national law opens the technical way of applying and
adjudicating in national courts and increases the political legitimization of the norms
in domestic a airs. There is a qualitative di erence between the necessity of imple-
mentation due to the legal system. States with a civil law system tend to be monistic.
States with common law systems tend to be dualistic. The latter often need the act
of implementation into national law to ensure the binding force of international law,
while the former do not need implementation. Nevertheless, or even because of this, an
act of implementation, especially in states with a civil law system, can be considered
as an important aspect of commitment to an international court.
Bringing cases to a court or triggering investigations actively is a further
strong indicator of commitment to a court. At international courts and tribunals there
is often no compulsory investigations or even prosecutions, since it is a principal idea
that they are – due to their institutional design – mere dispute settlement mechanisms
or institutions of last resort. One the one hand, this is due to the limitations of material
and personal resources of international judicial institutions. On the other hand, we
can expect states that bring their cases proactively to an international court to be
more willed to accept the decisions and rulings of a court. Thus, the court can reach
a higher political legitimization and higher chances for success.
Accordingly, comprehensive commitments to the ICC can be defined as acts of
states expressing approval and support for the International Criminal Court. This
includes but is not limited to the ratification of the corresponding agreements on ma-
88 Own translation.
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terial and procedural norms without reservations, the implementation of these norms
into national law and the proactive initiation of investigations and prosecutions.
Constraining and customizing those commitments means limiting or shaping such a
comprehensive commitment. According to the delegation dilemma of the states,
we can expect those states that in principal need the ICC the most since they su ered
from a violent history and want to deal with the past, (re-)build peace and democracy,
and thus improve their freedom and security, to constrain and customize their com-
mitments the most, since they also have the greatest cause for concern from negative
consequences and thus have to protect their freedom and sovereignty. We can expect
that among the non-party states, there will be mainly a very low level of commitment
to the ICC. However, even among the parties, there will be only a few states with
a high level of commitment, while most of them will have strongly constrained and
customized commitments.
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3.5 Solving Cooperation Problems with the ICC
3.5.1 Cooperation Problems of International Law
The yet open question is: What explains the extent to which states constrain and
customize their commitment to the ICC? Which states will bind themselves compre-
hensively to the ICC and which will protect themselves vigorously.
Although there are undoubtedly both strong opportunities and high risks in ratifying
the Rome Statute and becoming a state party to the ICC, those will not lead to benefits
and costs for every kind of state to the same extent. Self-binding to the ICC can be
hazardous for states. In principal, we can expect those states need the ICC the most
that have the highest incentives to protect themselves against possible attacks of their
political opponents.
Sikkink (2011) with her concept of the ’justice cascade’ holds the view that the univer-
sal norm of criminal accountability spread around the globe in a cascade from Nurem-
berg and Tokyo trials over some of the core treaties of humanitarian law and human
rights, such as Genocide Convention, Geneva Conventions or Convention against Tor-
ture up to the establishment of the ICC. Conversely, it can be argued that the states
behavior towards the ICC is connected with their position towards humanitarian law
and human rights.
The basic assumption behind is that the ICC presents a strong opportunity to solve
cooperation problems of international law. As shown in the subsection on states’
commitment to international law89 under the conditions of anarchy in international
relations, states su er from a lack of cooperation, since there is mistrust and uncer-
tainty between the states and they are caught in prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod, 1980;
Keohane, 1984a).
Concluding international agreements is one possible solution of the dilemma, since it
reduces negotiation costs and creates legitimacy (Abbott, 1989) in addition to reducing
uncertainty on the behavior of the other and creating predictability in the shadow of the
future (Keohane, 1984a). In an ideal situation “the law itself must be an equilibrium
in an non-cooperative game” (Koremenos, 2007, 191) and thus becomes self-enforcing
over the mechanisms of reciprocity (Keohane, 1984a) or retaliation (Mearsheimer,
1995), reputation (Guzman, 2008a), persuasion (Hawkins, 2004; Deitelho , 2009) or
socialization (Koh, 1997; Goodman/Jinks, 2013).
In the case of humanitarian law the mechanisms of retaliation or reciprocity can work
(Watts, 2009). However, in the case of human rights there are hardly any self-enforcing
89 See Commitment to International Law p. 30.
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mechanisms, since their violations mostly occur within states and not among states
(Tomuschat, 2014). It can be argued that compliance with international law is worst,
if there are neither or hardly any options of sanctioning nor self-enforcing mechanisms
(Scott, 2003), such as in the case of human rights.
Thus, under the conditions of international law, there is an enforcement problem as the
states often commit to human rights but afterwards do not comply with them (Hath-
away, 2002). The human rights performance of autocracies sometimes becomes even
worse after ratifying (Hafner-Burton/Tsutsui, 2005) and a huge gap between commit-
ment and compliance remains (Simmons, 2009). This means that there are appropriate
norms and respective treaties that often even have good rates of ratification. States
cannot be sure if other states comply with humanitarian law and especially human
rights. If they want to make sure which states comply, they must invest in monitoring
mechanisms for observation of human rights practices.
There is a reputation problem, since it is unclear, which commitments lead to compli-
ance (Moravcsik, 2000). If states do have a good compliance behavior, they have to
find ways signaling this to other states, since the ratification alone is no warranty for a
good compliance. Confronted with the reasons for being cautious towards the ICC such
as being too weak or becoming too strong the states are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma
and have a high uncertainty as to the behavior of the others. Therefore, states that
have an interest in the compliance and need information on cases of non-compliance
have high costs for monitoring humanitarian law and human rights.
Creating international courts and tribunals such as the ICC with the task of enforcing
humanitarian law and human rights and delegating authority to them is thus an im-
portant opportunity for the states to solve those cooperation problems, reduce costs
of monitoring and enhance credibility of commitments. However, we cannot expect
the possibility of solving cooperation problems to be the same for all states. Depen-
dent on their political interests and preferences, di erent incentive structures arise for
the states. Although enhancing monitoring and credibility are plausible ways to solve
cooperation problems according to the group rationality of the community of states,
they do not inevitably lead to advantages for every single state in its individual ratio-
nality. In light of these considerations, the central thesis of the study is: The extent
of commitment to the ICC depends on both the states’ interests in governing the in-
ternational community and the states’ general attitude towards humanitarian law and
human rights.
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Figure 10: Solving Cooperation Problems with the ICC
3.5.2 Reducing Costs of Monitoring versus Fear of Monitoring
The first decisive factor for the states behavior towards the ICC is the states’ interest
in governing the international community. As mentioned above, the ICC provides
a window of opportunity to integrate several mechanisms in international relations
which enables the monitoring of compliance with humanitarian law and human rights
law. This raises the possibility that at some point in the future the groundwork will
have been laid to establish one permanent international court. This court is not only
able to monitor, but even creates criminal responsibility and thus makes it possible to
investigate and prosecute individual perpetrators immediately.
The following question arises as to which states benefit the most from the enforcement
of international criminal law through the ICC? We can expect those states to take
full advantage of the ICC that were politically and financially highly engaged in the
creation and running of the several mechanisms to monitor humanitarian law and
human rights be they on the international, regional or national level. For those states,
the establishment and the success of the ICC results in a considerable reduction of
monitoring costs. Despite the lack of a mandate to monitor the compliance of severe
human rights violations the highly centralized institutions indirectly undertakes the
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tasks of monitoring thereby reducing costs for the states. An additional benefit is that
the ICC then provides a devices to label violations and to name perpetrators.
This is especially true for states that have a high level of political freedom and that
recognized the ICJ for compulsory jurisdiction and states with a high level of polit-
ical freedom have a high interest in governing the international community and in
increasing international peace and security.
For one thing, this is based on the Kantian thesis of democratic peace, that says
that states with a high level of democracy are more peaceful and more interested in
international law. Democracies have domestic institutions that make it possible to find
peaceful conflict solutions. Democracies are inter alia characterized by a strong rule of
law. The stronger the rule of law, the more likely it is that states support legalization
of international politics. Immanuel Kant described in his famous work ’Perpetual
Peace’ individuals as self-interested actors driven by reason, living in a state of nature
independent of external laws, striving for security by adopting laws (Vorländer/Kant,
1795/1973, 130f.).
To reach global peace, all people have to belong to any civil constitution and three areas
of law have to exist: citizen rights (ius civitas), international law of the nations (ius
gentium) and cosmopolitan law (ius cosmopoliticum): Firstly, in every state the form
of governing should be republican. Kant considers representation and the separation
of powers as essential. He points out that legislative power and executive power must
not be united in the same person or institution.90
Secondly, international law should be based on federalism of free states. They, however,
di er insofar from individuals in a state of nature as they have a domestic constitu-
tion that constrains their behavior. Nevertheless, those free states are able to enter
into contract with each other by establishing a confederation or a league of states,
rather than a federation of a world state. The problem arises that in every state the
government is a superior power in relation to the people as an inferior power. He
emphasizes that the only way for states to get rid of the hostile state of nature is
to give up autonomy and enter into an international public law. Thirdly, the law of
world citizenship should be limited to universal hospitality. This means that everyone
should have a right to visit the others under peaceable conditions (Vorländer/Kant,
1795/1973, 117-169).
90 Interestingly, Kant uses this assumption to argue that a democracy actually is a form of
despotism because everyone claims to be the master and thus there is no representation, see
Vorländer/Kant (1795/1973, 129f.).
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In a Kantian world, ensuring compliance with international law is very expensive.
States comply particularly if they are liberal republican states and the others are, too.
States that are not liberal have to be monitored closely to ensure their compliance.
“[It] is often di cult for a state to monitor the conduct of its treaty partners and to
evaluate whether that conduct violates the treaty. These monitoring and evaluation costs
reduce the risk that arguable nonconforming conduct will be detected or, if detected,
will be accurately labeled as a breach. International tribunals reduce these monitoring
and evaluation costs. The create a mandatory process by which plausible rule violations
are investigated and, at the conclusion of the case, they publicly identify the probability
that violations of international obligations will be detected and correctly labeled as
non-compliance.” (Helfer/Slaughter, 2005, 36)
It is to be assumed that the higher the level of political freedom of the citizens on
the domestic level, the higher the interest of political freedom of the states on the
international level. Democracy at the domestic level corresponds in some way to a
’polycracy’ of the states at the international level, meaning that not only the citizens
of a state shall have the same rights and duties, but also the di erent states at the
international level.
Hypothesis 1: The higher the level of democracy, the higher the level of
commitment to the ICC.
Additionally, states with a high level of political freedom are often closely involved
in the running and financing of international and regional organizations. Those orga-
nizations in turn are composed of mainly democracies and often have mechanisms of
monitoring the compliance with humanitarian law and human rights. Beyond a high
level of political freedom, we can expect those states that have recognized the ICJ for
compulsory jurisdiction benefit strongly from an enforcement of international criminal
law through the ICC. According to article 36 of the ICJ Statute, states parties to the
court:
“may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without
special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a. the interpretation of a
treaty; b. any question of international law; c. the existence of any fact which, if
established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d. the nature or
extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.”
For the states that recognized compulsory jurisdiction, this means that they can bring
any issue of international law to the court. This means that the ICJ has to decide
on manifold di erent areas of international law. The establishment of the ICC with
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its narrow jurisdiction has created a specialized permanent court with its privileges
individuals. This promises to increase considerably the e ciency of the enforcement
of humanitarian law and human rights. Correspondingly, the second hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2: States that have acknowledged the ICJ for compulsory juris-
diction tend to have a higher level of commitment to the ICC.
It can be concluded that up until the creation of the ICC the monitoring of human-
itarian law was unclear, politically complex, expensive, and most of all, unreliable.
The establishment of the ICC can be considered a window of opportunity to improve
international monitoring of humanitarian law and human rights as a permanent inter-
national court through enforcement of international criminal law. Those states benefit
the most from this that have a high level of political freedom and perhaps have rec-
ognized the ICJ for compulsory jurisdiction. Those are already highly involved in
the running and financing of several international monitoring mechanisms. For them,
the ICC brings with it a considerable reduction in monitoring costs. It o ers these
state parties an opportunity to consolidate their investment in several international
monitoring mechanism into one.
3.5.3 Enhancing Credibility versus Window Dressing
The second decisive factor for the states’ level of commitment to the ICC is the states’
fundamental interest in governing the international community. Beyond the reduction
of costs for monitoring humanitarian law and human rights, a comprehensive support
of the ICC o ers a chance for the states to make the commitments they have made to
humanitarian law and human rights more credible. As stated above, a public tying of
the own hands can increase the credibility of states considerably.
The question arises: which states benefit the most by enhancing the credibility of
commitment to humanitarian law and human rights? Firstly, states that need this
credibility the most are new democracies, as Moravcsik (2000) and Simmons (2009)
argue. It o ers a chance to signal to domestic and foreign actors that they are seriously
willing to cope with the past and promote the development of democracy.
Secondly, it is the states that have a high level of commitment to humanitarian law and
human rights, since these can be considered to be an indicator of the general attitude
towards international legalization in the area of peace and security. Moreover, those
states that have ratified only a few of the respective international agreements would
be subjected to a higher risk of unintended consequences than states that are bound
tightly to humanitarian law and human rights.
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Hypothesis 3: The higher the level of commitment to human rights, the
higher the level of commitment to the ICC.
Hypothesis 4: The higher the level of commitment to humanitarian law, the
higher the level of commitment to the ICC.
This is based on the fact that international law is pluralistic (Berman, 2007), highly
fragmented (Fischer-Lescano/Teubner, 2007) and states can often decide on a case-by-
case basis, which agreements they ratify.
The complex of humanitarian law consists of at least 25 treaties. The most important
among them are the four Geneva Conventions – on the protection wounded and sick in
the field (GCI) and at sea (GCII), of prisoners of war (GCIII) and of civilian persons
(GCIV) in times of international and non-international armed conflicts – as well as the
three additional protocols relating to the protection of victims of international (PI)
and non-international (PII) armed conflicts and distinctive emblems (PIII). Moreover,
there are treaties on the protection of culture and environment in armed conflicts and
the numerous treaties on the use of weapons in armed conflict, e.g. the “Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction” of 1993 or the “Convention on Cluster Munitions
of 2008”; as well as the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide” (1948) or the “Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limi-
tations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity” of 1968.91
In the legal area of human rights meanwhile over 20 agreements and additional pro-
tocols on human right law were concluded. The O ce of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) collects the data on ratification of the 18
most important agreements.92
Among them are the aspects mentioned in the Rome Statute concerning severe vio-
lations of human rights, such as the “Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment” of 1984 or the “International Con-
vention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance” of 2006. How-
ever, states that have a low level of commitment to human rights and humanitarian
law are not persuasive in enhancing credibility and rather use the commitment to the
ICC as window dressing. In that regard, Moyn (2014, 84) raises the question:
“[W]hy persist in upholding the fiction that human rights name an inviolable consensus
everyone shares? Like all universalist projects, human rights are violated every time
91 A full list of the 25 counted treaties of humanitarian law is to find in the annex on p. 239.
92 A full list of the 18 counted treaties of human rights law is to find in the annex on p. 240.
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they are interpreted and transformed into a specific program. Because they promise
everything to everyone, they can end up meaning anything to anyone.”
We can measure the scope of commitment to humanitarian law and human rights in
respect of the number of treaties ratified and the depth of commitment in respect to
the lack of reservations to the treaties. Up to date of measurement, only Uruguay has
ratified all 43 agreements (including their additional and optional protocols) of human
rights and humanitarian law. In second place are Argentina and Costa Rica with 42
ratified treaties, in third place Slovakia, Spain and Italy with 41 treaties and in the
forth place Albania, Belgium, Germany and Finland with 40 ratified treaties.
As we know that ratifying human rights treaties is no guarantee for compliance, we
have to put the information value of such counts into perspective. But even at states
with high levels of commitment to humanitarian law and human rights it is worth
looking at which treaties are not ratified.
Germany for example did not ratify the “Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity from 1968”, the
“International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families from 1990” and the “Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights from 2013”.
Belgium did not ratify the “Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limita-
tions to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity from 1968”, the “Optional Protocol
to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment from 2006” and the “International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families from 1990”.
The universality of human rights along with the absence of enforcement mechanisms
leads to the fact that particularly autocratic states do not take their commitment very
serious. However, establishing an international court such as the ICC increases the
probability of consequences of norm violations considerably. Thus, particularly for
states with a low level of commitment to humanitarian law and human rights, the ICC
poses a high risk.
There are democracies that have a very high level of commitment to humanitarian
law and human rights and there are others whose commitment is very low. Democ-
racies that ratified all 25 treaties of humanitarian law93 are Slovenia, Hungary, Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Panama. Those that ratified
24 treaties are Finland, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Spain,
93 As of 2016.
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Non-Democracies Democracies
Min 3 0 2
4 3 2
24 1 14
Max 25 0 8
Table 3: Minimum and Maximum Scores – Ratification of Humanitarian Law
Non-Democracies Democracies
Min 2 0 1
3 0 4
17 3 6
Max 18 2 2
Table 4: Minimum and Maximum Scores – Ratification of Human Rights Law
Italy, Poland, Lithuania, Romania, Croatia, New Zealand and Argentina. Excluding
small city and island states, the democracies with the lowest number of ratified HL
treaties are Suriname (7), Namibia (7), Botswana (8), Belize (10), Israel (11), South
Korea (14), Ghana (14), Benin (14), Senegal (16) and the USA (16).
Democracies that ratified all 18 treaties of human rights are Uruguay and Argentina.
Those that ratified 17 human rights treaties are Mongolia, France, Portugal, Costa
Rica, Spain and Italy. Excluding small city and island states, democracies with the
lowest number of ratified human rights treaties are Suriname (7), Botswana (8), India
(8) and Israel (9).
The non-democracies that unexpectedly ratified a very high number of humanitarian
law treaties include the following: Paraguay (24), Macedonia (23), Guatemala (23),
Nicaragua (22), Bosnia and Herzegovina (22), Montenegro (22), Moldova (22) and
Albania (22). Non-democracies that ratified a very high number of human rights
treaties include: Bolivia (18), Albania (18), Bosnia and Herzegovina (17), Ecuador
(17) and Montenegro (17).
Thus, whether a state is a democracy or not is not a su cient condition for com-
mitment to humanitarian law and human rights and, respectively, to the ICC. The
general attitude to international law and international integration in general plays an
important role, too.
The ICC provides a chance for all states to make themselves more attractive as part-
ners in international trade and politics. And, it is in particular a possibility for new
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democracies to demonstrate an enhanced credibility towards international and domes-
tic actors and to show the willingness to strengthen peace and democracy (Moravcsik,
2000; Simmons/Danner, 2010). However, the level of ratification a state has already
made matters the most, since a strong ICC would mean a high risk for states that
have comparatively low levels of commitment to humanitarian law and human rights
such as USA, India or Indonesia.
Seen in this way, the USA is not necessarily an outlier in its behavior towards the
ICC. Although it is a democracy it has very bad rates of ratification to human rights
(5 of 18) and humanitarian law (16 of 24). It can be argued that due to the states’
domestic interests and preferences, di erent incentive structures to the ICC arise and
thus di erent needs for committing to the ICC.
Strong democracies with a high level of commitment to humanitarian law and human
rights, such as Germany, Belgium or the Netherlands, benefit considerably from the
improvement in international peace and security through increased monitoring and
enforcement of international criminal law. States that have a lower level of political
freedom, such as Afghanistan, Ivory Cost or Cambodia; or states that have a high level
of political freedom, but a comparatively low level of commitment to humanitarian
law and human rights, such as the USA or India, are not necessarily interested in the
international strengthening of monitoring humanitarian law and human rights or even
in permanently enforcing international criminal law.
States that have both a low level of political freedom and low commitment to hu-
manitarian law and human rights, such as Iran, Syria, North Korea, obviously have
no incentives for increasing the monitoring and enforcement of international criminal
law.94
For some the delegation dilemma that the ICC creates is very real issue because they
are struggling with conflicting interests and have to protect themselves. Other states
either have no interest or weak interest in increasing the monitoring and enforcement
of humanitarian law and human rights. Or, their interest is so strong that they have
hardly any need to constrain and customize their commitments.
Most of the states find themselves caught between the two poles of complete rejection
and complete submission. There is high variation in the extent of self-binding among
those states that are party to the ICC. The vast majority of states are torn between
94 Sikkink (2011, 189 .) considers the dismissive attitude of the USA towards the ICC as impact of
the ’justice cascade’ insofar that the USA has reason to fear the new universal norms regarding
the potential prosecution US-soldiers in international conflicts and relating to consideration and
practices of torture and death penalty.
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contradictory interests. Since states have diverging political structures and positions,
the actual incentives for the individual state vary widely.
Every state has to weigh freedom and security on the domestic and international level.
They have to struggle with balancing their own interests and preferences against the
potential costs and risks of becoming a state party to the ICC. Even if, we accept that
the ICC is the peak of a long process in ending global impunity, we must consider that
states’ behavior to the ICC depend on their position to humanitarian law and human
rights law and their chance in solving cooperation problems of international law.
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4 An Index as Summary Measurement for
Comprehensive Commitment
In the following chapter, the Index of Commitment to the ICC will be conceptu-
alized. It is intended to serve as a measuring device for the states’ comprehensiveness
of commitments to the court beyond the ratification of the Rome Statute. It provides
evidence on the variation of the states’ extent of commitment within the group of states
parties to the ICC, and thus supports the theoretical argument of states constraining
and customizing their commitments to the court.
In order to build the index of comprehensive commitment, di erent ways of customizing
and constraining commitments to the ICC will initially be modeled (4.1). Afterwards,
the case selection and data will be presented, and the methods of data collection
and analysis will be set out (4.2). Finally, the results of building the Index of
Commitment to the ICC will be presented (4.3) and some notable patterns of
commitment will be highlighted.
4.1 Modeling Ways of Constraining and Customizing Commitments
States can be expected to use all possibilities of constraint and customization of their
commitments to the ICC when attempting to protect their sovereignty for the purpose
of forestalling politicization and legal overreach of the court and retaining a certain
room for maneuver towards the other states.95 By focusing on those possibilities of
constraining and customizing commitments that are available for all states, the follow-
ing possibilities can be identified (see Table 5): joining (Dim1) refers to the signature
and ratification of the founding treaty; amending (Dim2) means the signature and
ratification of the additional and amending agreements; modifying (Dim3) signifies
making declarations and reservations of the agreements; implementing (Dim4) refers
to the integration of norms into national law; and triggering (Dim5) means initi-
ating the court’s investigations. By measuring this it becomes possible to show that
states concurrently move closer to the court and protect their sovereignty.
In principle, this model can be applied to all international courts that are permanent
and go beyond mere dispute settlement, such as the ICJ, the regional human rights
courts or the courts of justice of the regional organizations.96
95 For a detailed illustration of the theoretical argument and the conceptualization of constrained
and customized commitments to the ICC see subsection 3.4 on p. 123.
96 Actually we can expect those indicator being true for international dispute settlement
mechanisms, such as the WTO-DSB or the International Center for Settlement of Investment
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Dimension Questions
Joining (Dim1) Did a state ratify the founding treaty becoming a party state?
Amending (Dim2) Did a state ratify the additional and amending agreements?
Modifying (Dim3) Did a state make reservations or interpretative declarations?
Implementing (Dim4) Did a state implement material/formal norms into national law?
Triggering (Dim5) Did a state trigger investigations and/or proceedings?
Table 5: Modeling Comprehensive Commitments to International Courts
In the case of the ICC, the following indicators (as shown in Table 6) measure the
dimensions of commitment to the ICC: joining the Statute of Rome (Dim1); join-
ing the APIC as well as the amendments on article 8 and the crime of aggression
(Dim2), making reservations or interpretative declarations to the mentioned agree-
ments (Dim3), implementing norms on cooperation and complementarity (Dim4) and
triggering investigations and prosecutions (Dim5).
4.1.1 Joining the Rome Statute (Dim 1)
In the case of the ICC, it is the Rome Statute97 that establishes the ICC as “a per-
manent institution (...) [that] shall have the power to exercise its jurisdictions over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern (...) complementary to
national jurisdiction” (art. 1). In order to become a state party to the ICC, states have
to sign and ratify the Rome Statute.98 According to article 125, the Rome Statute is
“open to accession by all States”.
Disputes (ICSID), too. However, because of their ad-hoc character and the high level of
flexibility of dispute settlement mechanisms, the indicators would probably not be su cient
measuring commitment.
97 The Statute of Rome of the ICC is composed by the following parts: Establishment of the Court
(Part I); Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law (Part II); General Principles of Criminal
Law (Part III); Composition and Administration of the Court (Part IV), Investigation and
Prosecution (Part V); The trial (Part VI); Penalties (Part VII); Appeal and Revision (Part
VIII); International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance (Part IX); Enforcement (Part X);
Assembly of States Parties (Part XI); Financing (Part XII) and Final Clauses (Part XIII)
98 To become a state party to the Rome Statute of the ICC it is not necessary to sign and later
ratify. It is also possible to approve, accept, accede or succeed instead, which does not require
the act of signature. For reasons of clarity, in the following, all of these actions are labeled as
ratification.
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Dimension ICC
Joining (Dim 1) Rome Statute of the ICC, Rome 1998
Amending (Dim 2) Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the ICC, New York 2002
Amendment to Article 8 of the Rome Statute, Kampala 2010
Amendments on the Crime of Aggression to the Rome Statute, Kampala 2010
Modifying (Dim 3) Rome Statute of the ICC, Rome 1998
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the ICC, New York 2002
Amendment to Article 8 of the Rome Statute, Kampala 2010
Amendments on the Crime of Aggression to the Rome Statute, Kampala 2010
Implementing (Dim 4) Norms on Cooperation
Norms on Complementarity
Triggering (Dim 5) State Referral of Party States (art. 14 Rome Statute)
Temporarily Submission of Non-Party States (art. 12(a) Rome Statute)
Table 6: Modeling Customized and Constrained Commitments to the ICC
On the evening of July 18, 1998 at the Conference of Rome, 26 states became signa-
tories to the Rome Statute 99. As of October 1998, there were 53 signatories. Four
years later, on April 11 in 2002 the UN held a special treaty ceremony where several
states (Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, Cambodia, Jordan, Mongolia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Ireland) ratified the Rome Statue
and thereby crossing the threshold of 60 ratifications. On July 1, 2002, the Rome
Statute of the ICC entered into force. In 2016 there were 124 states parties to the
Rome Statute.
4.1.2 Amending APIC, Art. 8 and Crime of Aggression (Dim 2)
There are three additional and amending agreements to the Rome Statute that are in-
cluded in the Index of commitment to the ICC: “the Agreement on the Privileges
and Immunities of the International Criminal Court”, “the Amendment to article 8 of
the Rome Statute” and “the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression to the Rome
Statute”.
On 9 September 2002, the Assembly of State Parties adopted the Agreement on the
Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court. After ten
99 States that have signed immediately on July 17/18 1998 are: Albania, Bolivia, Cameroon,
Congo, France, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Italy, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Mali, Malta,
Monaco, Netherlands, Niger, Panama, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, South Africa, Spain,
Switzerland, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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states had ratified the agreement, it entered into force on 22 July 2004. The APIC
is laid out in article 48 of the ICC-Statute [Privileges and immunities]: “The Court
shall enjoy in the territory of each State Party such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes” (art. 48(1) ICC-Statute). In addition to
article 48 of the Rome Statute it covers certain privileges and immunities for sta  and
o cials, as well as experts and witnesses.
Why are additional agreements to the Statute of Rome necessary? The ability to carry
out investigations and prosecutions is dependent on the possibility of operating un-
hampered within the states and to receive assistance from the governments concerned.
Usually privileges and immunities are embedded in the constitutive agreement of an
international or regional organization. According to Mochochoko (2001), the main
reason for codifying those rules in an additional agreement is that the ICC is (unlike
the ICTY and the ICTR) independent from the UNO and cannot benefit from the
privileges and immunity of the UNO, such as free communication via secure informa-
tion channels or facilitated traveling through laissez-passer documents or sealed bags.
However, punishing those responsible for war crimes, genocide or crimes against hu-
manities outs sta  members, experts or witnesses in very precarious situations. They
need protection through certain privileges and immunities (Mochochoko, 2001, 639 .).
While article 48 of the ICC-Statute addresses the issue of privileges and immunities
in general, the amendment agreement defines related obligations in detail.
The agreement grants the ICC special privileges during its investigations of the territo-
ries of the states parties, such as exemption from taxes, customs duties and import and
export restrictions (art. 8); reimbursement of duties and/or taxes (art. 9); funds and
freedom from currency restrictions (art. 10); facilities in respect to communications
(art. 11); exercise of the functions of the Court outside its headquarters (art. 12).
Property and possession with special protection are e.g. premises of the Court (art. 4);
flag, emblem and markings (art. 5); and property, funds and assets (art. 16). Persons
that enjoy privileges and immunities are e.g. representatives of states participating in
the assembly and its subsidiary organs and representatives of intergovernmental orga-
nizations (art. 13) or persons participating in the proceedings of the Court (art. 14);
judges, prosecutor, deputy prosecutor and registrar (art. 15) or witnesses (art. 19) and
victims (art. 20).
“The Agreement should thus be seen as yet another milestone in the codification of
international law of criminal tribunals and as yet another step in defining the privileges
and immunities that are necessary for a permanent Criminal Court as well as for persons
connected with it to carry out their functions e ectively and without interference. (...)
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Universal ratification and early entry into force of the agreement will be as important
as ratification to the Statute itself.” (Mochochoko, 2001, 663f.)
The APIC is open for signature and ratification to all states worldwide, not only to
States Parties to the ICC. Thus, we can consider the states decision to be bound to
the APIC as an important indicator for the commitment to the ICC in general.
“Whilst it is hoped that all States Parties to the Statute will ratify the Agreement,
di culties could arise if one or more States Parties do not ratify the Agreement. It can,
however, be safely argued that the Statute sets out the basic parameters for the appli-
cation of the Agreement and determines the legal status and privileges and immunities
the Court needs to function e ectively.” (Mochochoko, 2001, 641)
Moreover, there are three amendments to the Rome Statute of the ICC: the amendment
to article 8 (Kampala 2010), the amendments on the crime of aggression (Kampala
2010) and amendment to article 124 (The Hague 2015). Article 123(1) of the Statute
of Rome says:
“Sven years after the entry into force of this Statute the Secretary-General of the United
Nations shall convene a Review Conference to consider any amendments to this Statute.
Such review may include, but is not limited to, the list of crimes contained in article 5.
The Conference shall be open to those participating in the Assembly of States Parties
and on the same conditions.”
In the Rome Statute, it is required that “an amendment shall enter into force for
all States Parties one year after instruments of ratification or acceptance have been
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nation by seven-eighths of them”
(art. 121(4) Rome Statute). Every state is allowed to propose amendments. The ASP
decides if the proposal shall proceed and with a two-third-majority if the proposal
shall be accepted. Article 121(5) (Rome Statute) says: “In respect of a State Party
which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction
regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party’s
nationals or on its territory.”
In accordance with the VCLT, every state party to the Rome Statute is entitled to
become a state party to its amending agreements (art. 4 VCLT) and they are not bound
by them once they have agreed to become a state party via the assigned requirements
(art. 5 VCLT). It is required that every state joins the amendments having followed
the same formalities as they did upon joining the Rome Statute.
The amendment to article 8 was adopted at the first Review Conference of the
Rome Statute in Kampala 2010 and entered into force in 2012. It extends the definition
of war crimes according to article 8 (2) (b) on non-international armed conflicts.
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Add to article 8 (para. (2) (e) (xiii)):
“(xiii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons;
(xiv) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, ma-
terials or devices;
(xv) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets
with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions.”
Moreover, there are additions to the elements of crimes with respect to the war crime of
employing poison or poisoned weapons (art. 8 (2) (e) (xiii)), the war crime of employing
prohibited gases, liquids, materials or devices (art. 8 (2) (e) (xiv)), and the war crime
of employing prohibited bullets (art. 8 (2) (e) (xv)).
The amendments on the crime of aggression, also adopted in Kampala 2010,
defines the crime of aggression (art. 8 bis) and covers the exercise of jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression (art. 15 bis, art. 15 ter). Already at the Rome Conference in
1998, it had been stated that the ICC has jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
(art. 5(1) ICC-Statute). Both the definition of the crime of aggression and conditions of
jurisdiction were postponed, and art. 5 (2) says: “The Court shall exercise jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121
and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall
exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”
At the first review conference in Kampala 2010, this challenge was mastered, and the
crime of aggression was defined. Further, the conditions of jurisdiction were specified.
The foundation of the definition of the crime of aggression as described in the UN
General Assembly Resolution 3314 states:
“Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.” (Art. 1
A/RES/3314)
Thus, the definition of aggression in the Rome Statute is fundamentally equal to the
UN-Resolution (Barriga, 2010) when it says:
The ’crime of aggression’ means “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution by a
person in a position e ectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale,
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.” (Art. 8bis (1),
amendment to the ICC-Statute)
To be di erentiated from this is the ’act of aggression’, meaning:
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“the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of
the United Nations.” (art. 8bis (2), amendment to the ICC-Statute)
Such ’acts of aggression’ include but are not limited to the following: invasion, attacks
or bombardments by armed forces on land, sea or air both as military occupation or
blockades of ports or coasts. According to Ambos (2010, 654) the crime of aggres-
sion has a twofold nature that covers a collective act of aggression by a state of the
macro-level on one hand and an individual crime of aggression on the other. Thus,
the existence of an illegal act of aggression according to art. 8bis Rome Statute on the
basis of UN resolution 3314 does not lead automatically to criminal responsibility. The
wording “act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a man-
ifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations” establishes threshold provisions
ensuring that not every act of aggression leads to a crime of aggression. This is meant
to avoid the criminalization of minor incidents like border skirmishes or controversial
cases like humanitarian interventions (Ambos, 2010, 655).
Besides the definition of the crime of aggression, the exercise of jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression by state referral and proprio motu proprio motu (art. 15bis of the
amendment to the ICC-Statute) and by Security Council referral (art. 15ter, amend-
ment to the ICC-Statute) is established. The decoupling of the jurisdiction from the
definition of the crime of aggression is due to the fact that otherwise the result would
have been that the UNSC would have been able to trigger the investigation and prose-
cution of a crime of aggression. Thus, avoiding the risk of politicization, the definition
of the crime of aggression and the jurisdiction over it was separated in di erent amend-
ing articles (Ambos, 2010, 663).
On the basis of UNSC referral, it is possible to investigate and prosecute crimes of
aggression as well as the other three core crimes genocides, crimes against humanity
and war crimes in states parties. Without an UNSC referral, the jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression is based on the principle of consensus, whereby party states can
opt out via declaration. States not parties are generally not subject to the jurisdiction
of the court. Whether being o ender or o ended state, it is not possible to refer a
situation ex post facto according to art. 12. This is in contrast to the other three core
crimes. Moreover, the states agreed to activate both forms of jurisdiction (15bis and
15ter) in 2017 via a 2/3 majority (Barriga, 2010, 647).
In sum, we can say that the requirements for the jurisdiction are very high: A crime
of aggression has to be of exceptional gravity and scale (threshold clause), it has to
be in accordance with the UN Charter (A/Res/3314); it has to be committed ’by a
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person in a position e ectively to exercise control’ (limitation on political leaders); its
jurisdiction is only possible over states that are parties to the Rome Statute and that
have not withdrawn by way of declaration, and it needs a UNSC referral or a consensus
of the states parties to trigger investigations and prosecutions.100
Although the requirements for the existence of a crime of aggression are very high, we
can expect states being very restrained in the ratification of the amendment on the
crime of aggression. This is due to the conditions for investigation and prosecution of
a crime of aggression being so hard. We can consider this as an indicator that states
are very restrained towards the amendment on the crime of aggression. Either way,
we can interpret the ratification as very strong commitment to the ICC.
4.1.3 Modifying APIC, Art. 8 and Crime of Aggression (Dim 3)
Article 120 of Rome Statute says: “No reservations may be made to this Statute”.
Irrespective of their legal validity, we can nevertheless find several declarations and
reservations to the Rome Statute.
As o cial exception we can consider article 124 [transitional provision]101 that says:
“[O]n becoming a party to this Statute, [a state party] may declare that, for a period
of seven years after the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does
not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred
to in article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its
territory. A declaration under this article may be withdrawn at any time.”
Human rights agreements, agreements on the law of war and thus agreements of in-
ternational criminal courts and tribunals share a civilizing and humanitarian purpose.
The states parties to those agreements do not have particular interests that shall be
balanced against each other, but they have one common interest. There is a broad
consensus that reservations are not allowed to a ect the purpose of an international
agreement. So it is not in the sense of the raison d’être of human rights and humani-
tarian law to make reservations on their treaties.
100 For details and comprehensive discussion on the crime of aggression see Kreß (2010); Paulus
(2010); Ambos (2010); Barriga (2010); Clark (2010).
101 Use of article 124 was only made by Colombia and France, whereby France, however, withdrew
its declaration under article 124 that made upon ratification on 13 August 2008. With the
’amendment to article 124’ (The Hague 2015), that is not yet in force, article 124 shall be
deleted. However, since the amendment to article 124 was adopted in 2015 while the time of
measurement of the dependent variable is 2016 and of the independent variables is 2015, it is not
included in the dimension of amending of the Index of Commitment to the ICC.
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This explains why the article 120 [Reservations] of the Rome Statute comprises only
one sentences that says: “No reservations may be made to this Statute”.102
Nevertheless, there are several states parties that made interpretative declarations to
the Rome Statute that border on reservations according to Newman (2005, 325 .). He
refers especially to the declarations of Columbia that declared upon ratification:
“None of the provisions of the Rome Statute concerning the exercise of jurisdiction by
the International Criminal Court prevent the Colombian State from granting amnesties,
reprieves or judicial pardons for political crimes, provided that they are granted in
conformity with the Constitution and with the principles and norms of international
law accepted by Colombia.”
He argues that although reservations are prohibited and they are automatically invalid
according to the Rome Statute article 120 and the VCLT article 19, interpretative
declarations can become problematic.
“An accumulation of interpretative declarations could subtle promote certain interpre-
tations of the Rome Statute di ering from those one might otherwise expect. (...) On
standard principles of treaty interpretation, subsequent practice by parties to a treaty
can a ect the appropriate interpretation of treaty provisions. Consequently, the pos-
sibility of shifts in meaning must be presumed very real, simply under a slightly more
nuanced legal doctrine. Of course there are also political maneuvers underway simul-
taneously, as states attempt politically to capture favored interpretations.” (Newman,
2005, 332f.)
Fitzmaurice (2006, 170) believes that the ICC would be a real treaty sui generis,
which its rules on reservations reflect. However, it is the same rule that generated
a high number of interpretative declarations, of which some could be considered as
reservations:
“This is a new phenomenon principally in relation to human rights (humanitarian)
treaties, whereby the prohibition on reservations (...) compels States to make interpre-
tative declarations, which are in fact disguised reservations.”
Thus, notwithstanding the legal consequences of those interpretative declarations it
is interesting to look at the interpretative declarations, since they can be considered
as indicators for the fundamental attitude of the states towards the Rome Statute in
that they are trying to protect their sovereignty against the ICC and thus reflecting
the relative strength or weakness of their respective commitment to the ICC.
102 There are voices arguing that the prohibition of reservations is one reason that the USA refused
to ratify the Rome Statute, see e.g. Schabas (2004, 711).
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4.1.4 Implementing Norms on Complementarity & Cooperation (Dim 4)
A further essential indicator for the comprehensiveness of commitment to the ICC
is the implementation of norms into national law. The principle of complementarity
plays an important role in the institutional design. Up until the creation of the ICC,
international criminal tribunals were created ex post facto, thus after crimes commit-
ted in international armed conflicts. They had precedence over national jurisdiction.
This was interalia justified by the fact that national and international jurisdiction
are concurrent and international jurisdiction prevents national jurisdiction (Olásolo,
2005). The ICC is consciously created to be complementary. This is meant to express
that it respects state consent and the principle of sovereignty (Broomhall, 1999, 47).
The implementation of the Rome Statute in national law can be considered as a very
important condition for a good cooperation between the States Parties and the ICC
(Broomhall, 1999, 79). Here we can distinguish between implementation of legislation
on complementary and implementation of legislation on cooperation.
The Rome Statute itself requires no obligatory implementation of the norms of the ICC.
It is solely intended in article 70(4) that the member states may add the protection of
the court in their national rulings:
Art. 70 [O ences against the administration of justice] (4)a says: “Each State Party shall
extend its criminal laws penalizing o ences against the integrity of its own investigative
or judicial process to o ences against the administration of justice referred to in this
article, committed on its territory, or by one of its nationals”
States have to make national arrangements, if they want to fulfill their commitment to
the ICC (Broomhall, 1999; Ambos, 2011). Broomhall (1999) justifies the high impor-
tance of implementation with the ICC depending on state cooperation. He describes
two main issues in the relationship of the ICC and state parties: “complementarity
and cooperation, or investigation and prosecution by national justice systems of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court, and cooperation by States in the Court’s exercise
of jurisdiction” (Broomhall, 1999, 79).
The complementarity of the ICC results inter alia of art. 1 that says: “[The ICC] shall
be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this
Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.” Further in
art. 17(3) it says:
“In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether,
due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system,
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the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.”
The obligation to cooperate results from article 86, Rome Statute: “States Parties
shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court
in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”.
Furthermore, there is the obligation to establish national procedures for this cooper-
ation (art. 88 ICC): “States Parties shall ensure that there are procedures available
under their national law for all of the forms of cooperation which are specified un-
der this Part.”, and the obligations of implementation in the sense of the principle of
complementary (art. 17 ICC).
Thus, implementation in national law have to be made mainly as legislation on com-
plementarity and cooperation. Broomhall (1999) sees the changes one state has to
make being dependent on its constitutional and legal structure. While some states
would have to make none or hardly any changes, others would have to override to
some extent their own national legislation. Ambos (2011, 126 .) stresses that these
de facto obligations lead to a zero-solution in the form of a non-implementation being
improbable, but he sees herein considerable room for maneuver. A limited imple-
mentation would be in the form of the introduction of procedural and administrative
requirements. The maximal solution would be the complete implementation in form
of an explicit reference to the Rome Statute or a codification.
The NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) also points out the
relation between implementation and a successful cooperation:
“Given that the Court has no police force or prison, it will rely heavily on state co-
operation in this regard. Specifically, States must adopt legislation which provides for
the following: the Court to sit in the territory of a State Party; the criminalization of
o enses against the ICC’s administration of justice; the taking of evidence;the execution
of searches and seizures; the arrest and surrender of persons; certain immunities for ICC
o cials; and provisions for penalties and enforcement.” (CICC 2016)103
4.1.5 Triggering Investigations and Prosecutions (Dim 5)
The triggering of an investigation and prosecution by referral of a situation by a State
Party (art. 14) or by temporary submission to the Rome Statute by a Non-State Party
can be considered as a further indicator for a comprehensive commitment to the ICC,
since it reflects a credible willingness to deal with the past.
103 See CICC Fact Sheet on Implementation:
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FS_CICC_Implementation_Legislation_en.pdf
(27-04-2016).
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The dimension measures both in which states the ICC carries out investigations and
preliminary examinations and which party triggered them. There are four ways to
trigger investigations and prosecutions of committed crimes against humanity, war
crimes and genocide.104
- Referral of a situation by a State Party (art. 14)
- Initiation of investigation by the Chief-Prosecutor proprio motu (art. 15)
- Referral of a situation by the UNSC pursuant to ch.VII of the UN charter (art. 13(b))
- Temporarily submission of a non-Party State (art. 12, para. 3)
1) Referral of a situation by a State Party (art. 13(a) and art. 14 ):
“The Court may exercise its jurisdiction (...) if: (a) A situation in which one or more
of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State
Party in accordance with article 14”. (art. 13(a))
Article 14 [Referral of a situation by a State Party] says:
“1. A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed requesting the Pros-
ecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or more
specific persons should be charged with the commission of such crimes.
2. As far as possible, a referral shall specify the relevant circumstances and be ac-
companied by such supporting documentation as is available to the State referring the
situation.”
2) Referral of a situation by the UN-Security Council (art. 13(b)):
“The Court may exercise its jurisdiction (...) if: (b) A situation in which one or more of
such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations(...).(art. 13(b))”
In article 39, chapter VII of the UN-Charter it says :
“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security”
104 Triggering investigation of the crime of aggression has not been fully resolved. In the Kampala
compromise it was decided that for state referral and triggering proprio motu the UNSC first
shall decide if there is a act of aggression (art. 15bis(6)). If there is no such determination of
aggression by the UNSC within six month the proceedings may continue (art. 15bis(8)).
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3) Initiation of investigations proprio motu by the Prosecutor:
“The Court may exercise its jurisdiction (...) if: (c) The Prosecutor has initiated an
investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with article 15.” (art. 13(c))
Article 15 [Referral of a situation by the Prosecutor] says in paragraph 1 and 2:
“1. The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of information
on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
2. The Prosecutor shall analyze the seriousness of the information received. For this
purpose, he or she may seek additional information from States, organs of the United
Nations, intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable sources
that he or she deems appropriate, and may receive written or oral testimony at the seat
of the Court.”
Additionally, there is a further indirect option triggering investigations via ’submission
of a situation by non-party states’ according to article 12, para. 3:
“If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under
paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration (...), accept the exercise of jurisdiction by
the Court with respect to the crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate
with the Court without any delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.”
Opening investigations prorio motu empowers the ICC and makes it more independent.
The option of UN-Security Council referrals provides the opportunity to intervene in
particularly serious armed conflicts although or even when the state is not willing
by itself to stop the violence. But if states refer situations voluntarily, this can be
considered as very strong signal of commitment to the court. Even more if the state
concerned is not even party to the ICC.
Nevertheless, it is counter-factual to some extent to ask who did not use the courts’
investigatory power although it was possible. One of the main tasks of the ICC is
to examine if there were violations of the Statute of Rome or not. So, it is hardly
possible to decide which violations weren’t examined without them being examined.
The ICC is intended as complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. So even if
there are violations of international criminal law, a state still has the possibility of
national prosecutions. So, the following operationalization must be seen in this light.
What shall be measured is: In which states would it have been possible to appeal the
ICC? In which states did investigation occur and who initiated the investigation.
In sum, we can say that in all dimensions of commitment to the ICC, states have the
possibility of deciding to behave along a continuum between full commitment and zero
commitment. To become a state party still can be considered as the most important
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dimension of commitment, but all the other ways o er windows of opportunity of
strengthening or weakening this commitment.
Interestingly, there is very little path dependency in the possibilities of protecting
sovereignty among themselves. The possibility of modifying by making reservations,
declarations and objections is only possible if a state has ratified the Statute of Rome
or the amending agreements. All the other options are in principle open to all states
– regardless if they are parties to the ICC or not. This is due to the demand of
universality and the manifold creation of incentives participating the ICC-regime unless
a state is party to the Rome Statute or not. It is thus possible for example to trigger
investigations in the own country by the acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction with
respect to a certain crime in question (art. 12(3) ICC-Statute). States that used this
possibility are e.g. Palestine concerning the occupation of Palestinian territory in East
Jerusalem or Ukraine concerning the suppression of the protest on the Maidan between
2013-2014.
According to the theoretical considerations on the states behavior customizing and con-
straining their commitments to the ICC, the following Presumptions on Expected
Levels of Commitment can be made:
Presumption A: Among the states-parties there are only a few states with a high or
very high level of commitment to the ICC.
Presumption B: Among the states-parties, most states will have (strongly) customized
and constraint commitments.
Presumption C: The non-party states to the ICC tend to have a low or very low level
of commitment to the ICC and only few states show approximation to the ICC.
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4.2 Data and Methods I – Dimension Reduction and Index Building
4.2.1 Case Selection and Data Set I
In order to measure the level of commitment to the ICC as independent variable,
a data set is created that comprises data on the five dimensions of comprehensive
commitment for 195 states. Those include the 193 member states of the UN as well
as the State of Palestine and Cook Islands.105
For purpose of this empirical study time of measurement is August 2016. Up to
that point, the ICC had 124 states parties with the Ivory Coast (2013), Palestine
(2015) and El Salvador (2016) being the last states parties to ratify in this time frame.
The five dimensions on comprehensive and customized commitments to the ICC are
operationalized along their di erent indicators and elements by coding treaty docu-
ments of the United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) and reports of the CICC on states’
behavior towards the ICC.106
The variables that measure the dimensions of Joining (Dim1) andAmending (Dim2)
are found in the database of the United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS). Those are
states parties to the Rome Statute (Rome 1998), the Agreement on Privileges and
Immunities of the ICC (New York 2002), the Amendment to Article 8 of the Rome
Statute (Kampala 2010), and the Amendment on the Crime of Aggression (Kampala
2002).
The data on the indicators measuring Modifying (Dim3) via reservations and in-
terpretative declarations to the Rome Statute as well as the additional and amending
agreements is as well based on the UNTS. Only those declarations are considered as
relevant for the customization of commitments to the ICC that shield or try to shield
the states from the ICC. Declarations that express additional assent to the ICC are
excluded as e.g. Jordan, that declared “The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan hereby declares that nothing under its national law including the Constitu-
tion, is inconsistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”. Also
not captured are declarations according to article 103 “On the Role of the States in
the enforcement of sentences of imprisonment” of the Rome Statute.
Those declarations considered protective are: the transitional provision (art. 124);
maintaining reprieves, amnesties and pardons; interpreting humanitarian law or core
crimes; stressing the fight of terrorism; stressing the right of self-defense and the prin-
105 States that are not included because of a lack of data due to their controversial political
recognition are e.g.Kosovo and Taiwan.
106 An overview on variables, coding and sources can is found in “Database & Codebook I: Index of
Commitment (DV)” on p. 248.
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ciple of complementarity; or, in the case of the APIC, constrain the immunity of ICC
sta . However, it is not taken into account which of the declarations are legally tenable,
since it is the purpose of the study to examine the commitment of states regardless of
the actual legal and political consequences.
The data on Implementing (Dim4) is taken from the country reports of the CICC.
The CICC, is TAN of about 2,500 NGOs from 150 countries. The network tries to
encourage non-party states to join the ICC and motivate party states to deepen legal
integration and political support. They describe themselves working in partnership in
order to:
“[a]dvocate for all states to become party the Rome Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court; [a]dvance stronger national laws that deliver justice to victims of war crimes,
crimes against humanity and genocide; [s]trengthen state support for and cooperation
with the ICC; [e]nsure that the Court is fair, e ective and independent; [m]ake jus-
tice visible; [p]romote global civil society voices on international justice; Build a global
movement of justice advocates.”107
Monitoring the ICC and its states parties, the CICC gathers information and reports,
such as o cial documents and reports of the ICC, governments, IOs and ROs; or
reports and media statements on the behavior of states towards the ICC from NGOs
like AI or Human Rights Watch (HRW). The coding of which states have implemented
or are in the process of implementation of norms on cooperation or complementarity
is based on the CICC’s country reports.
It would have been even more scientifically valuable to measure the data on the di-
mensions of customized/constrained commitments on an annual basis. There is only
rare information on the state of implementation of norms on cooperation and com-
plementarity into national law. For many states there is hardly any information on
their status of implementation. Hence, it is not possible to measure the level of cus-
tomized/constrained commitments on an annual basis. It would have been possible
to explain it with a ’time-series cross-section analysis’ showing changes in the states’
commitment behavior towards the ICC. Therefore, a summary of the years since the
adoption of the Rome Statute has been chosen and the level of customized/constrained
commitment is measured for one summarized time frame (July 1998 until August
2016).
“Uncertainty and limited data should not cause us to abandon scientific research. One
the contrary: the biggest payo  for using the rules of scientific inference occurs precisely
when data are limited, observation tools are flawed, measurements are unclear, and
relationships are uncertain.” (King et al., 1994, 10)
107 See CICC: http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/?mod=coalition (04-11-2017).
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Thus, the focus lies mainly in the di erences between the individual pattern of com-
mitment behavior towards the ICC for each of the 195 states.
The dimension of Triggering (Dim5) is measured by looking at which states have
initiated investigations and prosecutions of the ICC via state-referral (art. 14) or via
temporary submission (art. 12(3)). The data is derived directly from the database
of the ICC itself.108 However, since we can expect states only trigger investigations
and prosecutions when they are involved in a probable violation of the core crimes,
only states that have experienced an armed conflict after 2002 according to the Battle-
Related Deaths Dataset of the UCDP are considered.109 However, since we can expect
states only trigger investigations and prosecutions when they are involved in a probable
violation of the core crimes, only states that have experienced an armed conflict after
2002 according to the Battle-Related Deaths Dataset of the UCDP are considered.104
4.2.2 Methods of Data Collection and Data Analysis I
The data on Joining (Dim1) and Amending (Dim2) is gained by counting the num-
bers of signature and ratification. For the data on Modifying (Dim3), Implement-
ing (Dim4) and Triggering (Dim5) a content analysis was made via hand-coding
along the basis of the criteria mentioned above. In this way, for each state an individ-
ual pattern of commitment to the ICC becomes visible in a range from no commitment
to low commitment ranging up to a high commitment. To make these patterns of com-
mitment behavior comparable, the data is mapped in the Index of Commitment
to the ICC as summary measurement.
Therefore, the di erent dimensions are weighted on the basis their importance for the
court. This makes it possible to show the commitment behavior of states in an order
from no commitment (0 points) up to full commitment (12 points). On an empirical
level, this allows for comparison of the commitment behavior of the di erent states,
and moreover helps to assess the level of commitment to the ICC as a whole.110
The concept of constrained and customized commitments to the ICC can be illustrated
empirically. It is possible to deconstruct the dichotomy of states parties and non-states
parties into di erent groups on the basis of their respective commitment levels. It
provides a more fine-grained measurement of the extent of states’ commitment to the
108 See ICC: https://www.icc-cpi.int (03-05-2017).
109 See UCDP: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads (26-09-2016).
110 All calculations and figures building and illustrating the Index of Commitment to the ICC are
made with Microsoft Excel 15 and Stata IC/14.
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Variable N Min Max
Joining (Dim1)
signature Rome Statute 195 0 1
ratification Rome Statute 195 0 1
Amending (Dim2)
signature APIC 195 0 1
ratification APIC 195 0 1
ratification Art8 195 0 1
ratification Crime of Aggression 195 0 1
Modifying (Dim3)
mod.RomeStatute 195 0 1
mod.APIC 195 0 1
mod.Art8 195 0 1
Implementing (Dim4)
Complementarity (progress) 195 0 1
Complementarity (issued) 195 0 1
Cooperation (progress) 195 0 1
Cooperation (issued) 195 0 1
Triggering (Dim5)
state referral art. 14 / 12(a) 195 0 1
Table 7: Overview on Dimensions and Variables
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ICC. It shows that there are many ways of constraining and customizing commitments
in order to protect sovereignty and still remain a state party.
The Index of Commitment to the ICC forms the dependent variable, that
can later be set in relation to di erent explanatory variables. That shows that the
extent of commitment to the ICC depends on the earlier level of commitment to
humanitarian law and human rights and the possibilities for states to reduce costs
of monitoring humanitarian law and human rights and at the level of commitment.
The methodological approach of building an index was chosen to create one single
value for each state that reflects the states’ level of comprehensive commitment
to the ICC. Thus, the latent variable of customized/constrained commitment can
be operationalized by summarizing di erent dimensions and indicators of commitment
to international courts. It is possible to compare the di erent levels of commitment
of the states and it is possible to compare the di erent levels of commitment of the
states.
The results of the index values can be taken as the basis for building a typology of
commitment behavior towards the ICC. The choice of the dimensions follows the con-
siderations above, namely that the five dimensions illustrate those ways of constraining
and customizing commitments that are directly available to all states. They do not
depend necessarily on the states’ power capacity in international negotiations or their
e ort in political negotiations. This would be the case if states wanted to influence
the institutional design of a court or the political standing towards the UNSC or other
IOs or ROs. According to this, the determination of the dimensions that enter into
the index is a theoretical argument-based decision. Although there are other possi-
ble ways of choosing dimensions for an index, we can say that there are no objective
quality criteria making it possible to assess if all relevant dimensions are taken into
account or if those that are chosen are really relevant (Schnell et al., 2013, 158f.). The
combination of indicators summarized to one dimension as well as the relation of the
di erent dimension to each other, follows an arbitrary numerical reduction building
an argument-based, weighted, additive index.111 A robustness check for this way of
calculating the index points is provided in subsection 7.5.112
Index of Commitment to the ICC
= 0.5*SigRS+1.5*RatRS+0.25*SigAPIC+1.25*RatAPIC+1*Art8+1*CoA+1.5*ModRS
+0.5*ModApic+0.25*ModArt8+0.25*ModCoA+1.5*ImpCom+1.5*ImpCoop+1*Trigg
111 On further information on the ways on building indices, see Schnell et al. (2013, 159 .).
112 See on p. 241.
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Joining the Rome Statute (Dim1) at the onset is scored with 2 points. Signing and
ratifying the additional and amending agreements (Dim2) is scored much higher with
3.5 point due to the consideration that the full support of all agreements is a highly
important indicator for the willingness of states to commit fully. The modification of
commitments (Dim3) is scored with 2.5 points because having made no modifications
demonstrates a high willingness to commit. Implementing (Dim4) is scored even higher
as it can be considered as highly significant if the states even bind themselves legally
by harmonizing their national laws to conform to the norms. Triggering (Dim5) is
only scored with one point, since it is harder to initiate a legal process in times of
political instability. Even more so because the ICC allows for two other ways of
referral to trigger investigation. For the same reason, this dimension is not excluded
but instead it is recognized if a state (that maybe is not even party to the ICC) triggers
investigation. As a further condition, this dimension is adjusted by valuing states with
0 points that experienced an actual armed conflict since 2000.
Dimension Variables Scores/Variable Scores/Dimension
Joining (Dim 1) signature Rome Statute 0.50 2.00
ratification Rome Statute 1.50
Amending (Dim 2) signature APIC 0.25 3.50
ratification APIC 1.25
amendment to art. 8 1.00
crime of Aggression 1.00
Modifying (Dim 3) Rome Statute of the ICC 1.50 2.50
APIC 0.50
amendment to art. 8 0.25
amendment to CoA 0.25
Implementing (Dim 4) cooperation (in progress/issued) (0.50/1.50) 3.00
complementarity (in progress/issued) (0.50/1.50)
Triggering (Dim 5) art. 14/art. 12(a) Rome Statute 1.00 1.00
Table 8: Scores of the Dimensions of the Index of Commitment to the ICC
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4.3 Results I – The Index of Commitment to the ICC
4.3.1 Variation in the Di erent Dimensions of Commitment
The basis of the Index of Commitment to the ICC are the states’ achievements in
the di erent dimensions of commitment. An overview of the frequencies of the states’
results can be found in Table 9.
Variables N No Yes
Joining (Dim1)
sig. Rome Statute 195 43 (22.50%) 152 (77.95%)
rat.Rome Statute 195 71 (36.41%) 124 (63.59%)
Amending (Dim2)
sig./acc.APIC 195 109(55.90%) 86 (44.10%)
rat./acc.APIC 195 120 (38.46%) 75 (61.54%)
rat.Art8 195 163 (83.59%) 32 (16.41%)
rat.CoA 195 163 (83.59%) 32 (16.41%)
Modifying (Dim3)
mod.RomeStatute 152 134 (88.16%) 18 (11.84%)
mod.APIC 86 62 (72.09%) 24 (27.91%)
mod.Art8 32 32 (100%) 0 (0%)
mod.CoA 32 32 (100%) 0 (0%)
Implementing (Dim4)
Law on Complementarity 195 91 (46.67%) 66 (33.85%)
issued + 38 (19.49%)
Law on Cooperation 195 117 (60.00%) 48 (24.62%)
issued + 30 (15.38%)
Triggering (Dim5)
state referral art. 14 / 12(a) 67 60 (%) 7 (%)
Table 9: Frequencies – Dimensions of Commitment
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States Parties to the Rome Statute (124) Non-Party States to the Rome Statute (71)
Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua a. Barbuda,
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, signed, but not ratified (28)
Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herz. Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Egypt, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,
CAfRep., Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Islamic Rep. of Iran, Jamaica, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan,
Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands Monaco, Morocco, Mozambique, Oman, Russia,
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, DR Congo, Sao Tome a. Principe, Solomon Islands, Syria,
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Thailand, Ukraine, Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Yemen, Zimbabwe
France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, not signed (43)
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Brunei, China, Cuba,
Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lesotho, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq,
Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Israel, Kazakhstan, DPR Korea, Kiribati, Laos,
Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Micronesia,
Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Palau,
Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia,
New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palestine, Singapore, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Togo, Tonga, Turkey,
Portugal, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, United States of America,
St.Kitts a. Nevis, St.Lucia, St.Vin. a.Grenadines, Vietnam
Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste,
Trinidad a. Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Unit. Kingdom,
Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia
Table 10: States Parties and Non-Party States to the Rome Statute
Joining the ICC (Dimension 1): As pointed out at the beginning of the work, in
2016, 124 states had ratified the Rome Statute, while 71 states did not. Moreover,
with the addition of those states that signed the Rome Statute we have 152 states as
opposed to 43 states that did not sign.113114
Amending (Dimension 2): The Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the
ICC of 2002 was ratified by 75 states. It is 86 states including those that have at least
signed. The APIC is open for ratification by all states. The Ukraine as non-party state
has ratified the agreement. As will later become apparent, the Ukraine shows further
113 In order to distinguish those that signed from those that did not, the variable of signature
includes those that became party to the ICC via approval, acceptance, accession or succession,
although these ways formally do not need the act of signature.
114 The time of measurement for the comprehensive and customized commitments is September
2016. On 30 November 2016 the Government of the Russian Federation notified that the would
not become a state party to the ICC. In the present model it is still counted as a signature.
Likewise Burundi is still considered as a state party although it declared on 26 October 2016
that it has decided to withdraw from the Rome Statute what took e ect in October 2017. The
same is true for the Philippines that withdrawal took e ect in March 2019. South Africa (19
October 2016) and Gambia (10 November 2016) announced a withdrawal; both of them
rescinded this decision in the beginning of 2017, see: https://treaties.un.org/pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&clang=_en (05-05-2017).
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Figure 11: States Parties to the APIC
steps of rapprochement to the ICC despite being no party state. The Bahamas have
signed the APIC although the state is also not party to the Rome Statute.
The amendment to article 8 and the amendment on the crime of aggression have (up
to 2016) 32 states parties.115 However, it is not exactly the same 32 states in each
case. Norway and Mauritius are states parties to the amendment to article 8, but
not to the amendments on the crime of aggression. Conversely, the State of Palestine
and Iceland are states parties to the amendments on the crime of aggression, but not
to article 8. Furthermore, we can see that both amendments are mainly ratified by
democratic states. As Table 14 shows, among the states parties to the amendment
to article 8 there are 2 non-democratic and 30 democratic states. Likewise, among
the states that are party to the amendments on the crime of aggression there are 3
non-democratic and 29 democratic states (see Table 15).
Modifying (Dimension 3): There are several states that have made reservations,
declarations and notifications upon signature or ratification of the Rome Statute.
Among those, 18 modifications can be deemed indicators for the protection of sovereignty
towards the ICC. In most of these modifications the states intention is to retain the
privileges given through humanitarian law and still, e.g. to have the right to attack
military targets or stress the national sovereignty.
115 Up to 05-2017 the amendment to article 8 as well as the amendments on the crime of aggression
has with Argentina and Portugal 34 states parties.
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States Parties to the APIC (75) Non-Party States to the APIC (120)
Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, signed, but not ratified (11)
Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bahamas, Ghana, Guinea, Jamaica, Jordan,
Brazil, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Madagascar, Mongolia, Peru, Sierra Leone, Tanzania
CAfRep. , Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, DR Congo, not signed (109)
Denmark, Dom.Rep., Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,
France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Barbados, Belarus, Bhutan, Brunei, Burundi, Cambodia,
Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Cook Is., Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, El Salvador,
Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia,
Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, India,
Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Romania, Samoa, Senegal, Kazakhstan, Kenya, DR of Korea, Kiribati, Kuwait,
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia,
Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Uganda, Ukraine, UK of Great Britain, Uruguay Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Morocco, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Qatar, Russia, Rwanda, St.Kitts and Nevis, St.Lucia,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino,
Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles,
Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa,
South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,
Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor Leste, Togo,
Tonga, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, UA Emirates,
United States of America, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu,
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Table 11: States Parties and Non-Party States to the APIC
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Figure 12: States Parties to the Amendment to Article 8
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States Parties to the Amendment to Article 8 of the Rome Statute (32)
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, El Salvador,
Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Macedonia,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay
Table 12: States Parties to the Amendment to Article 8
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Figure 13: States Parties to the Amendment on the Crime of Aggression
States Parties to the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression (32)
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, El Sal-
vador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Palestine, Poland, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Macedonia,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay
Table 13: States Parties to the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression
States Parties art. 8 Democracy total
no yes
no 107 56 163
yes 2 30 32
Table 14: States Parties Article 8 & Democracy Dummy 2015
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States Parties CoA Democracy total
no yes
no 106 57 163
yes 3 29 32
Table 15: States Parties Crime of Aggression & Democracy Dummy
Australia has declared:
“no person can be surrendered to the Court unless the Australian Attorney-General
issues a certificate allowing surrender. Australian law also provides that no person can
be arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the Court without a certificate from
the Attorney-General.”
Columbia has declared:
“None of the provisions of the Rome Statute concerning the exercise of jurisdiction by
the International Criminal Court prevent the Colombian State from granting amnesties,
reprieves or judicial pardons for political crimes, provided that they are granted in
conformity with the Constitution and with the principles and norms of international
law accepted by Colombia.”
France has declared interalia:
“The provisions of article 8 of the Statute (...) relate solely to conventional weapons
and can neither regulate nor prohibit the possible use of nuclear weapons nor impair the
other rules of international law applicable to other weapons necessary to the exercise by
France of its inherent right of self-defense”.
With regard to the APIC, there are 24 reservations, declarations and notifications that
are made upon signature, ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or succession
of agreement. Those entail mainly constraints on certain formalized privileges and
immunities for citizens of their own state.
Implementing (Dimension 4): According to the data of the CICC, there are 66
states that have implemented national law on complementarity to the ICC and at
least 38 that are in a process of preparing implementation (see Figure 14). There are
48 states that have implemented national law on cooperation with the ICC. At least
30 states are in the process of preparing implementation of norms on cooperation (see
Figure 15).
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Figure 14: Implementation of Law on Complementarity to the ICC
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Figure 15: Implementation of Law on Cooperation with the ICC
173
Triggering (Dimension 5): There are 7 states that have triggered investigations
and prosecutions of the ICC on their own initiative, either pursuant to article 14 as
state-referral (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic,
Mali) or in accordance with article 12(3) by respecting the jurisdiction of the ICC as
non-party state (Palestine, Ivory Coast, Ukraine)116.
States Parties Involved in Armed Conflicts 2000-2015 (28)
Burundi, Ivory Coast, Chad, Cambodia, Senegal, Djibouti, Bangladesh, Niger, Peru, Liberia,
Afghanistan, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Republic Congo, Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo, Uganda, Palestine, Georgia, Philippines, Guinea, United Kingdom of Great Britain,
Kenya, Tadjikistan, Mali, Colombia, Macdonia, Australia
Non-Party States Involved in Armed Conflicts 2000-2015 (35)
Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, Azerbaijan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Eritrea, India, Thai-
land, Myanmar, Nepal, Angola, Syria, Israel, United States of America, Iraq, Ethiopia, Haiti,
Lebanon, Libya, China, Egypt, Cameroon, Mozambique, Sudan, Mauritania, Yemen, Uzbekistan,
Russia, Rwanda„ Algeria, South Sudan, Ukraine
Table 16: States Involved in Armed Conflicts 2000-2015 by Ratification Status
According to UCDP, there have been armed conflicts since 2000 in at least 63 states
worldwide (see Table 16). There are 56 states that have experienced an armed conflict
have triggered no investigations on their own. However, this consideration has to be
relativized insofar as the mere existence of an armed conflict does not mean there
occurred one or more of the core crimes according to the Rome Statute. Nor can we
conclude that such crimes have happened in those states that have triggered investi-
gations by themselves according to article 14 and 12(3), since it is one central task of
the ICC to examine if there were. Accordingly, the variable is only measures which
states have used the possibility of investigations and prosecutions as one dimension of
commitment to the ICC.
116 Later on both Ivory Coast (in 2013) and the State of Palestine (in 2016) ratified the Rome
Statute and became states parties to the ICC.
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4.3.2 The Index of Commitment to the ICC
Building the Index of Commitment to the ICC makes it possible to illustrate
the states’ results in the di erent dimensions of commitment as one central summary
measurement. The states can receive values between 0 and 12 on a scale with 0.25
incremental steps (see Figure 16). As shown in Figure 17 there are 60 states that have
0 points and 135 states with index points between 0.25 and 12 points.
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Figure 16: Frequency Distribution of the States’ Index Positions
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Figure 17: Streamlined Frequency Distribution of the States’ Index Positions
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Figure 18: Frequency Distribution of the States’ Index Positions by Ratification
If those states that have ratified are separated from those that have not (see Figure 18),
it becomes apparent that there is a strong variation of the level of commitment to the
ICC within the group of states parties. The states can be categorized into six groups
(see Figure 19) giving a typology of commitment to the ICC:
Group 1 (Comprehensive Commitments) comprises those states that have reached
10.00-12.00 points and thus have bound themselves very closely to the ICC.
In Group 2 (Slightly Customized Commitment) are those that have reached
8.00-9.75 points. Although they have bound themselves very strongly to the ICC,
they have slightly customized their commitments.
Group 3 (Moderately Customized Commitment) comprises those that have
reached 6.00-7.75 points. Their commitments are strongly customized, and they have
only reached the half of the possible index points.
Group 4 (Strongly Customized Commitment) consists of those that reached
4.00-5.75 points. They have massively customized their commitments and reached not
even half of the possible index points. It is the biggest group within the states parties
and the second biggest within all states.
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Figure 19: Grouped Frequency Distribution of the States’ Index Positions
In Group 5 (Weak Commitment) are those that have reached 2.00-3.75 points.
Their commitment is very weak.
Group 6 (Very Weak or No Commitment) consists of those states that have
reached 0-17.5 points and thus show hardly any or no commitment to the ICC. With
67 states, it is the biggest group within the typology of commitment to the ICC.
Thus, it can be stated that the presumptions on the levels of commitments have proven
to be true: Among the states parties there are only a few states that show a very high
(26 states) level of commitment, such as the Netherlands (12.0), Germany (11.5) or
Belgium (10.5). Most of the states among the parties to the ICC have constraint
and customized commitments, be it slightly (24 states), such as Bosnia-Herzegovina
(9.5), South Korea (9.0) or the United Kingdom of Great Britain (8.0); moderately
(32 states), such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (7.5), Canada (6.5) or
Portugal (6.0); or, strongly customized commitments as in the case of Burundi (5.0)
and Gambia (4.5) which had both threatened to withdraw from the ICC in 2016.
As expected, among the non-party states, there are only a few which have shown
rapprochement to the ICC, such as Armenia and Nicaragua with 2 points and Ukraine
with 3.5 points. Most of the non-party states have no or very weak commitment (67
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states), such as Indonesia and Rwanda with 1.5 points, Russia, Turkey and Syria with
0.5 points, or China, India, Israel, Libya and the United States of America.
4.3.3 Patterns of Commitment to the ICC
We can observe that states often ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC, but thereafter
constrain/customize their commitments. This phenomenon becomes even more ap-
parent when comparing the status of ratification with the level of commitment to the
ICC along di erent ROs.117 The whole community of the member states of the EU
have ratified the Rome Statue of the ICC (see Table 18) and all of them have an index
position of at least 6 points (see Table 19).
States Parties ICC States Parties EU total
no yes
no 71 0 71
yes 96 28 124
total 167 28 195
Table 18: Contingency Table – States Parties ICC & States Parties EU
Index of Commitment States Parties EU total
no yes
10.00-12.00 10 16 26
8.00-9.75 15 9 24
6.00-7.75 29 3 32
4.00-5.75 38 0 38
2.00-3.75 8 0 8
0.00-1.75 67 0 67
total 167 28 195
Table 19: Contingency Table – Commitment to the ICC & States Parties EU
Likewise, all member states of Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) have ratified the
Rome Statute of the ICC (see Table 20), however, their index points range from a
comprehensive commitment to a strongly customized commitments (see Table 21).
117 Moreover, there are some interesting constellations that would be appropriate for comparative
case studies in the sense of most-similar systems designs with groups of states that shown many
similar characteristics due to region, common political environment, but behave totally di erent
in their commitment behavior towards the ICC such as Botswana, Burundi and South Africa;
India and Indonesia; or Colombia, El Salvador and Nicaragua.
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The Index of Commitment to the ICC
index points Group 1 – Comprehensive Commitment (26 states)
12.00 Estonia, Finland, Netherlands, Samoa, Slovenia,Trinidad and Tobago
11.50 Croatia, Germany, Poland
11.00 Georgia , Norway, Macedonia
10.50 Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Iceland, Luxembourg, Uruguay
10.00 Chile, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland
index points Group 2 – Slightly Customized Commitment (24 states)
9.50 Bulgaria, Bosnia Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Denmark,
Montenegro, Ireland, Serbia, Uganda
9.00 Czechia, Greece, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, New Zealand, Romania, South Korea
8.50 Botswana, Panama, Senegal, Sweden
8.00 Albania, France, Mali, United Kingdom of Great Britain
index points Group 3 – Moderately Customized Commitment (32 states)
7.50 Andorra, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador,
Gabon, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Palestine, Paraguay, South Africa
7.00 Bolivia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, San Marino
6.50 Belize, Canada, Cape Verde, Guyana, Italy, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Tunisia
6.00 Australia, Colombia, Lesotho, Portugal, Timor Leste
index points Group 4 – Strongly Customized Commitment (38 states)
5.75 Ghana, Mongolia, Peru, Sierra Leone
5.50 Barbados, Comoros, Cook Is., Liberia, Moldova, Philippines, Suriname, Vanuatu
5.25 Jordan
5.00 Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Fiji, Niger
4.75 Madagascar, Tanzania, Venezuela
4.50 Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Gambia, Grenada, Guatemala,
Ivory Coast, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo,
St.Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Seychelles, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Zambia
index points Group 5 – Weak Commitment (8 states)
3.75 Guinea
3.50 Chad, Djibouti, Tajikistan, Ukraine
2.00 Armenia, Ethiopia, Nicaragua
index points Group 6 – No or very weak Commitment (67 states)
1.50 Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Rwanda
1.00 Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Malaysia, Mozambique
0.75 Bahamas, Jamaica
0.50 Algeria, Bahrain, Cameroon, Egypt, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan,
Lao PDR, Monaco, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Russian Federation,
Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Syrian Arabic Republic, Thailand,
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zimbabwe
0.00 Belarus, Bhutan, Brunei, China, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, India, Iraq, Israel,
Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Micronesia, Nepal, North
Korea, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tonga, Turkmenistan,
Tuvalu, United States of America, Vietnam
Table 17: Groups Within the Index of Commitment to the ICC
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States Parties ICC States Parties Mercosur total
no yes
no 71 0 71
yes 119 5 124
total 190 5 195
Table 20: Contingency Table – States Parties ICC & States Parties Mercosur
Index of Commitment States Parties Mercosur total
no yes
10.00-12.00 25 1 26
8.00-9.75 24 0 24
6.00-7.75 29 3 32
4.00-5.75 37 1 38
2.00-3.75 8 0 8
0.00-1.75 67 0 67
total 190 5 195
Table 21: Contingency Table – Commitment to the ICC & States Parties Mercosur
The states of the Communidad Andina de Naciones (CAN) are all parties to the ICC
(see table 22), but they do have customized or even strongly customized commitments
to the ICC (see table 23).
States Parties ICC States Parties European CAN total
no yes
no 71 0 71
yes 120 4 124
total 191 4 195
Table 22: Contingency Table – States Parties ICC & States Parties CAN
Index of Commitment States Parties CAN total
no yes
10.00-12.00 26 0 26
8.00-9.75 24 0 24
6.00-7.75 29 3 32
4.00-5.75 37 1 38
2.00-3.75 8 0 8
0.00-1.75 67 0 67
total 191 4 195
Table 23: Contingency Table – Commitment to the ICC & States Parties CAN
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From the 53 states parties to the African Union (AU), 33 states have ratified the Rome
Statute (see table 24), but their level of commitment to the ICC di ers strongly (see
table 25).
States Parties ICC States Parties AU total
no yes
no 51 20 71
yes 91 33 124
total 142 53 195
Table 24: Contingency Table – States Parties ICC & States Parties AU
Index of Commitment States Parties AU total
no yes
10.00-12.00 26 0 26
8.00-9.75 17 7 24
6.00-7.75 22 10 32
4.00-5.75 25 13 38
2.00-3.75 4 4 8
0.00-1.75 48 19 67
total 142 53 195
Table 25: Contingency Table – Commitment to the ICC & States Parties AU
Only two states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have ratified
the Statute of Rome (see table 26) and both have bad rates of commitment to the ICC
(see table 27).
States Parties ICC States Parties ASEAN total
no yes
no 63 8 71
yes 122 2 124
total 185 10 195
Table 26: Contingency Table – States Parties ICC & States Parties ASEAN
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Index of Commitment States Parties ASEAN total
no yes
10.00-12.00 26 0 26
8.00-9.75 24 0 24
6.00-7.75 32 0 32
4.00-5.75 36 2 38
2.00-3.75 8 0 8
0.00-1.75 59 8 67
total 185 10 195
Table 27: Contingency Table – Commitment to the ICC & States Parties ASEAN
This shows there is qualitative di erence between the mere act of ratifying in order to
become a state party and the actual extent of comprehensive commitment. The states
may be put in di erent group based upon the extent of the commitment to the ICC.
In the following chapter it will be given empirical evidence for the theoretical argu-
ment that the states’ extent of commitment depends on their possibilities of solving
cooperation problem of human rights law and humanitarian law.
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5 Testing the Explanatory Power of Solving
International Cooperation Problems with the ICC
The Index of Commitment to the ICC lends empirical evidence to the theoretical
argument that states ratify the Rome Statute and become a state party to the ICC,
but also constrain and customize their commitments with the intention of retaining a
certain room for political maneuver. The index as a measurement for comprehensive
commitment shall serve as a dependent variable. Thereby, the theoretical argument
shall be tested that states’ comprehensive commitment to the ICC depends on their
interests in governing within the international community and their commitment to
humanitarian law and human rights. The underlying consideration for this is that the
ICC o ers the states the possibility to reduce their monitoring costs and to increase
their credibility to commitment they have already made.
A model will be developed to operationalize variables for the four main hypotheses,
as well as several alternative arguments from the literature in order to make them
empirically testable (5.1). Then, data set, time frame and methods of data collection
and data analysis will be set out and justified (5.2). Finally, the results of the multiple
linear regression and multiple logistic regression analyses testing the theoretical argu-
ments on explaining the states’ index positions and the states’ decision to ratify, will
be presented (5.3). It will be shown that there is strong empirical evidence for states’
commitment behavior depending on their possibilities of solving cooperation problems
of international relations with the ICC.
5.1 Model and Operationalization
5.1.1 Hypotheses on Solving Cooperation Problems
From the first theoretical argument that states’ commitment to the ICC depends on
their willingness to participate in the governing of the international community of
states and reduce the cost of monitoring humanitarian law and human rights, the
following hypotheses can be derived:
Reducing Costs of Monitoring Humanitarian Law & Human Rights Law
Hypothesis 1: The higher the level of democracy, the higher the level of commitment
to the ICC.
Hypothesis 2: States that have acknowledged the ICJ for compulsory jurisdiction tend
to have a higher level of commitment to the ICC than states that have not acknowledged
the ICJ for compulsory jurisdiction.
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The second theoretical argument that states’ commitment to the ICC depend on their
general attitude towards humanitarian law and human rights and the possibility of
increasing their commitments to them. The following hypotheses can be derived:
Enhancing Credibility of Commitments to Humanitarian Law & Human Rights
Law
Hypothesis 3: The higher the level of commitment to humanitarian law, the higher the
level commitment to the ICC.
Hypothesis 4: The higher the level of commitment to human rights, the higher the
level of commitment to the ICC.
Figure 20: Causal Mechanism – Commitment and Solving Cooperation Problems
5.1.2 Dependent Variables
Accordingly, the dependent variable is the level of commitment to the ICC measured
with the Index of Commitment to the ICC, that ranges from 0 (no or weak
commitment) to 12 (comprehensive commitment). For a test of robustness and to
compare the explanatory power of the theoretical argument the Ratification of
the Rome Statute is used as an additional dependent variable with the two values
0 (no ratification) and 1 (ratification).
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5.1.3 Independent Variables
Due to the four central hypotheses on reducing costs of monitoring humanitar-
ian law and human rights law and enhancing credibility of commitments
to humanitarian law and human rights law the model includes four explana-
tory variables: the level of democracy, subjecting to compulsory jurisdiction of the
ICJ, the number of ratified treaties on humanitarian law and the number of ratified
treaties of human rights.
As can be seen in Figure 20, both the level of political freedom (x1) and the recognition
of compulsory jurisdiction (x2) can be considered as indicators for the states interest
in governing the international community. This is due to the fact that the ICC o ers a
window of opportunity to reduce the costs of monitoring humanitarian law and human
rights through the creation of criminal responsibility for war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide and the crime of aggression being able to be investigated and
prosecuted at one permanent international court.
The number of ratifications of humanitarian law treaties (x3) and of human rights
law (x4) are moreover indicators for the states’ attitude towards the legalization of
international peace and security. States can be expected to bind themselves to the
ICC to the extent that they are already bound to humanitarian law and human rights
law.
The level of democracy (x1) as an independent variable is operationalized with
the “Index of Freedom in the World”. This measures political rights and civil liberties
on an annual basis for 195 states.118 Each state is ranked in two seven-point metric
scales, one for political rights and one for civil liberties, with the rating one signifying
the greatest degree of freedom and seven the smallest degree of freedom. The average
of the both scales, that is used in the present analysis, is called ’freedom rating’. States
that are ranked between 1.0-2.5 are considered to be free, 3.0-5.0 partly free and 5.5-
7.0 as not free. Since it is counterintuitive that one is the highest ranking and seven
the lowest, the scale is reversed in the subsequent regression analyses.
The independent variable compulsory jurisdiction ICJ (x2) specifies the states
that have made declarations recognizing the jurisdiction of the ICJ as compulsory
(art. 36, para. 2 ICJ-Statute). This means that they have the right to bring other
states to court, if those also have recognized the ICJ for compulsory jurisdiction. The
corresponding data is taken from the database of the ICJ on contentious jurisdiction.119
118 See Freedom in the World by Freedom House:
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016 (26-09-2016).
119 See ICJ: http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (10-04-2017).
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The independent variable humanitarian law (x3) counts the number of ratified
treaties on humanitarian law. Therefore, 25 treaties and optional or additional proto-
cols are checked for the ratification status of states up until 2015. Those include the
Geneva Conventions I-IV, as well as its Additional Protocols I-III and the declaration
on the “Acceptance of the Competence of the International Fact-Finding Commission
according to article 90 of AP I”. Moreover, it counts four treaties on the protection
of culture and environment, 14 treaties on the use of weapons in armed conflicts and
both the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”
and the “Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity”.120 The data on the respective ratification status is
taken from the databases of the ICRC121 and the UNTS122.
The independent variable Human Rights Law (x4) counts the number of ratified
treaties on human rights. Therefore, 18 treaties and optional or additional protocols
has been checked for the ratification status of states up to 2015. Those include the
ICCPR, ICESCR and several other treaties on certain aspects of human rights, such as
the CAT or the CEDAW.123. The data on the respective ratification status of human
rights law is taken from the databases of the OHCHR124 and the UNTS125.
5.1.4 Control Variables
Due to the subject matter of the ICC and the interests and preferences of the states
concerned, there are several alternative factors that might influence the states’ compre-
hensiveness of commitment to the ICC that will be included in the models as control
variables.
There is a control for armed conflict and peacekeeping:. This is due to the
consideration that we can expect states that have the most fear of investigations and
prosecution to be particularly cautious or even dismissive towards the ICC.126 This
reflects to some extent the assumptions of approaches considering power and security
120 A list on the 25 recorded treaties on humanitarian law is to find on p. 239.
121 See ICRC: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl (16-09-2016).
122 See UNTS: https://treaties.un.org/PAGES/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&clang=_en
(16-09-2016).
123 A list on the 18 recorded treaties on human rights is to find on p. 240.
124 See OHCHR: http://indicators.ohchr.org (16-09-2016).
125 See UNTS: https://treaties.un.org/PAGES/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&clang=_en
(16-09-2016).
126 In principal, it would be obvious to control for human rights violations as well, as there is reason
to assume that states with a better human rights practice tend to commit to the ICC more likely
(Dutton, 2011, 483). However there is a very high negative correlation with the level of political
freedom (-0.718) measured with the Political Terror Scale (PTS) of 2015 (Gibney et al., 2016) so
that there would be no added value including human rights violations into the regression models.
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as driving forces behind states behavior towards international law and international
courts.127
Correspondingly, the control variable armed conflicts (c1) measures the sum of
years of armed conflict per conflict for each state between the years 2000-2015. This
shall serve as proxy for the extent of which a state is concerned in one or more armed
conflicts. It is created on the basis of the Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (Melander
et al., 2016) of the UCDP that collect data on armed conflicts on an annual basis to
provide information on armed conflicts to a broader public.
Investigations and prosecutions could threaten states that have high military contri-
butions to UN-peacekeeping operations. This includes several democracies like Italy,
France, Germany, Great Britain or the USA. In addition to which are many non-
democratic nations that use the participation in peacekeeping operations purposefully
to earn money and to procure foreign currencies, such as Ethiopia, India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and Rwanda.128 Soldiers of UN-peacekeeping troops have been accused
again and again of being involved or committing crimes themselves, such as sexual
exploitation, arms trade or gold and diamonds trading, that can under certain circum-
stances be considered war crimes or crimes against humanity. The UN itself is not able
to exercise jurisdiction and the states that deployed the troops are often unwilling or
unable to prosecute peacekeepers. The ICC has no clear limit as to who should be
prosecuted. In some cases the investigations could be more broadly reaching than just
prosecuting higher-ranking perpetrators.129
127 For a discussion on the theoretical argument of states committing to international law and courts
depending on increasing the own power and security, see p. 31.
128 As of 2016 85,451 troops were in deployment for the 16 contemporary UN Peacekeeping
operations. The contributions of the mentioned states are: Italy (1.074), France (845), Germany
(379), GB (342), USA (34) and Ethiopia (8.165), India (6.752), Pakistan (6.774), Bangladesh
(5.635), Rwanda (5.125), see UN Peacekeeping troops and police contributors archive:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml
(14-06-2017). In Bangladesh e.g. the government received for 1.28 billion dollar, between 2000
and 2010, as compensation for their contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. That is
almost 1% of the GDP. The military salaries for UN are much higher ($1.028) that for the
Bangladeshi military ($193), see: http:
//www.ozy.com/acumen/why-1-small-nation-plays-a-major-role-in-peacekeeping/62085
(10-05-17).
129 In an O ce of the Prosecutor (OTP) policy paper from 2003, the problem of the impunity gap
through limitations on leaders is discussed: “The strategy of focusing on those who bear the
greatest responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court will leave an impunity gap
unless national authorities, the international community and the Court work together to ensure
that all appropriate means for bringing other perpetrators to justice are used. In some cases the
focus of an investigation by the OTP may go wider than high-ranking o cers, if investigation of
certain type of crimes or those o cers lower down the chain of command is necessary for the
whole case.”, OTP policy paper, page 7, available under: https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/
rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b25-60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf
(08-02-2017).
187
The control variable of peacekeeping troops per mio. habitants (c2) specifies
the number of troops contributed to UN Peacekeeping operations per state in relation
to the number of habitants of the states. It is created by extracting the number of con-
tributed troops from the “troop and police contributors archive” of the United Nations
peacekeeping statistics130 and set in relation to the population in million according to
the database of the CIA World Fact Book as of August 2016, that provides information
on political, societal, economical and historical issues for 267 world entities.131
Another thinkable determinant of the comprehensiveness of commitment to the ICC
could be former experiences of international criminal tribunals or amnesties. Corre-
spondingly, there is a control for transitional justice. There is a highly controversial
debate in the research literature on democratization and peace-building. Whether a
political and even legal reprocessing of the past is helpful in promoting peace and
democracy (Freeman, 2006; Hughes/Thakur, 2007) in in question. Some say it could
further destabilize a state searching for stability and it is better to agree on amnesties
during the processes of peace negotiations (Snyder/Vinjamuri, 2003; Ginsburg, 2009;
Moyn, 2014).132 We can expect states that have experiences with international crimi-
nal tribunals to have a more comprehensive commitment to the ICC than states that
have none, or even granted a high numbers of amnesties.133 Accordingly, there are
two variables created on the basis of the Transitional Justice Data Base (TJDB) from
(Olsen et al., 2010). The control variable international criminal tribunals (c3)
counts the number of international criminal tribunals a state has established and the
number of amnesties (c4) counts the number of amnesties a state has enacted
between 1990-2010.
There is a control for hegemonic power due to the consideration that hegemonic power
imbalances play a role in the extent of comprehensiveness of commitment to the ICC.
For one thing, it could be possible that former colonial powers are more supportive
towards the ICC, since they are in some instances politically and economically still
tightly interconnected with their former colonies and have an interest in peace-building
and peacekeeping in the former colonies. In contrast, we can expect even less powerful
states, that are economically or politically highly dependent on certain hegemonic
130 See UN Peacekeeping troops and police contributors archive:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml
(02-08-2017).
131 See CIA World Fact Book:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2119.html
(24-08-17).
132 For a more detailed illustration of the several TJ-instruments see p. 85 and p. 85.
133 For a legal analysis on the tension between amnesties and prosecution see e.g. Newman (2005).
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powers to follow the extent of comprehensiveness the latter show. The USA for example
put massive pressure on the states to sign so called ’Bilateral Immunity Agreements’134
that provide for not surrendering U.S. citizens to the ICC that provide not to surrender
U.S. citizens to the ICC (Kelley, 2007).135 The control variable of Former Colonial
Power (c5) shows which states were a colonial power between 1800-2016. It is created
by coding the data on state introductions of the CIA World Fact Book136.
The variable BIA with the USA (c6) specifies which states have negotiated a bi-
lateral non-surrender agreement or so called ’Article 98 Agreement’ with the USA,
which shield citizens of the USA from a surrender to the ICC. The variable is based
on coding the country reports of the CICC that has collected data on ratification,
implementation an cooperation of the states towards the ICC137.
Finally, there is a control for the influence of the legal and governmental systems with
respect to the consideration that states are limited by their domestic structures. Thus,
states with a common law system can be expected to have a higher level of commit-
ments to the ICC, since they have higher incentives to implement the norms of the
Rome Statute into national law. Civil law systems tend to be monistic while common
law systems tend to be dualistic. States with a ’dualist system’ have to translate inter-
national law into the national legal system. “Therefore, for a dualist state ratification
of the Rome Statute is not enough and national implementing legislation is necessary.
War crimes trials, for example, can only take place when the national legislation is
enacted, unless of course such legislation already exists.”138 States with a ’monist
system’ do not need to translate international law into the national legal system. The
ratification of an international agreement makes it part of the national law immedi-
ately. National courts can directly apply and adjudicate the Rome Statute. Thereby,
134 Human Rights Watch has criticized some of the most striking in an open letter to the US
Secretary of State of the time, Colin Powell: Croatia’s accession to North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) was placed in question for not signing a BIA. Niger was threatened to lose
cooperative development projects. Bosnia was confronted with losing military assistance. The
Philippines was o ered a $30 million for military assistance. In response, both EU and Mercosur
made statements not to conclude such non-surrender agreements with the USA. In 2002, the EU
even released a declaration with guiding principles binding EU party states and EU candidate
states (Human Rights Watch, 2003).
135 For further consideration on post-colonial accusation, see p. 31 and for reflections on dependency
networks and the conclusion of a BIA with the USA see p. 62.
136 See CIA World Fact Book:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2028.html
(24-04-17).
137 Country reports of the CICC: http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=world (30-09-2016).
138 See Peace and Justice Initiative: http:
//www.peaceandjusticeinitiative.org/implementation-resources/dualist-and-monist.
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it should be taken into consideration that the states have a di erent understanding as
to whether national law or international law takes precedence.
Due to this, the control variable common law system (c7) is created by coding data
from the CIA World Fact Book on the legal systems of the states in the world 139 as of
2016. Those systems that are pure common law systems or that combine common law
with traditional law are considered to be common law systems. Moreover, with regard
to the governmental systems, Goldsmith/Posner (2006) argue that states with unwrit-
ten constitutions are more likely to ratify international agreements. This is because
the more democratic a state is, the more the parliament gets strengthened by interna-
tional law. Thus, we could expect states with presidential systems to be less willing
to ratify international agreements, since the increasing influence of international law
would lead to an unintended strengthening of the parliament and a possible weakening
of the president.
The control variable parliamentary system (c8) is created by coding data of the
CIA World Fact Book on the governmental systems of the states in the world140 as of
2016. Those governmental systems that are pure parliamentary systems or parliamen-
tary monarchies are considered to be parliamentary systems.141
139 See CIA World Fact Book:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2100.html
(26-09-2016).
140 See CIA World Fact Book:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2128.html
(26-09-2016).
141 An overview of the summary statistics can be found in Table 28 on p. 191.
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variable N mean sd min max
Dependent Variables
Ratification of the Rome Statute 193 0.632 0.483 0 1
Index of Commitment to the ICC 193 4.867 3.907 0 12
Explanatory Variables
Political Freedom 193 4.650 2.021 1 7
Compulsory jurisdiction ICJ 193 0.368 0.483 0 1
Humanitarian Law treaties 193 15.016 6.488 3 25
Geneva Law treaties 193 3.477 1.160 1 5
human rights law 193 11.23 3.812 2 18
Control Variables
Armed conflicts 193 3.031 8.036 0 75
PK troops/mio. habitant 193 24.572 74.21 0 671
Number of Amnesties 193 1.684 2.261 0 10
Int. Criminal Tribunal 193 0.057 0.232 0 1
Former Colonial Power 193 0.077 0.268 0 1
BIA with the USA 193 0.715 0.453 0 1
Common law system 193 0.155 0.363 0 1
Parliamentary system 193 0.492 0.501 0 1
Table 28: Summary Statistics – Determinants for Commitment to the ICC
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5.2 Data and Methods II – Testing Hypotheses with Regression
Analyses
5.2.1 Case Selection and Data Set II
A data set is created comprising information on the behavior of states towards the
ICC for 193 states.142 For each of the states as cases there are 15 data points, one
data point. The data is measured with cross-sectional data snapshot for 2016 as time
of measurement of the Index of Commitment to the ICC. The explanatory and
control variables are likewise measured as cross-sectional data dependent on both the
data availability and the content-related suitability either for 2015 as lagged variables
or for a certain time frame usually up to 2015.143
From a methodological view, it would be appropriate to measure the Index of Com-
mitment to the ICC as well as the independent variables for every single year after the
entry into force of the Rome Statute of the ICC and afterwards to examine the deter-
minants of the index positions with a “times-series cross-sectional regression analysis”.
This would have allowed the examination of the development of the states’ commit-
ment to the ICC including setbacks, e.g. the withdrawal of signatures, and we could
have linked such developments to certain political events. However, there is a lack of
availability of annual data on the implementation of norms on complementarity and
cooperation. Although the CICC continuously collects data on the implementation
into national law, it is neither exhaustive nor available on an annual basis, but up
to now only displayed in a continually updated version. Therefore, it would not be
possible extract data on an annual basis. A “times-series cross-sectional regression
analysis” would have been problematic from a theoretical view, since the amending
agreements on article 8 and the crime of aggression were only adopted in 2010.
Thus, it is a practicable and a reasonable way to use cross-sectional data for a snapshot
test of the theoretical argument of states commitment behavior being dependent on
their possibilities of solving cooperation problems of international relations with the
ICC, such as reducing monitoring costs and enhancing the credibility of commitments
to humanitarian law and human rights. The year 2016 has been chosen since this is
the most recent year for which data is available.
142 While the Index of commitment to the ICC was measured for 195 states, the regression
analyses testing explanatory factors is reduced on 193 states. Since there is a lack of data at the
level of political freedom according to Freedom House for the State of Palestine and Cook Islands
the two states are excluded from the regression analyses to maintain sub-sample stability.
143 A more detailed overview of variables, coding, times of measurement and sources and can be
found in “Database & Codebook II: Determinants of Commitment (IV)” on p. 251.
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5.2.2 Methods of Data Collection and Data Analysis II
In order to test the explanatory power of the theoretical arguments for solving coopera-
tion problems statistical methods of regression analysis will be used. This aims to draw
explanatory inferences about the states’ positions on the Index of Commitment to
the ICC and as robustness check in comparison to the states’ ratification of the Rome
Statute on their benefits of reducing cost of monitoring and enhancing the credibility
of commitments to humanitarian law and human rights through establishing the ICC
as international court of enforcement.
The empirical method of regression analysis144 makes it possible not only to investi-
gate correlations between those variables but also to examine a causal relationship that
flows from the independent variables in the direction to the respective dependent vari-
able. Gujarati (2003, 18) defines regression analysis as follows: “Regression Analysis
is concerned with the study of the dependence of one variable, the dependent variable,
on one or more other variables, the explanatory variables, with a view to estimating
and/or predicting the (...) mean of average value of the former in terms of the known
or fixed (...) values of the latter.”
The choice of the type of regression analysis depends on the scales of the independent
and dependent variables. Therefore, explaining the determinants of states’ positions
on the Index of Commitment to the ICC as dependent variable the method of
’Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)’ as subtype of a multiple linear regression analysis is
used (Gujarati, 2003). Multiple logistic regression analysis will be used to check to
check robustness when examining the states’ decision to ratify the Rome Statute. The
method of ’multiple logistic regression analysis’ will be used for a robustness check
in order to examine the explanatory power of the same determinants (independent
variables) on the states’ decision to ratify the Rome statute of the ICC (Cox, 1958;
Long/Freese, 2001).145
Explaining Positions on the Index of Commitment: Multiple Linear Regression
The e ects of the supposed determinants on the states’ positions on the Index of
Commitment to the ICC will be examined using an OLS as subtype of multiple linear
regression analysis. The method is intended to be used for examining the influences of
144 The term of regression was originally introduced by Francis Galton. He demonstrated empirically
that although tall parents tend to have tall children while short parents tend to have short
children, the average height of children of parents with a certain height tend to ’regress’ to the
average height of the population (Galton, 1886) cited from Gujarati (2003, 17).
145 All calculations and figures explaining and illustrating the determinants of the states behavior
are made with Stata IC/14.
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two of more independent variables on one dependent variable. The method of OLS was
introduced originally by Carl Friedrich Gauss who used it for astronomical analysis
of the movement of celestial bodies and geodetical measurements of the Kingdom of
Hanover (Gauss, 1823). Nowadays, the OLS regression is one of the most powerful
and most often used methods of regression analysis (Gujarati, 2003, 58). For this
method the dependent variable has to be quantitative and continuous, while the inde-
pendent variables can be either quantitative and continuous or categorial and binary.
Categorical variables can be included as dummy variables.146
The multiple linear regression analysis makes it possible to express the dependent vari-
able (position on the Index of Commitment to the ICC) as a linear function of the
four hypothesized independent variables (level of democracy, compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ, level of commitment to humanitarian law, level of commitment to human
rights).
outcomei = (b0 + b1X1i + b2X2i + ... + bnXni) + error
Both b0 and bn are the regression coe cients: bn quantifies the relation of outcome
and predictor variable showing the direction and strength of the relationship and b0 is
the constant that shows were the respective model is located relating to the outcome
(Field, 2016, 482 .).
Index of Commitment to the ICC = (b0 + b1 * level of political freedom + b2 * compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ + b3 * humanitarian law treaties + bcnXcn) + error
In order to control the e ects of the third variables it will be tested how the main four
independent variables change if the di erent control variables are held constant. This
ensures that the e ects of free floating third variables do not bias the results.
Explaining Ratification of the Rome Statute: Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis
A multiple logistic regression analysis will be used in order to compare the explanatory
powers of the independent variables on the states’ positions on the Index of Com-
mitment to the ICC with those of the states’ decision to ratify the Rome statute
of the ICC (dependent variable).
The multiple logistic regression analysis is intended to be used for binary outcomes with
two or more independent variables on one dependent variable that measures if a certain
event occurs or not. The method makes it possible to examine how each independent
146 Dummy variables indicate the presence or absence of an attribute, such as democratic or
non-democratic or ratified and not ratified. Thus they only assume the two values 1 (presence of
the attribute) and 0 (absence of the attribute) (see Gujarati, 2003, 340 .).
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variable a ects the probability of the event occurring. While the dependent variable is
binary and given values 1 (event occurs) or 0 (event does not occur), the independent
variables can be either quantitative and continuous or categorial and binary.
The method examines how changes in the values of the explanatory variables changes
the odds of the dependent variable. Thus, it makes it possible to examine the influences
of the explanatory variables (level of democracy, compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ,
level of commitment to humanitarian law, level of commitment to human rights) on
the states’ decision to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC.
Since a multiple logistic regression analysis is non-linear, the changes in the odds of the
dependent variable depends on the levels of all dependent variables. Therefore, the re-
sults are much more di cult to interpret for a multiple logistic regression analysis than
for a multiple linear regression analysis. No single approach is able to fully describe
the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. Thus, the key
challenge is to find a convincing summary of the substantive process how changes of
the independent variables lead to changes of the dependent variable (Long/Freese,
2001, 99 .).
In the present study, the chosen method of interpretation are calculating the logit
coe cients in a regression table (see e.g. table 37), the odds ratio and the probability
of states ratifying the Rome Statute (see table 38). While in an OLS the coe cient
tells us directly how much a unit in the dependent variable increases (or decreases)
dependent on a one unit change of the independent variable, the coe cient in a logistic
regression represents the natural logarithm of the odds for y =1 changing for each unit
increase (or decrease) of the independent variable. Thus, it is helpful to transform
the logits to probabilities by predicting the e ects of the explanatory variables while
setting the others at their mean (see Mehmetoglu/Jakobsen, 2017, 167 .).
Both for the multiple linear regression analyses and multiple regression analysis one
of the basic requirements is no or small collinearity between the independent variables
and thus to avoid multicollinearity. According to Frisch (1926), multicollinearity orig-
inally meant an exact linear relationship among some or even all explanatory variables
in a regression model. A high collinearity leads to an increase of the standard errors,
restrains the fit of the model and makes it hard to assess the importance of the indi-
vidual independent variables (Field, 2016, 421f.). In the present study, the problem
arises between the explanatory variables of ratified treaties of human rights and hu-
manitarian law (r = 0.71) and the ratified treaties of Geneva law (r = 0.50) as shown
in subsection 7.7 “Correlation Matrix – Dependent and Independent Variables”.
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What can become a statistical problem is very plausible on the theoretical level, since
we can expect states that ratify a high number of human rights treaties to also ratify
a high number of humanitarian law treaties. It is even more surprising that the
correlation between ratified treaties of humanitarian law and human rights is not
even higher. One probable explanation might be that humanitarian law has better
compliance mechanisms than human rights and thus human rights are more often
ratified for window dressing. We can assume that states don’t have the same interest
with regard to committing to human rights as they do with humanitarian law. As a
result of this the two variables are measuring not the same.
The problem of multicollinearity and the associated distorted results remains. There-
fore, both for the regression models explaining the states’ positions on the Index of
Commitment to the ICC and for the regression models explaining the states’ de-
cision to ratify the Rome Statute robustness checks are calculated in three versions
coping with cross-correlation and multicollinearity.
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5.3 Results II – The Explanatory Power of Solving Cooperation
Problems
5.3.1 Explaining States’ Positions on the Index of Commitment
As shown in Figure 21, the scatterplot of the states’ positions on the Index of Com-
mitment to the ICC and the level of political freedom according to Freedom House
2015 shows that there is a positive correlation (r=0.61).147
States with a high level of political freedom tend to have a high level of commitment
to the ICC. Noticeable outliers that are not free according to Freedom House (FH),
though they have high scores on the Index of Commitment to the ICC are e.g. the
Central African Republic (CAF) with 9.5 IndCom points; Uganda (UGA) with 9.5; the
Democratic Republic of Congo (ZAR) with 7.5; and Gabon (GAB) with 7.5 IndCom
points. Moreover, one can see that among those states that have 0 index points are
states of all levels of political freedom. Nevertheless, there is an overall correlation
between the level of political freedom and the level of commitment to the ICC.148
Figure 22 shows that states that have recognized the International Court of Justice for
compulsory jurisdiction and those that have not, have a high variation in their point
on the Index of Commitment to the ICC. Nevertheless, as the regression line
shows, states that have recognized the ICJ for compulsory jurisdiction tend to have a
higher commitment to the ICC than states that did not (r = 0.43).
When considering the ratified treaties of humanitarian law (see Figure 23, there is
a clear positive correlation (r = 0.63) between the number of ratified treaties of hu-
manitarian law and the level of commitment to the ICC. Very small states, especially
small island states usually have rather low rates of HR ratifications (Simmons/Danner,
2010), as can be seen here in the cases of e.g. Andorra (ADO), Marshall Islands (MHL),
Samoa (WSM) or Trinidad and Tobago (TTO). However, surprising outliers here are
e.g. again Uganda (UGA) with only 13 of 25 ratified Humanitarian Law (HL) treaties,
the Central African Republic (CAR) with only 7, as well as Botswana (BWA) with
only 8 of 25 ratified HL treaties.
147 In order to improve the comprehensibility the scores of Freedom House, that range from 1 (most)
free to 7 (least free) are reversed to 7 (most free) and 1 (least free).
148 The abbreviation of the country names follows the standard of ISO 3166 Alpha 3, see ISO
standards: https://www.iso.org/iso-3166-country-codes.html (20-06-2017).
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Figure 21: Scatterplot – Index and Political Freedom in the World (Reversed)
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Figure 22: Scatterplot – Index and Compulsory Jurisdiction ICJ
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Figure 23: Scatterplot – Index and Ratified Humanitarian Law
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Figure 24: Scatterplot – Index and Ratified Geneva Law
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Figure 25: Scatterplot – Index and Ratified Human Rights
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Taking into account only the ratified Geneva Law (Geneva Conventions plus additional
protocols), the correlations are even stronger (r = 0.66) as shown in Figure 24. Here
again, there are small (island) states as non-surprising outliers (Andorra, Marshall
Islands, Samoa) and the surprising outlier Belarus (BLR) that has ratified all of the 5
treaties of Geneva Law but nevertheless has 0 points on the index. When looking at
Belarus’ scores on the other determinants (Freedom House (FH) not free, not recog-
nized the ICJ and only 10 of 25 humanitarian law treaties) it is surprising that Belarus
ratified all treaties of Geneva Law although it has an IndCom score of 0.
Looking at the number of ratified treaties of human rights (see Figure 25), there is a
positive correlation (r = 0.57) with the level of commitment to the ICC. However, it
should be noted that again among those states that have 0 points on the Index of
Commitment to the ICC there is a high variation in the ratified human rights law.
Measuring the influence of the independent variables and controlling for di erent third
variables, the multiple linear regression analysis provides insights into the actual ex-
planatory power of the theory of constrained and customized commitments.
Because of the high correlation between humanitarian law and human rights (r=0.703)
and the problem of multicollinearity there would be no added value in placing both
variables into one regression. Instead the regression analysis with its nine regression
models will be performed in three versions in which the credibility of commitments
is operationalized with the number of ratifications of Humanitarian Law (version
a), Geneva Law (version b) and Human Rights (version c).
In the respective regression tables, one can see the regression coe cients of the ex-
planatory and controlling variables (in the rows) included in di erent regression models
(in the columns). The regression coe cients show the unit increase (or decrease) of the
states’ position on the Index of Commitment to the ICC (as dependent variable)
through each unit increase (or decrease) of the respective variable, while all the other
variables in the model are held constant. The significance levels are in accordance with
the convention of social sciences set at ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. In parentheses
one can see the standard errors for the respective variables within each model, that
show how strong the average deviation of the estimated parameter is, compared to the
true parameter. In the last two rows one can see the adjusted coe cient of determi-
nation R2 that measures the ’goodness of fit’ by calculating the explained variation
through the total variation after adjusting for the number of variables included in the
model.
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States’ Position on the Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a Model 7a Model 8a Model 9a
Index of Commitment Credibility Monitoring Credibility Arm.Con.& Transitional Hegemonic Legal & Control Full
to the ICC & Monitoring Peacekeeping Justice Power Gov. System Only Model
Explanatory Variables
Humanitarian Law 0.381*** – 0.245*** 0.241*** 0.232*** 0.239*** 0.209*** – 0.191***
(0.0338) – (0.0338) (0.0334) (0.0339) (0.0338) (0.0352) – (0.0349)
Political Freedom – 1.047*** 0.754*** 0.702*** 0.769*** 0.725*** 0.792*** – 0.731***
– (0.110) (0.106) (0.107) (0.114) (0.106) (0.117) – (0.123)
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ – 2.014*** 1.200*** 1.306*** 1.293*** 1.274*** 1.199*** – 1.407***
– (0.461) (0.424) (0.420) (0.421) (0.415) (0.416) – (0.404)
Control Variables
Years of Armed Con. – – – -0.0543** – – – -0.0609* -0.0438*
– – – (0.0242) – – – (0.0342) (0.0263)
UNPK troops/Mio.Hab. – – – 0.00338 – – – 0.00420 0.00358
– – – (0.00252) – – – (0.00318) (0.00242)
Number of Amnesties – – – – 0.00934 – – -0.0818 0.0937
– – – – (0.0914) – – (0.124) (0.0970)
Int. Criminal Tribunals – – – – 1.988** – – 1.330 1.287
– – – – (0.821) – – (1.050) (0.805)
Form.Colonial Power – – – – – -1.907** – -0.176 -1.702**
– – – – – (0.742) – (0.947) (0.734)
BIA with the USA – – – – – -1.286*** – -2.928*** -1.316***
– – – – – (0.453) – (0.552) (0.444)
Common Law System – – – – – – -1.607*** -1.863*** -1.335**
– – – – – – (0.556) (0.679) (0.548)
Parliamentary System – – – – – – 0.570 2.643*** 0.761*
– – – – – – (0.430) (0.509) (0.428)
Constant -0.850 -0.743 -2.759*** -2.409*** -2.802*** -1.493* -2.426*** 6.106*** -1.196
(0.552) (0.536) (0.551) (0.584) (0.635) (0.760) (0.552) (0.564) (0.793)
Observations 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193
R-squared 0.400 0.432 0.556 0.572 0.570 0.584 0.577 0.342 0.625
Adj. R-squared 0.397 0.426 0.549 0.561 0.558 0.573 0.565 0.313 0.602
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 29: Explaining States’ Positions on the Index of Commitment (HL)
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Table 29 (Explaining States’ Positions on the Index of Commitment (HL)) shows the
explanatory power of the determinants of the Index of Commitment to the ICC
with ratified humanitarian law treaties as operationalization of existing commit-
ment to international law. Model 1a (Credibility) shows only the e ect of the
level of ratification of humanitarian law on the states’ position on the Index of
Commitment and thus measures the explanatory power of the mechanism of solving
international cooperation problems by enhancing the credibility of commitments to
humanitarian law and human rights law through support of the ICC as court safe-
guarding those areas of international law. The regression coe cient of 0.381*** shows
that any further ratification of one of the 25 treaties of humanitarian law leads to
an increase of 0.381 of a state’s position on the Index of commitment to the ICC is
highly significant at ***p<0.01 signifying that there is only a chance of 1% that the
null hypothesis (no influence of the number of ratified humanitarian law treaties) is
true. The R2 of 0.397 indicates that 40% of the variance in the states’ index positions
can be explained through the mechanism of enhancing credibility of commitments.
Analogously to that, Model 2a (Monitoring) shows the uncontrolled influences of
the level of political freedom and the recognition of compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ on the states’ position on the Index of Commitment. It measures
the explanatory power of the mechanism of solving international cooperation prob-
lems by reducing costs of monitoring (humanitarian law and human rights) through
the establishment of the permanent court (investigating and prosecuting violations of
international criminal law). Every increase of the level of political freedom leads to
an increase of 1.047*** of the state’s index position and a state that has recognized
the ICJ for compulsory jurisdiction has an average increase of 2.014*** on the index.
Here again both variables are highly significant at the 1%-level, meaning there is only
a chance of 1% that the null hypothesis (no influence of the level of political freedom
and the recognition of the ICJ for compulsory jurisdiction) is true. The fit of the
model is adjusted R2=0.426, meaning that 43% of the variance of the states’ positions
on the index can be explained through the mechanism of reducing costs of monitoring
humanitarian law and human rights.
If we put the three main explanatory variables together as inModel 3a (Monitoring
& Credibility), they remain highly significant and demonstrate 55% of the variance
in the states’ positions on the index. However, until this point we can’t say if the
fit of the model and the explanatory power of the variables actually comes from the
latter, or if there are influences of third variables that are hidden in the explanatory
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variables. Accordingly, the models 4-7 control for the influences of di erent possible
third variables.
InModel 4a (Conflict, Repression & Peacekeeping), the explanatory variables
control for the influence of experienced armed conflicts and troops contributed to UN-
peacekeeping operations. Holding those potential third variables constant, the four
explanatory variables still remain significant. The fit of the model still lies at 56%
explained variance.
In Model 5a (Transitional Justice), there is a control for the influence of for-
mer use of amnesties and international criminal tribunals. Holding them constant
the explanatory variables remain significant and the fit of the model remains at 56%
explained variance.
Model 6a (Hegemonic power) controls for the influence of states being a former
colonial power and having agreed as bilateral non-surrender agreement with the USA
as operationalization for the influences of hegemonic power structures. While the
explanatory variables are still highly significant, one can see that there is a significant
negative e ect on the states’ position on the Index of Commitment to the ICC if a state
is either a former colonial power (-1.907**) or has concluded a bilateral non-surrender
agreement with the USA (-1.286***). The fit of the model rises to 57%.
In Model 7a (Legal and Governmental System), there is a control for the
influences of the states’ legal and governmental system. One can see that contrary
to the assumption of the literature there is a highly significant negative e ect on the
states’ index positions if a state has a common law system (-1.607***). Nevertheless,
the explanatory variables remain highly significant and the fit of the model remains
at 57%.
Since some of the control variables show a significant e ect in explaining the variance
in the states’ positions on the Index of Commitment to the ICC, they are all
put into Model 8a (Control variables only) to make them comparable to the
actual explanatory power of the explanatory variables. Although their contribution
in explaining the dependent variable remains high with 31% explained variance, the
explanatory power of the main four variables (see Model 3) is appreciably higher at
55% .
Finally in Model 9a (Full model), all explanatory and control variables are put
into one, reaching a fit of 60% explained variance. The high R2 to some extent results
from cross-correlations between the variables. Although there is no multicollinearity
(since there are no variables included into one model in which r is higher than 0.49), the
remaining cross-correlations increase the R2. However, this is de facto not a problem
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for the present study because the regression coe cients are individually significant
and the study aims only to test the theoretical arguments and not to estimate exact
predictors.149.
The full model shows that an increase of commitment to humanitarian law leads to
an increase of the states’ index position of 0.191***, an increase of political freedom
to an increase of 0.731*** and states that have recognized the ICJ for compulsory
jurisdiction do have an average increase of 1.407*** on the index.
Variable Coe cient Min Max
Political Freedom 0.731*** 1 7
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ 1.407*** 0 1
Humanitarian Law Treaties 0.191*** 3 25
Table 30: Size of Coe cients of the Three Explanatory Variables (HL)
While most of the control variables remain non-significant in the full model, there are
some that still show significant influences. Experienced armed conflicts (-0.0438*),
being a former colonial power (-1.702**), having concluded a bilateral non-surrender
agreement (-1.316***) and having a common law system (-1.335**) show a negative
influence on the states level of commitment to the ICC, while having a parliamentary
governmental system shows a positive influence (0.761*). However, both armed con-
flicts and parliamentary systems are only significant at the 10%-level, indicating that
there remains a probability of 10% that the hull hypotheses is true.
If we set the size of the coe cients in relation to their minimum and maximum values
that are achieved (see Table 32), it becomes apparent that the strongest e ect is those
of the level of political freedom, followed closely by those of the number of ratified
treaties of humanitarian law and human rights and least the recognition of
the ICJ for compulsory jurisdiction.
If we reproduce these nine regression models one to one, only replacing the explanatory
variable of ratified humanitarian law treaties with the variable of ratified treaties of
Geneva law (Geneva Conventions I-IV, API, APII, APIII, Dec under AP1) as core of
humanitarian law and second proxy for states’ commitment to humanitarian law, the
results achieved are even stronger (see Table 31).
149 For a more detailed discussion on problems and handling of multicollinearity in di erent kinds of
regression analyses see Gujarati (2003, 370).
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States’ Position on the Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b Model 6b Model 7b Model 8b Model 9b
Index of Commitment Credibility Monitoring Credibility Arm.Con.& Transitional Hegemonic Legal & Control Full
to the ICC & Monitoring Peacekeeping Justice Power Gov. System Only Model
Explanatory Variables
Geneva Law 2.220*** – 1.522*** 1.504*** 1.513*** 1.457*** 1.366*** – 1.293***
(0.183) – (0.178) (0.189) (0.180) (0.177) (0.179) – (0.184)
Political Freedom – 1.047*** 0.748*** 0.750*** 0.824*** 0.709*** 0.768*** – 0.772***
– (0.110) (0.100) (0.102) (0.105) (0.102) (0.110) – (0.114)
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ – 2.014*** 1.109*** 1.132*** 1.137*** 1.158*** 1.070*** – 1.160***
– (0.461) (0.407) (0.414) (0.402) (0.401) (0.396) – (0.391)
Control Variables
Years of Arm.Con. – – – -0.00315 – – – -0.0609* -0.00599
– – – (0.0248) – – – (0.0342) (0.0258)
UNPK troops/Mio.Hab. – – – 0.00210 – – – 0.00420 0.00261
– – – (0.00247) – – – (0.00318) (0.00232)
Number of Amnesties – – – – 0.168* – – -0.0818 0.168*
– – – – (0.0882) – – (0.124) (0.0928)
Int. Criminal Tribunals – – – – 1.620** – – 1.330 1.054
– – – – (0.787) – – (1.050) (0.771)
Form.Colonial Power – – – – – -1.459** – -0.176 -1.520**
– – – – – (0.710) – (0.947) (0.698)
BIA with the USA – – – – – -1.320*** – -2.928*** -1.401***
– – – – – (0.434) – (0.552) (0.420)
Common Law System – – – – – – -1.739*** -1.863*** -1.541***
– – – – – – (0.516) (0.679) (0.510)
Parliamentary System – – – – – – 0.664 2.643*** 0.806**
– – – – – – (0.407) (0.509) (0.408)
Constant -2.851*** -0.743 -4.312*** -4.306*** -5.020*** -2.869*** -3.903*** 6.106*** -3.074***
(0.672) (0.536) (0.620) (0.703) (0.728) (0.801) (0.613) (0.564) (0.868)
Observations 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193
R-squared 0.434 0.432 0.590 0.592 0.609 0.614 0.616 0.342 0.657
Adj. R-squared 0.431 0.426 0.583 0.581 0.599 0.603 0.606 0.313 0.636
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 31: Explaining States’ Positions on the Index of Commitment (GL)
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We see again that the three explanatory variables are highly significant at the 1%-level
in all nine regression models (1b-9b). The explained variance is appreciably higher in
all models that include the variable of ratified Geneva law treaties. The uncontrolled
explanatory power of Geneva law lies at 43% explained variance and a regression
coe cient of 2.220*** (Model 1b). Thus, it is higher than those of humanitarian
law (Model 1a) with a regression coe cient of 0.318*** that were at 40% explained
variance. The full model comprises all explanatory variables as well as all control
variables the explained variance lies at 64%. In relation to the existing minimum and
maximum values, the variable of Geneva Law has the strongest e ect, followed by those
of the level of political freedom, the number of ratified human rights treaties. Followed
last by the recognition of the ICJ for compulsory jurisdiction which demonstrates the
smallest e ect.
Variable Coe cient Min Max
Political Freedom 0.772*** 1 7
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ 1.160*** 0 1
Geneva Law Treaties 1.293*** 1 5
Table 32: Size of the Coe cients of the Three Explanatory Variables (GL)
In relation to the control variables, we see again that the factors of being a former
colonial power (-1.520**), having concluded a bilateral non-surrender agreement (-
1.401***) and having a common law system (-1.541**) have a negative influence on
the states level of commitment to the ICC. A parliamentary governmental system has
a positive influence (0.806**) and the variable of experienced armed conflicts has lost
its significance in comparison with model 8a.
Performing the nine regression models in a third version, and thereby replacing the
explanatory variable of ratified treaties of Geneva law with those of ratified treaties of
human rights, a similar picture emerges (see Table 33).
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States’ Position on the Model 1c Model 2c Model 3c Model 4c Model 5c Model 6c Model 7c Model 8c Model 9c
Index of Commitment Credibility Monitoring Credibility Arm.Con.& Transitional Hegemonic Legal & Control Full
to the ICC & Monitoring Peacekeeping Justice Power Gov. System Only Model
Explanatory Variables
Human Rights 0.581*** – 0.414*** 0.401*** 0.408*** 0.403*** 0.364*** – 0.339***
(0.0611) – (0.0512) (0.0513) (0.0521) (0.0507) (0.0552) – (0.0566)
Political Freedom – 1.047*** 0.890*** 0.843*** 0.841*** 0.851*** 0.877*** – 0.774***
– (0.110) (0.0973) (0.0997) (0.106) (0.0993) (0.110) – (0.119)
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ – 2.014*** 1.349*** 1.444*** 1.423*** 1.405*** 1.335*** – 1.505***
– (0.461) (0.407) (0.407) (0.402) (0.399) (0.402) – (0.393)
Control Variables
Years of Arm.Con. – – – -0.0482** – – – -0.0609* -0.0279
– – – (0.0238) – – – (0.0342) (0.0261)
UNPK troops/Mio.Hab. – – – 0.00139 – – – 0.00420 0.00186
– – – (0.00249) – – – (0.00318) (0.00241)
Number of Amnesties – – – – -0.102 – – -0.0818 -0.0200
– – – – (0.0906) – – (0.124) (0.0986)
Int. Criminal Tribunals – – – – 2.038** – – 1.330 1.451*
– – – – (0.795) – – (1.050) (0.791)
Form.Colonial Power – – – – – -1.813** – -0.176 -1.731**
– – – – – (0.720) – (0.947) (0.724)
BIA with the USA – – – – – -1.344*** – -2.928*** -1.362***
– – – – – (0.438) (0.552) (0.435)
Common Law System – – – – – – -1.205** -1.863*** -1.001*
– – – – – – (0.563) (0.679) (0.555)
Parliamentary System – – – – – – 0.661 2.643*** 0.801*
– – – – – – (0.421) (0.509) (0.421)
Constant -1.656** -0.743 -4.413*** -3.980*** -4.089*** -3.034*** -3.926*** 6.106*** -2.231**
(0.725) (0.536) (0.649) (0.682) (0.685) (0.831) (0.673) (0.564) (0.858)
Observations 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193
R-squared 0.321 0.432 0.578 0.588 0.594 0.606 0.592 0.342 0.635
Adj. R-squared 0.318 0.426 0.571 0.577 0.583 0.600 0.581 0.313 0.613
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 33: Explaining States’ Positions on the Index of Commitment (HR)
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The explanatory variables again remain highly significant in all nine models (1c-9c).
One can see that the uncontrolled e ect of ratified human rights (Model 1c) lies at
0.581***, meaning that any additional ratified treaty of the 18 human rights treaties
leads to an average increase of 0.581 on the Index of Commitment to the ICC. In
the full model (Model 9c) that comprises all explanatory variables as well as all control
variables the explained variance lies at 61%. In relation to the existing minimum and
maximum values, the variable of human rights has the strongest e ect, followed by
those of the level of political freedom. Followed last by the recognition of the ICJ for
compulsory jurisdiction which shows the smallest e ect.
Variable Coe cient Min Max
Political Freedom 0.774*** 1 7
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ 1.505*** 0 1
human rights law 0.339*** 2 18
Table 34: Size of the Coe cients of the Three Explanatory Variables (HR)
Although the explanatory power of commitment to human rights is lower than that
of commitment to humanitarian law treaties or Geneva law treaties, the overall fit
of the model still reaches 61% explained variance. This might be due to the fact,
that the variable of ratified human rights treaties has the lowest correlations with the
variables of political freedom (r = 259) and recognition of compulsory jurisdiction (r
= 0.261), and thus the highest added value that is included in the regression models.
Nevertheless, we can state that the strongest explanatory factor for the states’ position
on the Index of Commitment to the ICC is the level of ratification of Geneva law
treaties. This means that it is crucial that states not only have ratified the Geneva
Convention I-IV, but also the additional protocols I-III as well as the “Declaration
Provided for under art. 90 AP I, Acceptance of the Competence of the International
Fact-Finding Commission according to art. 90 of AP I”, thereby demonstrating a strong
commitment to humanitarian law that is reflected in the commitment to the ICC.
If we compare the explanatory power of the ratified treaties of humanitarian law,
Geneva law and human rights (see Table 35), we can see that political freedom and
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ remain constant, regardless whether the full model
includes humanitarian law, Geneva law or human rights.
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Variable Coe cient Min Max
Full Model 9a (Humanitarian Law)
Political Freedom 0.731*** 1 7
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ 1.407*** 0 1
Humanitarian Law Treaties 0.191*** 3 25
Full Model 9b (Geneva Law)
Political Freedom 0.772*** 1 7
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ 1.160*** 0 1
Geneva Law Treaties 1.293*** 1 5
Full Model 9c (Human Rights)
Political Freedom 0.774*** 1 7
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ 1.505*** 0 1
human rights law 0.339*** 2 18
Table 35: Comparison of Coe cients of Explanatory Variables in Full Models
This can be considered as strong evidence for the theoretical argument of states cus-
tomizing and constraining their commitments to the ICC depending on their possibil-
ities of solving cooperation problems of international relations, such as reducing costs
of monitoring and enhancing credibility of humanitarian law and human rights. How-
ever, since the Index of Commitments to the ICC is a scientifically constructed
measurement, it is helpful to subject the explanatory power of the theoretical argu-
ment for the states’ ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC to an additional test
of robustness.
5.3.2 Explaining States’ Ratification the Rome Statute
If we look again at the four explanatory variables (political freedom, strong bond to
the ICJ, commitment to humanitarian law and commitment to human rights), we can
see that there is a considerable di erence in values of states parties and non-party
states to the ICC.
The level of political freedom is appreciably higher among those that are party to the
ICC (see Figure 26). Here we can again see one aspect of the puzzle presented at the
beginning of the work (see Figure 1), that those states that have the highest levels of
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Figure 26: Level of Political Freedom by Ratification of the Rome Statute
political freedom150 are among the states parties and only 12 with very high scores of
political freedom – from 1 to 2.5 – are among the non-states parties, namely India,
Israel, USA, Jamaica as well as some small city and island states151. Moreover, there
are 50 non-democratic states that nevertheless are state party to the ICC.152
Looking at the bond to the ICJ, one can see that most of the states (61 of 71) that
have recognized the ICJ for compulsory jurisdiction have ratified the Rome Statute
and thus are party to the ICC, nevertheless is within the group of states parties a
certain balance between those that did recognize and those that did not recognize the
ICJ for compulsory jurisdiction (see table 36 and figure 27).
Considering the commitment to humanitarian law and human rights, it becomes ap-
parent that the number of states that ratified many treaties tend to be higher. Those
states that have ratified a very high number of humanitarian law treaties (21 or more
out of 25) are almost all states parties to the ICC (see Figure 28). Exceptional cases
150 There are 73 states plus Cook Islands which is not captured by Freedom House.
151 Bahamas, Kiribati, Micronesia, Monaco, Palau, Sao Tome and Principe, Tonga, Tuvalu.
152 For a detailed list, see the contingency table on ratification of the Rome Statute and being
democracy or non-democracy on p. 238.
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States Parties ICC Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ total
no yes
no 61 10 71
yes 63 61 124
total 124 71 195
Table 36: Contingency Table – States Parties ICC & Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ
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Figure 27: Compulsory Jurisdiction ICJ by Ratification of the Rome Statute
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Figure 28: Commitment to Humanitarian Law by Ratification of the Rome Statute
are only Nicaragua and Belarus that ratified 22 and Ukraine that ratified 21 humani-
tarian law treaties.153 Vice versa, the only state that has ratified only three treaties,
but nevertheless is state party to the ICC is the Marshall Islands.
The same applies to the ratified treaties of Geneva Law (see 29). Belarus is the only
state that has ratified all five treaties of Geneva Law, but is no state party to the ICC
and, vice versa, Andorra and the Marshall Islands are the only two states that have
ratified less than three treaties, but are nevertheless states parties to the ICC.
Likewise, states parties to the ICC tend to have ratified more human rights treaties
with the exceptions being Fiji (4), St.Kitts and Nevis (4) as well as the Marshall
Islands (3). Vice versa, non states parties tend to have ratified a much smaller number
of human rights treaties with Ukraine (16), Turkey (15), Azerbaijan (14), Nicaragua
(13), Rwanda (13) and Togo (13) as outliers.
In order to make reliable statements on the explanatory power of those variables
for the states’ decision to ratify the Rome Statute and become a party to the ICC,
153 However, with a view back to the Index of Commitment to the ICC Nicaragua and Ukraine
show as non-party states with 2 respectively 3 index points a certain move towards the ICC.
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Figure 30: Commitment to Human Rights by Ratification of the Rome Statute
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we have to control again for both mutual influences and the influence of possible
third variables. Accordingly, those shall be examined again in a multiple regression
analysis with the ratification of the Rome Statue as new dependent variable. Since
this is unlike the Index of Commitment to the ICC, not a continuous (0 to 12), but a
dichotomous variable (0 vs. 1), an OLS as form of multiple linear regression analysis
is not applicable.
Explaining states’ decision to ratify the Rome Statute to become a state party to
the ICC needs a logistic regression analysis that is able to examine the probabilities
of the ratification changing from 0 to 1 in dependence of unit changes in the four
explanatory variables controlled for certain third variables. One thing that is di erent
for the interpretation of the regression results (see Table 29) is the information value
of the regression coe cient. Unlike in an OLS regression, it is not possible to interpret
the coe cient directly as one-unit change in the dependent variable if the independent
variable increases by one unit. The ’logit coe cients’ reflect how the natural logarithm
of the odds for the event occurring measured by the dependent variable (ratification
of the Rome Statute) changes, if the independent variable increases by one step in its
scale.
Therefore, in interpreting the influence of the independent variables on the dependent
variable (states’ decision to ratify), it is more helpful to consider the odds ratio and to
calculate probabilities of the dependent variable changing from 0 to 1 through certain
changes in the values of the independent variable. The ’odds ratio’ itself measures
the odds of changes in the dependent variable if the independent variables changes.
An odds ratio greater than 1 means that there is a positive relationship between
the variables, an odds ratio less than one means that there is a negative relationship
between them, and an odds ratio of exactly 1 means there is no relationship. By means
of the delta-method it is possible to calculate the changes in probability for one-step
changes of one certain independent variable in a model, when all the other variables
are set at their mean. If the 95% confidence interval does not cross 1 the e ect is
significant at the 5%-level (Mehmetoglu/Jakobsen, 2017, 169 .).
Another di erence lies in the calculation of the coe cient of determination R2. In an
OLS regression, R2 measures the overall fit of the model. This would not be precise
in a logistic regression. One alternative method is calculating Mc Fadden’s pseudo R2
that measures as intercept model the log-likelihood as total sum of squares and for
the full model, and the log-likelihood as sum of squared errors for the full model (see
Mehmetoglu/Jakobsen, 2017, 167).
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States’ Ratification Model 10a Model 11a Model 12a Model 13a Model 14a Model 15a Model 16a Model 17a Model 18a
of the Rome Statute Credibility Monitoring Credibility Arm.Con.& Transitional Hegemonic Legal & Control Full
to the ICC & Monitoring Peacekeeping Justice Power Gov. System Only Model
Explanatory Variables
Humanitarian Law 0.186*** – 0.146*** 0.154*** 0.142*** 0.154*** 0.138*** – 0.147***
(0.0302) – (0.0357) (0.0376) (0.0365) (0.0382) (0.0371) – (0.0411)
Political Freedom – 0.611*** 0.531*** 0.523*** 0.531*** 0.535*** 0.557*** – 0.558***
– (0.102) (0.106) (0.112) (0.112) (0.111) (0.119) – (0.137)
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ – 1.540*** 1.418*** 1.697*** 1.415*** 1.479*** 1.414*** – 1.714***
– (0.434) (0.472) (0.510) (0.473) (0.483) (0.476) – (0.525)
Control Variables
Years of Arm.Con. – – – -0.0591** – – – -0.0697** -0.0583*
– – – (0.0255) – – – (0.0354) (0.0300)
UNPK troops/Mio.Hab. – – – 0.00566 – – – 0.00470 0.00572
– – – (0.00360) – – – (0.00334) (0.00363)
Number of Amnesties – – – – -0.00447 – – 0.0170 0.112
– – – – (0.0938) – – (0.0910) (0.114)
Int. Criminal Tribunals – – – – 0.760 – – 0.392 0.204
– – – – (0.943) – – (0.869) (0.976)
FormColonial Power – – – – – -2.026* – 0.0392 -1.647
– – – – – (1.096) – (0.874) (1.291)
BIA with the USA – – – – – -1.080** – -1.605*** -1.107*
– – – – – (0.539) – (0.469) (0.569)
Common Law System – – – – – – -0.504 -0.317 -0.269
– – – – – – (0.548) (0.497) (0.585)
Parliamentary System – – – – – – 0.0694 1.212*** 0.240
– – – – – – (0.432) (0.370) (0.474)
Constant -2.077*** -2.590*** -4.160*** -4.219*** -4.141*** -3.336*** -4.106*** 1.346*** -3.588***
(0.433) (0.484) (0.683) (0.747) (0.732) (0.868) (0.688) (0.458) (0.965)
Observations 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193
PseudoR-squared 0.197 0.288 0.361 0.401 0.364 0.390 0.364 0.181 0.429
Log Likelihood -101.977 -90.463 -81.148 -76.096 -80.796 -77.481 -80.723 -103.926 -72.458
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 37: Explaining States’ Ratification of the Rome Statute (HL)
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The models in the multiple logistic regression explaining the states’ decisions to ratify
the Rome Statute are build up analogously to those of the multiple linear regression
explaining states’ positions on on the Index of Commitment to the ICC.154
The explanatory variables Political Freedom, Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ and Hu-
manitarian Law are again significant throughout all models (10a-18a). In Model
18a (Full model) the three explanatory variables are significant and reaches 43%
explained variance. When comparing the exact risk and protective factors of the vari-
ables, it is helpful to look at their odds ratios and probabilities.
As shown in table 38 in the full model, all the explanatory variables are a risk factor
for and thus encourage the ratification of the Rome Statute. An one step change at
the level of Political Freedom increases the probability of ratification by 74.7% per
unit increase. States that have recognized Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ have a 454.8%
probability of ratifying the Rome Statute and with each ratified treaty of Humani-
tarian Law, the probability of ratification increase by 15.8%.
Looking at the significance of the control variables compared to the OLS that explains
the states’ index positions, it is especially noticeable that being a former colonial power
has no significant explanatory power at all. While being a former colonial power has a
significant negative e ect on the states positions on the Index of Commitment to
ICC, all but Turkey, the USA and Russia are party to the ICC. Having agreed to a
BIA with the USA is a protective factor which decreases the probability of ratification
by 67%.
If the variable of ratified humanitarian law treaties is replaced by the variable of
ratified Geneva law (see 39), we can observe the same e ect as in the OLS explaining
the states’ index positions. The explained variances increase in all models concerned.
It goes up to 47% explained variance in the full model. The three explanatory variables
are highly significant throughout all models (10b-18b).
154 See on p. 204 for the version with ratified humanitarian law treaties and on p. 208 for the version
with the ratified Geneva law.
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Variable Coe cient b Odds Ratio % Change in Odds Min. Max.
for Unit Change in x
Explanatory Variables
Humanitarian Law 0.147*** 1.584*** 15.8% 3 25
Political Freedom 0.558*** 1.747*** 74.7% 1 7
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ 1.714*** 5.548*** 454.8% 0 1
Control Variables
Years of Armed Conflicts -0.058* 0.943* -5.7% 0 75
UNPK troops/Mio.Hab. 0.006 1.006 – 0 671
Number of Amnesties 0.112 1.118 – 0 10
Int. Criminal Tribunal 0.204 1.227 – 0 1
Form.Colonial Power -1.647 0.193 – 0 1
BIA with the USA -1.107* 0.330* -67.0% 0 1
Common Law System -0.269 0.764 – 0 1
Parliamentary System 0.240 1.271 – 0 1
Table 38: Probabilities for Ratification of the Rome Statute in Full Model (HL)
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States’ Ratification Model 10b Model 11b Model 12b Model 13b Model 14b Model 15b Model 16b Model 17b Model 18b
of the Rome Statute Credibility Monitoring Credibility Arm.Con.& Transitional Hegemonic Legal & Control Full
to the ICC & Monitoring Peacekeeping Justice Power Gov. System Only Model
Explanatory Variables
Geneva Law 1.326*** – 1.158*** 1.107*** 1.187*** 1.163*** 1.120*** – 1.111***
(0.215) – (0.235) (0.244) (0.242) (0.240) (0.237) – (0.257)
Political Freedom – 0.611*** 0.567*** 0.581*** 0.619*** 0.551*** 0.579*** – 0.612***
– (0.102) (0.113) (0.119) (0.123) (0.117) (0.126) – (0.142)
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ – 1.540*** 1.398*** 1.500*** 1.337*** 1.476*** 1.409*** – 1.531***
– (0.434) (0.494) (0.512) (0.500) (0.510) (0.503) – (0.541)
Control Variables
Years of Arm.Conflicts – – – -0.0184 – – – -0.0697** -0.0228
– – – (0.0272) – – – (0.0354) (0.0342)
UNPK troops/Mio.Hab. – – – 0.00604 – – – 0.00470 0.00593
– – – (0.00417) – – – (0.00334) (0.00420)
Number of Amnesties – – – – 0.127 – – 0.0170 0.157
– – – – (0.0998) – – (0.0910) (0.114)
Int. Criminal Tribunals – – – – 0.458 – – 0.392 0.145
– – – – (0.922) – – (0.869) (0.971)
FormColonial Power – – – – – -1.544 – 0.0392 -1.340
– – – – – (1.403) – (0.874) (1.525)
BIA with the USA – – – – – -1.363** – -1.605*** -1.450**
– – – – – (0.626) – (0.469) (0.650)
Common Law System – – – – – – -0.554 -0.317 -0.445
– – – – – – (0.563) (0.497) (0.614)
Parliamentary System – – – – – – 0.185 1.212*** 0.285
– – – – – – (0.449) (0.370) (0.491)
Constant -3.917*** -2.590*** -6.073*** -6.071*** -6.635*** -4.845*** -5.984*** 1.346*** -5.278***
(0.737) (0.484) (0.977) (1.061) (1.104) (1.084) (0.978) (0.458) (1.225)
Observations 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193
PseudoR-squared 0.256 0.288 0.418 0.431 0.426 0.442 0.422 0.181 0.468
Log Likelihood -94.487 -90.463 -73.939 -72.263 -72.889 -70.765 -73.391 -103.926 -67.506
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 39: Explaining States’ Ratification of the Rome Statute (GL)
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Variable Coe cient b Odds Ratio % Change in Odds Min. Max.
for Unit Change in x
Explanatory Variables
Geneva Law 1.111*** 3.037*** 203.7% 1 5
Political Freedom 0.612*** 1.843*** 84.3% 1 7
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ 1.531*** 4.622*** 362% 0 1
Control Variables
Years of Armed Conflicts -0.022 0.978 – 0 75
UNPK troops/Mio.Hab. 0.006 1.006 – 0 671
Number of Amnesties 0.157 1.170 – 0 10
Int. Criminal Tribunal 0.145 1.156 – 0 1
Former Colonial Power -1.340 0.262 – 0 1
BIA with the USA -1.450** 0.235** -76.6% 0 1
Common Law System -0.445 0.641 – 0 1
Parliamentary System 0.285 1.330 – 0 1
Table 40: Probabilities for Ratification of the Rome Statute in Full Model (GL)
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States’ Ratification Model 10c Model 11c Model 12c Model 13c Model 14c Model 15c Model 16c Model 17c Model 18c
of the Rome Statute Credibility Monitoring Credibility Arm.Con.& Transitional Hegemonic Legal & Control Full
to the ICC & Monitoring Peacekeeping Justice Power Gov. System Only Model
Explanatory Variables
Human Rights 0.294*** – 0.270*** 0.268*** 0.278*** 0.275*** 0.265*** – 0.263***
(0.0503) – (0.0575) (0.0590) (0.0611) (0.0600) (0.0605) – (0.0673)
Political Freedom – 0.611*** 0.624*** 0.610*** 0.590*** 0.615*** 0.628*** – 0.588***
– (0.102) (0.112) (0.119) (0.118) (0.118) (0.124) – (0.141)
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ – 1.540*** 1.350*** 1.604*** 1.368*** 1.398*** 1.350*** – 1.629***
(0.434) (0.474) (0.509) (0.476) (0.485) (0.476) (0.517)
Control Variables
Years of Arm.Conflicts – – – -0.0571* – – – -0.0697** -0.0434
– – – (0.0304) – – – (0.0354) (0.0311)
UNPK troops/Mio.Hab. – – – 0.00366 – – – 0.00470 0.00382
– – – (0.00275) – – – (0.00334) (0.00283)
Number of Amnesties – – – – -0.0930 – – 0.0170 -0.00261
– – – – (0.100) – – (0.0910) (0.118)
Int. Criminal Tribunals – – – – 0.712 – – 0.392 0.430
– – – – (0.922) – – (0.869) (0.973)
FormColonial Power – – – – – -1.859 0.0392 -1.607
– – – – – (1.141) – (0.874) (1.325)
BIA with the USA – – – – – -1.168** – -1.605*** -1.159*
– – – – – (0.577) – (0.469) (0.594)
Common Law System – – – – – – -0.143 -0.317 -0.0418
– – – – – – (0.562) (0.497) (0.612)
Parliamentary System – – – – – – 0.0422 1.212*** 0.153
– – – – – – (0.441) (0.370) (0.479)
Constant -2.648*** -2.590*** -5.427*** -5.303*** -5.240*** -4.428*** -5.384*** 1.346*** -4.295***
(0.559) (0.484) (0.859) (0.907) (0.875) (1.019) (0.874) (0.458) (1.071)
Observations 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193
PseudoR-squared 0.175 0.288 0.392 0.421 0.387 0.418 0.392 0.181 0.443
Log Likelihood -104.744 -90.463 -77.230 -73.502 -76.526 -73.8417 -77.196 -103.926 -70.719
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 41: Explaining States’ Ratification of the Rome Statute (HR)
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Figure 32: Adj. Pred. through Humanitarian Law (Democracies vs. Non-Democracies)
When we look at the conditional e ects of democracy on the decision to ratify
the Rome Statute we can see that the e ects of having recognized the ICJ for
compulsory jurisdiction (Figure 31), the commitment to humanitarian law (Figure 32)
or only to Geneva law (Figure 33) and the commitment to human rights (Figure 34)
are significantly higher if a state is democratic than if it is non-democratic.
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Figure 31: Adj. Pred. through Com. Jur. ICJ (Democracies vs. Non-Democracies)
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Variable Coe cient b Odds Ratio % Change in Odds Min. Max.
for Unit Change in x
Explanatory Variables
Human Rights 0.263*** 1.301*** 30.1% 2 18
Political Freedom 0.588*** 1.801*** 80.1% 1 7
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ 1.629*** 5.097*** 409.7% 0 1
Control Variables
Years of Armed Conflicts -0.043 0.958 – 0 75
UNPK troops/Mio.Hab. 0.004 1.004 – 0 671
Number of Amnesties -0.003 0.997 – 0 10
Int. Criminal Tribunal 0.430 1.538 – 0 1
Former Colonial Power -1.607 0.200 – 0 1
BIA with the USA -1.159* 0.314* -68.8% 0 1
Common Law System -0.042 0.959 – 0 1
Parliamentary System 0.153 1.165 – 0 1
Table 42: Probabilities for Ratification of the Rome Statute (Full Model HR)
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Pr
. R
at
ific
at
ion
 o
f R
om
e 
St
at
ut
e
1 2 3 4 5
Ratification Geneva Law
Non-Democracies Democracies
Adjusted Predictions (Democracies vs. Non-Democracies)
Figure 33: Adj. Pred. through Geneva Law (Democracies vs. Non-Democracies)
225
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Pr
. R
at
ific
at
ion
 R
om
e 
St
at
ut
e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Ratification Human Rights
Non-Democracy Democracy
Adjusted Predictions (Democracies vs. Non-Democracies)
Figure 34: Adj. Pred. through Human Rights (Democracies vs. Non-Democracies)
In sum, we can say that the results fit to some extent to the results of other empirical
studies on the states’ decision to ratify the Rome Statue, that see e.g. the dependency
of the states (Goodli e et al., 2012) or the anticipated political costs of potential in-
vestigations and prosecutions of the ICC (Chapman/Chaudoin, 2013) as central deter-
minants. However, referring to the theoretical argument of Simmons/Danner (2009,
2010) it can be argued that the level of democracy plays an important role for the
states’ behavior towards the ICC. There are many non-democratic states that have
ratified the Rome Statute. However, those are mainly states with a comparatively high
level of political freedom. Those that did not ratify the Rome Statute have a rather
low level of political freedom. As the Index of Commitment to the ICC shows,
their commitments are significantly less comprehensive than those of the states with
a higher level of political freedom.
One conceivable interpretation of these empirical findings is that states are caught in
the delegation dilemma to the ICC. They try overcome this by constraining and
customizing their commitments to the ICC. They are motivated to do this because
of the opportunity to reduce costs of monitoring humanitarian law and human rights.
An additional motivation is the expected enhancement of their credibility on the world
stage relating to their commitments to humanitarian law and human rights.
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6 Conclusion and Outlook
6.1 Summary of the Results
The present work has been driven by the puzzling fact that numerous democratic
and even non-democratic states signed and ratified the Rome Statute to become a
state party to the ICC, although this meant a serious intrusion into their national
sovereignty. The questions arising from this included: 1) How strong is the commit-
ment of states to the ICC beyond the ratification of the Rome Statute? And, 2)
What explains the states’ extent of commitment to the ICC? In order to answer these
questions, the theoretical argument has been made that states customize and con-
strain their commitments to the ICC based on their possibilities solving cooperation
problems with the ICC.
The reason for this is that states are caught in a delegation dilemma towards the
ICC. There are strong incentives to ratify the Rome Statute and to become a state
party. The states enjoy certain privileges of being party to the ICC, such as shaping or
reshaping the institutional design as a member of the ASP which acts as a legislative
power. Particularly, (post-)conflict states receive support in dealing with the past
and promoting peace and democratization. However, above all, the court presents a
possibility of solving cooperation problems of international law. While it is inherent
in international law to promote cooperation among the states through the creation of
legitimacy and predictability, it su ers often from a lack of compliance by the states to
the law. The lack of enforcement mechanisms undermines the credibility of the states’
commitment to the law. An international court, such as the ICC whose main purpose
is to enforce international law, is able to reduce the high costs of monitoring human
rights and humanitarian law and enhances the credibility of commitments to them.
Nonetheless, there are as well strong reasons not to become a state party. To some
extent the ICC is missing clear institutional counterparts (Tomuschat, 2010) which
makes its position in international relations unforeseeable. Hence, there is a widespread
fear of the states that the court could be too weak on the international level and unable
to cope with the power ambitions and particular interests of individual powerful states
or political parties. These other states are their political opponents. There is a fear
that the ICC could be become too strong and overly encumber the sovereignty of the
states acting as an own political player. In the worst case it could go beyond the
control of the states parties. We could say that international courts, such as the ICC,
are like strong herding dogs without a master. They run the risk either of being too
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weak to guard their herd or being too strong and perhaps attack the herd they are
meant to protect.
Thus, many states are caught in a delegation dilemma towards the ICC. Not ratifying
the Rome Statute could mean waiving the privileges of being a state party or waiving
support in dealing with the past and improving freedom and security. Conversely, rat-
ifying the Rome Statute could mean a high risk of creating comparative disadvantages
with respect to other states and therefore undermining their own freedom and security.
This dilemma is further aggravated by the fact that those states that needs the ICC
the most have the greatest cause for concern of negative consequences.
An appropriate solution for the states is to ratify the Rome Statute in order become
a state party to the ICC, but to constrain and customize their commitments. This
makes either investigations and prosecutions less likely or at least their consequences
more foreseeable. The dimensions of a comprehensive commitment to the ICC are:
joining the Rome Statute (dim1); joining additional or amending agreements (dim 2),
such as the APIC or the amendments on the crime of aggression; making reservations
or interpretative declarations under the agreements (dim3); implementing norms on
cooperation or complementarity into national law (dim4); and triggering investigations
on their own initiative (dim5).
The Index of Commitment to the ICC was developed in order to measure the
extent of such a comprehensive commitment. It is built as argument-based, weighted,
additive index (Schnell et al., 2013, 159 .) including the five dimensions of commit-
ment in order to build a summary measurement for comprehensive commitment as
latent variable. The Index of Commitment to the ICC varies from 0 to 12 points, in
which 0 means no commitment and 12 means a comprehensive commitment to the ICC.
Analyzing a grouped frequency distribution it became moreover possible to categorize
the states into six groups of di erent levels of commitment to the ICC: Comprehen-
sive Commitments (group 1), Slightly Customized Commitments (group 2),
Customized Commitments (group 3), Strongly Customized Commitments
(group 4), Weak Commitments (group 5), No or very weak commitment
(group 6). In this way 195 states were ranked on the index for 2016. Those mea-
surement showed that there are numerous states with no or very weak commitment
although being parties to the ICC. However, among the states parties to the ICC just
under one-fifth of the states shows a comprehensive commitment, while the biggest
group of states with one-third show strongly customized commitments.155
155 For the grouped frequency distribution on the states positions on the Index of Commitment to
the ICC see p. 177.
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The regression analyses have shown that the level of political freedom, the recognition
of compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ and the number of ratified treaties of humanitar-
ian law and human rights make a decisive contribution to the explanation of the states’
level of commitment to ICC. In making a robustness check, a multiple logistic regres-
sion analyses showed that these factors are likewise decisive in explaining the states’
ratification of the ICC. However, the explained variance is bigger when explaining the
index positions, than of the explained variance between states that ratified as opposed
to those that did not. This is compatible with one of the core assumptions of the work,
that states variation in di erent levels of commitment is bigger than its variation in
deciding on the mere ratification of the Rome Statute to become a state party to the
court.
6.2 Contribution to Research on the ICC
In particular in the areas of human rights law and humanitarian law, we know mean-
while that especially non-democratic states, but also democratic states tend to ratify
human rights treaties as a form of window dressing (Simmons, 2009) or under pres-
sure from transnational civil actors (Hathaway, 2002) or international organizations,
while those ratifications often remain being ’empty promises’ (Hafner-Burton/Tsutsui,
2005). The single act of ratification is not an appropriate indicator of states commit-
ment to international law in general and human rights in particular. Instead, there is a
need for more fine-grained measurements for commitments to certain legal agreements
or even judicial institutions such as international courts and tribunals.
The Index of Commitment to the ICC can be considered as such a finer mea-
surement tool for looking at states’ commitment to the ICC. The conceptualization
of comprehensive commitments and the theoretical argument of states behavior due
to their possibilities of solving cooperation problems of international law contribute
twofold to the IR research on states’ behavior towards international courts and tri-
bunals in general and the ICC in particular. For one thing, it makes it possible to
open the black box of states parties to the ICC. Building an index as a summary mea-
surement of comprehensive commitment captures commitment to the ICC beyond the
mere ratification of the Rome Statute. This includes several indicators for commit-
ment, such as binding to additional or amending agreements or making reservations
or interpretative declarations to them. Thus, the dichotomy of states parties and
non-party states is deconstructed. Further, it is able to measure variation, especially
among the group of states parties to the Rome Statute.
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The index shows clearly that ’commitment is not commitment’, but there is a huge
variation in the extent of the states’ willingness to be bound to the ICC. We cannot
conclude automatically that states with a high level of commitment are more likely to
comply with core crimes of the Rome Statute, nor are they more likely to cooperate
with the court according to the procedural norms. Or, conversely, that states with
low levels of commitment are less likely. Nevertheless, it gives us valuable clues for
di erent levels of the states’ self-binding to the ICC. It makes it possible to relate
them with explanatory approaches of states behavior towards international courts and
tribunals.
The second research contribution of the present work is that it develops a theoretical
argument on varying degrees of benefits solving of cooperation problems through the
commitment to the ICC. This makes allowance for the fact that although there are
strong incentives to commit themselves, such as the reduction of costs of monitoring
the compliance with humanitarian law and human rights or enhancing credibility of
commitments to humanitarian law and human rights, those incentives do not inevitably
lead to benefits for all states in the same way. For states that are neither involved
nor interested in the monitoring of the humanitarian law and human rights there is
no advantage in reducing costs of monitoring humanitarian law and human rights.
For states that have only a very low level of commitment to humanitarian law and
human rights there is little reason to make those commitments more credible. On the
contrary, we can expect those states to have incentives to hinder the strengthening
of the ICC. Receiving empirical evidence on the states’ diverging incentive structures
due to their possibility of solving cooperation problems with the ICC gives us valuable
insights in states’ motives for committing to an international agreement or delegating
authority to an international court.
This might raise awareness of the fact that it is too simplified to claim that all states
would have the same benefits of creating a certain international court or dispute set-
tlement mechanism due to its issue areas. Alter (2004) considers that delegation of
authority depends on the aims of reducing transaction costs or enhancing credibil-
ity and thus makes the distinction between courts as agents or trustees. Koremenos
(2007) argues that delegation depends on the complexity of cooperation problems to
be solved. In this sense, the present work hopes to raise awareness for the influence of
states’ diverging incentives to commit to international law and to delegate authority to
international courts, such as the ICC, even if there are potentially common cooperation
problems to be solved.
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Recognizing that there was a ’justice cascade’ (Sikkink, 2011) from the Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials over some of the core treaties of humanitarian law and human rights
law leading up to the establishment of the ICC and the creation of an universal norm
of criminal accountability, we can argue that the states behavior towards the court is
connected with their position towards humanitarian law and human rights as they are
trapped in a delegation dilemma towards the ICC and have to weigh their commitment
dependent on the commitments they made to humanitarian law and human rights.
6.3 Limits of Empirical Results and Need for Further Research
As a matter of course, the assumptions and empirical results of the present work has
its limits. There are two important identifiable limitations on the empirical results.
First, probably the most important limitation is due to the availability of data on
implementation of norms on complementarity and cooperation into national law. Even
though the CICC collects data on implementation of both norms and complementarity
and cooperation, these are published in a continuously updated form. It is not possible
to see when these changes occurred after it has been updated. That means it is not
possible to assign certain levels of implementation to certain years. It would be more
favorable to collect data on implementation on a yearly basis. A time-series data set on
comprehensive commitment for 1998-hitherto with data points per year per countries
could be created in this way. This would allow for a ’pooled times-series cross-section
analysis’.156 This would allow it to gather stronger evidence to test the hypotheses on
the states’ incentives due to their possibilities in solving cooperation problems. Then it
would be possible to measure e ects of time. We expect the states need di erent time
frames to obtain ratification or implementation. Finally, it would allow for testing of
the relation of reoccurring waves of commitment to certain political events.
The second limitation of the results which needs further research is seen in the concep-
tualization of comprehensive commitment that is mainly focused on formal commit-
ment to the ICC. The Index of Commitment to the ICC shows a high robustness.
The OLS testing explanations for the states’ index positions and the results of the lo-
gistic regression testing explanations for the ratification show very similar patterns.
Nevertheless, it has to be accepted that the index measures first and foremost formal
commitment. It focuses mainly on behavior towards agreements. Only the dimension
of triggering investigations and prosecutions brings in a dynamic aspect. In the course
of a larger research project it would possible to include further aspects of commitment
156 For the influence on the limitation of data on implementation see p. 161 and on p. 192.
231
that include stronger political dimensions, such as the amount of financial contribution
and their payment within the negotiated time frames; the engagement in the ASP as
legislative power or the voluntarily conclusion of enforcement agreements regarding
execution of sentences. Particularly, in the case of the USA’s non-commitment, we
could attempt to measure their actual attitude towards the ICC. The USA reaches
only 0 points on the Index of Commitment to the ICC. However, this does not mean
that there are no political groups supporting international law and the ICC. Because
it would be even harder to collect data on those more political aspects on an annual
basis, it would be better to carry out comparative cases studies on the political aspects
based on a strategic case selection.
Further research to supplement the results of the present studies would be worthwhile.
By means of comparative case studies based on strategic case selection it would be
possible researching certain patterns that occur within the Index of commitment
to the ICC as e.g. the similar commitment behavior of states according to their
membership of certain regional organizations157 and could be indicators for e ects of
political ’di usion’, such as the case of EU where members tend to have a very high level
of commitment, the ASEAN that tend to have a very low level of commitment or the
AU in which members show a very high variation in their levels of commitment to the
ICC. Furthermore, it can be observed that some rivaling, or conflicting pairs of states
show a totally di erent commitment behavior to the ICC, such as Israel and Palestine
(0 vs. 7.5 index points), North Korea and South Korea (0 vs. 9 index points), or India
and Bangladesh (0 vs. 5 index points) or Haiti and the Dominican Republic (0.5 vs. 7
index points). That provides an interesting opportunity to test further arguments
on politicization or at least strategical behavior dependent on political conditions.
Comparative case studies based on strategic case selections (e.g. typical cases from
each group of commitment, perhaps within a most-similar-systems design) would allow
research of the relationship of (formal) commitment to the ICC and compliance with
the Rome Statute.
Another important aspect for further research might include the inverse connection
between commitments to humanitarian law and human rights and the commitment be-
havior towards the ICC. In the present work, it has been argued that the commitment
behavior to humanitarian law and human rights as independent variables has a crucial
influence on the commitment behavior to the ICC as dependent variable. However, we
can expect a relationship vice versa, too. Does the genesis and the strengthening of
the ICC have an influence on the ratification rates of treaties of humanitarian law and
157 For the patterns of regional organizations see p. 178.
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human rights? We can expect this especially in those cases were the states make cred-
ible commitment to the ICC promoting a universal norm of criminal accountability
and strengthening peace and security in international relations. It would be rewarding
to approach this relation systematically.
6.4 Why Constrained Commitments Can Still Lead to Strong Bonds
The establishment of international courts and tribunals are phenomenons and cata-
lysts of the legalization and judicialization of international relations. However, states
as authors, guards and addressee of international law remain in a dilemma towards in-
ternational courts and tribunals. On the one hand, they need the courts and tribunals
to solve cooperation problems of international law, such as a lack of compliance. Speak-
ing metaphorically, we can say that the logic and design of national criminal courts
at the level of international relations is like putting a fish from a garden pond into a
puddle of muddy water and then hoping it will survive.
On the other hand, states have to be cautious towards courts since the state cannot
properly evaluate the long-term consequences of being state party to a court. The
international courts could turn out to be too weak to cope with power ambitions
and particular interests of individuals states. Or, they could become to strong and
overreach their mandate, dominate the agenda or in the worst case get out of the
states’ control.
Since the legalization of international relations is strongly influenced by international
security interests, domestic interests and preferences as well as diverging norms and
ideas, we can consider anarchy being still both dead and alive158, as long as we do not
look in the box of empirical reality with methods of social sciences.
Thus, the acceptance threshold of states to international courts is only slowly and
cautiously rising, particularly in case of those states that are a ected the most, whereas
positive e ects of thrusts of transition from autocracy to democracy cannot be ruled
out. It matters most how the states for one thing are interested in participating in
the governance of the global community and thus a reduction of monitoring costs
through the establishment of the ICC and for another thing have made commitments
to humanitarian law and human rights already and thus enhancing the credibility of
commitments with the delegation of authority to the ICC.
158 The consideration of anarchy being dead and alive relies on Steinberg (2013) who argues that
realism is even in areas of legalization still relevant.
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This behavior of the states can be considered as an expression of behavior towards
courts that (Locke, 1967 [1689]), father of Liberalism, made yet in the recent days
of sovereign nations. He argued that one only submits to a superior authority if and
as long as these are able to protect the security of the subjected and it is no longer
necessary to protect one’s security itself.
“For all Power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end,
whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be
forfeited, and the Power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who may place
it anew where they shall think best: for their safety and security. And thus the Com-
munity perpetually retains a Supreme Power of saving themselves from the attempts
and designs of any Body, even of their Legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish,
or so wicked, as to lay and carry on designs against the Liberties and Properties of the
Subject.” (para. 149) (Locke, 1967 [1689], 385)
International courts, such as the ICC, however, are based on the respect of sovereignty
and the principle of complementarity. They are not designed to protect the security of
the states. Even if states are parties to the court, they have to protect their sovereignty
in order to remain capable to protect their security towards the international courts
and towards the other states. One might argue that it was never the aim of the ICC
to protect the states comprehensively. The ICC is designed consciously as court of
complementarity, not the least of which because this was the only chance to win over
the states for the ’project international criminal law’. In addition to the dilemma with
which the states are confronted, the courts are confronted by the decision as to whether
one should harden the rules or increase the number of states parties. Nevertheless,
we have to concede that we cannot expect the states to commit comprehensively
to an international court that is not able to adequately protect. Instead, we have to
anticipate further constraints and customization of commitments and subsequent cases
of non-cooperation.
However, this does not mean that the ICC is a ’illusionary giant’ in that sense that it
seems to be very powerful when viewed from a certain distance but becomes smaller and
smaller the nearer it comes. On the contrary, we can expect even slower adoption and
customization or constraint commitments that lead to strong bonds in the medium-
and long-term since being a state party to the ICC can change domestic structures
and can change international norms.
As is often the case in international politics we can expect the states changing behavior
because of entrapment and sunk costs (Scharpf, 1985) and thus lock-in-e ects (Ma-
honey, 2000). Solely, the ratification of international law can influence the domestic
political agenda, the litigation of domestic courts and thereby the mobilization of civil
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society (Simmons, 2009, 112 .). Thus, the recognition of the Rome Statute is able to
change domestic politics.
“[R]atified treaties can influence agenda, litigation, and mobilization in ways that should
be observable in government policies post-ratification. Treaties change politics – in par-
ticular, the domestic politics of the ratifying country. While their enforcement interna-
tionally tends to create collective action problems that state actors have few incentives
to overcome, the consequences locally can be profound.” (Simmons, 2009, 113)
Commitments to the ICC can become self-enforcing through domestic actors, even if
the ratifying states did not intend to bind themselves e ectively. In the introduction
one example was given regarding the non-cooperation of South Africa during the state
visit of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. Although an international arrest warrant
had been issued for him, South African knowingly let him pass unhindered in June
2015. While there are voices claiming this would be an indicator for the ICC’s weak-
ness159, one has to take into account that the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa
ruled in 2016 that it was an unlawful failure not to arrest Omar al-Bashir and spoke of
a ’disgraceful conduct’160. Following the South African legal procedure, the Pre-Trial
Chamber of the ICC convened hearing in April 2017. Lastly in July 2017 the Pre-Trial
Chamber II ruled against South African and expressed that South Africa have had a
duty to arrest the Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir161. This shows that domestic
legal structures and political actors play a crucial role in the process of integration of
the ICC and thus the implementation of norms on complementarity and cooperation
can be considered as important indicator for a credible commitment to the ICC.
We can expect the ICC to strengthen international criminal law and its core crimes
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. With
the establishment of the IMT and the IMTFE and the legal application of the crime
of genocide and the crimes against humanity the course was set for an international
recognition of them as an international applicable law (Sands, 2016). Because of their
enforcement through the ICC and the numerous theoretical and political reflections,
we can expect them to stabilize as global recognized international norms.
159 For reporting on the escape of Omar al Bashir from South Africa see e.g ’The Guardian’ of 16
June 2015 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/16/
omar-al-bashir-escape-south-africa-african-union (01-08-2017) or ’The New York Times’
of 16 June 2015 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/africa/
omar-hassan-al-bashir-sudan-south-africa.html (01-08-2017).
160 The Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa Judgment, Case no: 867/15, para. 7|.
161 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, No. ICC-02/05-01/09, decision under article 87(7) of the Rome
Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and
surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, para. 127.
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Those international norms provide precedent for certain political parties, even if their
states are not yet willing to be part of the ICC, such as in the case of the Ukraine.
The Ukraine is not party to the ICC but made a declaration under article 12(3) of the
Rome Statute recognizing the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to alleged crimes
committed on its territory from 20 February 2014 onward. This has made it possible
to investigate and prosecute the violent event in the context of the Maidan protests.
We have to recognize that cases brought to courts are always a mirror of the social
and political reality. These cases are sometimes present an opportunity to express the
own political interests.
“A court of law is a theater, temple and battlefield. A court enacts social process as
drama, sacrament and contest. Day after day in the court-room the magic of human
self-socializing is performed publicly, for all to see: the universal made particular, the
particular made universal. (...) Like any other social institution, a court is a transforma-
tory structure-system, transforming social reality in particular ways. Itself the product
of the past social reality of a particular society, a court makes a specific contribution to
the general social task of forming a given society’s future out of that society’s past, as
it acts in society’s continuous present.” (Allott, 1996, 17)
According to Shelton (2009, 5) a court is always shaped by political interests, since
its mission is to rule based on the law that was developed in a political process.
Probably, all disputes that are tried at international courts and tribunals are political.
The challenge is to solve them legally.
In the long run, the ICC has the potential to be integrated more and more into domes-
tic and international politics. Perhaps one day it will be possible to protect the states
and their civil societies from genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the
crime of aggression. The states will have subordinated themselves to international law
more than they do today. This, however, depends upon the laws capability to be taken
seriously and it depends upon whether the states are meaningfully discouraged from
withdrawing themselves from investigations and prosecutions no matter how strong
they have constrained and customized commitments. The ICC should concentrate
on a few specific cases that are brought to an end that lead to consequences for the
identified perpetrators of international criminal law. At the same time, the domestic
rule of law of the states has to be strengthened so that the universal norm of criminal
accountability becomes a domestic reality. The reconciliation between this very nec-
essary international tool and the domestic reality of the state would allow us to say:
A commitment is a commitment is a commitment.
236
7 Appendices
7.1 List of States Parties to the Rome Statute (08-2016)
States Parties to the ICC (123/195)
Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile,
Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast,
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius,
Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Roma-
nia, Samoa, San Marino, St.Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sene-
gal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tajikistan, United Republic of Tanzania,Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia
Non-Party States to the ICC (Signed, But Not Ratified) (28/195)
Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Cameroon, Egypt, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,
Islamic Republic of Iran, Jamaica, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Monaco, Morocco, Mozambique, Oman,
Russian Federation, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Syrian Arabic Republic, Thailand,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zimbabwe
Non-Party States to the ICC (Not Signed 43/195)
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Brunei, Burundi162, China, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, In-
dia, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kiribati, Lao Peo-
ple’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Micronesia, Myanmar, Nepal,
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, So-
malia, South Sudan, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Togo, Tonga, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu,
United States of America, Vietnam
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7.2 Puzzle: Ratification and Democracy (08-2016)
non-democracy democracy
no 59 non-surprising states: 12 surprising states: 71
state party Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bhutan,
Brunei, Cameroon, China, Cuba, DPR Korea, Equatorial Guinea,
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Libya,
Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal,
Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Rus-
sia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Soma-
lia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand,
Togo, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,
Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe
Bahamas, Kiribati, India, Israel, Jamaica, Micronesia, Monaco, Palau,
Sao Tome and Principe, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States of America
state party 50 surprising states: 74 non-surprising states: 124
Afghanistan, Albania, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Re-
public, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Djibouti, DR Congo, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia,
Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mal-
dives, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine,
Paraguay, Philippines, Rep. of Congo, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia
Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barba-
dos, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape
Verde, Chile, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Dominica, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Is., Mau-
ritius, Mongolia, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, South
Korea, St.Kitts a. Nevis, St.Lucia, St.Vincent a.Grenadines, Senegal, Ser-
bia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vanuatu
109 86
Table 43: Contingency Table – Ratification of the Rome Statute & Political Freedom
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7.3 List of Treaties on Humanitarian Law (08-2015)
Parties Humanitarian Law Agreement
196 1.Geneva Conventions (I-IV)
Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva 1949.
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva 1949.
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva 1949.
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva 1949.
174 2. Protocol Additional to the GCs of 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (API), Geneva 1977.
76 3.Declaration provided for under art. 90 AP I. Acceptance of the Competence of the Int. Fact-Finding Commission according to art. 90 of AP I.
168 4. Protocol Additional to the GCs of 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (APII), Geneva 1977.
72 5. Protocol Additional to the GCs of 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (APIII), Geneva 2005.
147 6. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Paris 1948.
55 7. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, New York 1968.
127 8. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague 1954.
104 9. First Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague 1954.
68 10. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague 1999.
77 11. Con. on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile use of Environmental Modification Techniques, New York 1976.
Treaties on the Use of Weapons in Armed Conflicts
138 12. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, 1925.
173 13. Con. on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons (...), London u.a. 1972.
123 14. Con. on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious (...), Geneva 1980.
116 15. Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (PI), Geneva 1980.
95 16. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (PII), Geneva 1980.
113 17. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (PIII), Geneva 1980.
107 18. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), Vienna 1995.
102 19. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended 1996 (PII as amended 1996), Geneva 1996.
83 20.Amendment to the Con. on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (...), Geneva 2001.
91 21. Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (PV), Geneva 2003.
192 22. Con. on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons (...), Paris 1993.
162 23. Con. on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Oslo 1997.
100 24. Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dublin 2008.
87 25.Arms Trade Treaty, New York 2013.
Table 44: List of Humanitarian Law Treaties
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7.4 List of Treaties on Human Rights (08-2015)
Parties Human Rights Agreement
177 1. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966 (CERD).
168 2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York 1966 (CCPR).
164 3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York 1966 (CESCR).
115 4.Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York 1966.
189 5. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, New York 1979 (CEDAW).
160 6. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, New York 1984 (CAT).
196 7. Convention on the Rights of the Child, New York 1989 (CRC).
83 8. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming at the abolition of the death penalty 1989.
48 9. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, New York 1990 (CMW).
108 10.Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1999.
165 11.Optional Protocol,to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, New York 2000.
173 12.Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, New York 2000.
82 13.Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, New York 2002.
168 14. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, New York 2006 (CRPD).
90 15.Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, New York 2006.
53 16. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, New York 2006 (CPPD).
22 17.Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York 2008.
29 18.Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communication Procedure, New York 2011.
Table 45: List of Human Rights Treaties
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7.5 Examination of Robustness: Index of Commitment to the ICC
Scores per Variable
Dimension Commitment to the ICC (Variables) Scores/Variable Scores/Dimension
Joining (Dim 1) signature Rome Statute 1.00 2.00
ratification Rome Statute 1.00
Amending (Dim 2) signature APIC 1.00 4.00
ratification APIC 1.00
amendment to art. 8 1.00
crime of Aggression 1.00
Modifying (Dim 3) Rome Statute of the ICC 1.00 3.00
APIC 1.00
amendment to art. 8 1.00
Implementing (Dim 4) cooperation (in progress/issued) 1.00 2.00
complementarity (in progress/issued) 1.00
Triggering (Dim 5) art. 14/art. 12(a) Rome Statute 1.00 1.00
Table 46: Dimensions of the Index – Scores per Variables
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Figure 35: Frequency Distribution – Index (Scores per Variable)
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Scores per Dimension
Dimension Commitment to the ICC (Variables) Scores/Variable Scores/Dimension
Joining (Dim 1) signature Rome Statute 1.00 2.50
ratification Rome Statute 1.50
Amending (Dim 2) signature APIC 0.25 2.50
ratification APIC 0.75
amendment to art. 8 0.75
crime of Aggression 0.75
Modifying (Dim 3) Rome Statute of the ICC 1.00 2.50
APIC 0.75
amendment to art. 8 0.75
Implementing (Dim 4) cooperation (in progress/issued) 1.25 2.50
complementarity (in progress/issued) 1.25
Triggering (Dim 5) art. 14/art. 12(a) Rome Statute 2.00 2.00
Table 47: Dimensions of the Index – Scores per Dimension
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Figure 36: Frequency Distribution – Index (Scores per Dimension)
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Ratification as Strongest Factor
Dimension Commitment to the ICC (Variables) Scores/Variable Scores/Dimension
Joining (Dim 1) signature Rome Statute 1.00 4.00
ratification Rome Statute 3.00
Amending (Dim 2) signature APIC 0.25 4.00
ratification APIC 1.25
amendment to art. 8 1.25
crime of Aggression 1.25
Modifying (Dim 3) Rome Statute of the ICC 1.00 2.00
APIC 0.50
amendment to art. 8 0.50
Implementing (Dim 4) cooperation (in progress/issued) 0.50 1.00
complementarity (in progress/issued) 0.50
Triggering (Dim 5) art. 14/art. 12(a) Rome Statute 1.00 1.00
Table 48: Dimensions of the Index – Ratification as Strongest Factor
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Figure 37: Frequency Distribution – Index (Ratification as Strongest Factor)
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7.6 Index of Commitment to the ICC
Group 1 Comprehensive Commitment
12.00 Estonia, Finland, Netherlands, Samoa, Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago
11.50 Croatia, Germany, Poland
11.00 Georgia , Norway, Macedonia
10.50 Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Iceland, Luxembourg, Uruguay
10.00 Chile, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland
Group 2 Slightly customized commitment
9.50 Bulgaria, Bosnia Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Montenegro, New Zealand,
Romania, Serbia, South Korea, Uganda
8.50 Botswana, Panama, Senegal, Sweden
8.00 Albania, France, Mali, United Kingdom of Great Britain
Group 3 Moderately Customized commitment
7.50 Andorra, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Gabon,
Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Palestine, Paraguay, South Africa
7.00 Bolivia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, San Marino
6.50 Belize, Canada, Cape Verde, Guyana, Italy, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Tunisia
6.00 Australia, Colombia, Lesotho, Portugal, Timor Leste,
Group 4: Stronglyly Customized Commitment
5.75 Ghana, Mongolia, Peru, Sierra Leone
5.50 Barbados, Comoros, Cook Islands, Liberia, Moldova, Philippines, Suriname, Vanuatu
5.25 Jordan
5.00 Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Fiji, Niger
4.75 Madagascar, Tanzania, Venezuela
4.50 Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Gambia, Grenada, Guatemala,
Ivory Coast, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo,
St.Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Seychelles, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Zambia
Group 5: Weak Commitment
3.75 Guinea
3.50 Chad, Djibouti, Tajikistan, Ukraine
2.00 Armenia, Ethiopia, Nicaragua
Group 6 No or Very Weak Commitment
1.50 Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Rwanda
1.00 Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Malaysia, Mozambique
0.75 Bahamas, Jamaica
0.50 Algeria, Bahrain, Cameroon, Egypt, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR,
Monaco, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Russian Federation, Sao Tome and Principe,
Solomon Islands, Syrian Arabic Republic, Thailand, Turkey, UA Emirates, Uzbekistan,
Yemen, Zimbabwe
0.00 Belarus, Bhutan, Brunei, China, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, India,
Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Micronesia, Nepal,
North Korea, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu,
United States of America, Vietnam
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7.7 Correlation Matrix – Dependent and Independent Variables
var. Index Rat FH ICJ HL GL HR Con UNPK Am ICT CPow BIA CivL ComL Par Pres
Index 1.000
Rat 0.866 1.000
FH 0.612 0.534 1.000
ICJ 0.403 0.359 0.284 1.000
HL 0.632 0.488 0.443 0.354 1.000
GL 0.659 0.547 0.413 0.345 0.727 1.000
HR 0.567 0.465 0.259 0.261 0.703 0.524 1.000
Con -0.257 -0.254 -0.249 0.010 -0.138 -0.346 -0.129 1.000
UNPK 0.048 0.087 -0.023 -0.027 -0.015 0.047 0.088 -0.025 1.000
Am -0.205 -0.169 -0.406 -0.093 -0.118 -0.280 0.088 0.469 0.024 1.000
ICT 0.159 0.095 0.004 -0.049 0.120 0.131 0.126 -0.057 0.074 0.094 1.000
CPow 0.159 0.101 0.266 0.220 0.283 0.198 0.211 0.016 -0.065 -0.114 -0.071 1.000
BIA -0.405 -0.315 -0.346 -0.185 -0.341 -0.296 -0.257 0.181 0.041 0.197 0.007 -0.288 1.000
CivL 0.348 0.184 0.113 0.117 0.488 0.396 0.521 -0.123 -0.076 -0.006 0.073 0.182 -0.235 1.000
ComL -0.131 -0.029 0.191 -0.031 -0.198 -0.140 -0.327 0.121 0.063 -0.136 -0.105 0.036 0.017 -0.418 1.000
Par 0.369 0.278 0.484 0.152 0.294 0.248 0.169 -0.061 -0.045 -0.197 0.160 0.256 -0.113 0.057 0.178 1.000
Pres -0.153 -0.023 -0.315 -0.043 -0.197 -0.149 0.037 0.119 0.106 0.306 -0.107 -0.194 0.109 -0.064 -0.141 -0.794 1.000
Table 49: Cross-Correlation Table (All Variables)
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7.8 Regression Analyses with Civil Law and Presidential System
Multiple Linear Regression Explaining Index Positions (Civil Law & Presidential System)
States’ Position on the Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a Model 7A Model 8A Model 9A
Index of Commitment Credibility Monitoring Credibility Arm.Con.& Transitional Hegemonic Legal & Control Full
to the ICC & Monitoring Peacekeeping Justice Power Gov. System Only Model
Explanatory Variables
Humanitarian Law 0.381*** – 0.245*** 0.241*** 0.232*** 0.239*** 0.209*** – 0.189***
(0.0338) – (0.0338) (0.0334) (0.0339) (0.0338) (0.0384) – (0.0376)
Political Freedom – 1.047*** 0.754*** 0.702*** 0.769*** 0.725*** 0.817*** – 0.781***
– (0.110) (0.106) (0.107) (0.114) (0.106) (0.109) – (0.114)
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ – 2.014*** 1.200*** 1.306*** 1.293*** 1.274*** 1.207*** – 1.441***
– (0.461) (0.424) (0.420) (0.421) (0.415) (0.421) – (0.409)
Control Variables
Years of Arm.Conflicts – – – -0.0543** – – – -0.0566 -0.0470*
– – – (0.0242) – – – (0.0350) (0.0261)
UNPK troops/Mio.Hab. – – – 0.00338 – – – 0.00402 0.00302
– – – (0.00252) – – – (0.00331) (0.00245)
Number of Amnesties – – – – 0.00934 – – -0.148 0.0808
– – – – (0.0914) – – (0.130) (0.0998)
Int. Criminal Tribunals – – – – 1.988** – – 2.256** 1.759**
– – – – (0.821) – – (1.075) (0.802)
FormColonial Power – – – – – -1.907** – 0.335 -1.556**
– – – – – (0.742) – (0.974) (0.739)
BIA with the USA – – – – – -1.286*** – -2.589*** -1.135**
– – – – – (0.453) – (0.582) (0.447)
Civil Law System – – – – – – 0.918** 1.958*** 0.821*
– – – – – – (0.433) (0.508) (0.422)
Presidential System – – – – – – 0.495 -0.429 0.368
– – – – – – (0.405) (0.537) (0.407)
Constant -0.850 -0.743 -2.759*** -2.409*** -2.802*** -1.493* -3.155*** 6.101*** -1.913**
(0.552) (0.536) (0.551) (0.584) (0.635) (0.760) (0.635) (0.623) (0.834)
Observations 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193
R-squared 0.400 0.432 0.556 0.572 0.570 0.584 0.570 0.293 0.618
Adj. R-squared 0.397 0.426 0.549 0.561 0.558 0.573 0.558 0.262 0.595
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Multiple Logistic Regression Explaining Ratification (Civil Law & Presidential System)
States’ Ratification Model 10a Model 11a Model 12a Model 13a Model 14a Model 15a Model 16A Model 17A Model 18A
of the Rome Statute Credibility Monitoring Credibility Arm.Con.& Transitional Hegemonic Legal & Control Full
to the ICC & Monitoring Peacekeeping Justice Power Gov. System Only Model
Explanatory Variables
Humanitarian Law 0.186*** – 0.146*** 0.154*** 0.142*** 0.154*** 0.151*** – 0.158***
(0.0302) – (0.0357) (0.0376) (0.0365) (0.0382) (0.0405) – (0.0454)
Political Freedom – 0.611*** 0.531*** 0.523*** 0.531*** 0.535*** 0.599*** – 0.616***
– (0.102) (0.106) (0.112) (0.112) (0.111) (0.114) – (0.131)
Comp. Jurisdiction ICJ – 1.540*** 1.418*** 1.697*** 1.415*** 1.479*** 1.329*** – 1.666***
– (0.434) (0.472) (0.510) (0.473) (0.483) (0.483) – (0.538)
Control Variables
Years of Arm.Conflicts – – – -0.0591** -0.0722* -0.0604*
– – – (0.0255) – – – (0.0372) (0.0322)
UNPK troops/Mio.Hab. – – – 0.00566 – – – 0.00382 0.00443
– – – (0.00360) – – – (0.00312) (0.00327)
Number of Amnesties – – – – -0.00447 – – -0.0458 0.0844
– – – – (0.0938) – – (0.0909) (0.116)
Int. Criminal Tribunals – – – – 0.760 – – 0.968 0.557
– – – – (0.943) – – (0.844) (0.980)
FormColonial Power – – – – – -2.026* – 0.559 -1.736
– – – – – (1.096) – (0.825) (1.243)
BIA with the USA – – – – – -1.080** – -1.467*** -1.139*
– – – – – (0.539) – (0.464) (0.594)
Civil Law System – – – – – – 0.100 0.527 0.00468
– – – – – – (0.460) (0.341) (0.525)
Presidential System – – – – – – 0.974** 0.319 0.969**
– – – – – – (0.436) (0.361) (0.470)
Constant -2.077*** -2.590*** -4.160*** -4.219*** -4.141*** -3.336*** -4.942*** 1.435*** -4.233***
(0.433) (0.484) (0.683) (0.747) (0.732) (0.868) (0.798) (0.475) (1.047)
Observations 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193
PseudoR-squared 0.197 0.288 0.361 0.401 0.364 0.390 0.382 0.148 0.445
Log Likelihood -101.977 -90.463 -81.148 -76.096 -80.796 -77.481 -78.468427 -108.13117 -70.425899
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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7.9 Database & Codebook I: Index of Commitment (DV)
Signature of the Rome Statute of the ICC (rs_sign)
time 2000-2016
source United Nations Treaty Series, Chapter XVIII (Panel Matters), No. 10
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&clang=_en
(03-05-2017)
type dichotomous
range [0,1]
description counts the states that have signed the Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome 1998)
coding 0: not signed
1: signed
Ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC (rs_rat)
time 2000-2016
source United Nations Treaty Series, Chapter XVIII (Panel Matters), No. 10
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&clang=_en
(03-05-2017)
type dichotomous
range [0,1]
description counts the states that have ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome 1998)
coding 0: not ratified
1: ratified
Signature of the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities (apic_sign)
time 2000-2016
source United Nations Treaty Series, Chapter XVIII (Penal Matters), No. 13
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-13&chapter=18&clang=_en
(03-05-2017)
type dichotomous
range [0,1]
description counts the states that have signed the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities
of the ICC (New York 2002)
coding 0: not signed
1: signed
Ratification of the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities (apic_rat)
time 2000-2016
source United Nations Treaty Series, Chapter XVIII (Penal Matters), No. 13
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-13&chapter=18&clang=_en
(03-05-2017)
type dichotomous
range [0,1]
description counts the states that have ratified the Amendment on the Privileges and Immunities
of the ICC (New York 2002)
coding 0: not ratified
1: ratified
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Ratification of the Amendment to Article 8 of the Rome Statute (art8_ra)
time 2000-2016
source United Nations Treaty Series, Chapter XVIII (Penal Matters), No. 10.a
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10-a&chapter=18&clang=_en
(03-05-2017)
type dichotomous
range [0,1]
description counts the states that have ratified (or accepted) the amendment to Article 8
of the Rome Statute of the ICC (Kampala 2010)
coding 0: not ratified
1: ratified
Ratification of the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression (coa_ra)
time 2000-2016
source United Nations Treaty Series, Chapter XVIII (Penal Matters), No. 10.b
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10-b&chapter=18&clang=_en
(03-05-2017)
type dichotomous
range [0,1]
description counts the states that have ratified (or accepted) the amendments on the
crime of aggression to the Rome Statute of the ICC (Kampala 2010)
coding 0: not ratified
1: ratified
Reservations or Interpretative Declarations to the Rome Statute (rs_sov_dec)
time 2000-2016
source United Nations Treaty Series, Chapter XVIII (Panel Matters), No. 10
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&clang=_en
(03-05-2017)
type dichotomous
range [0,1]
description counts the states that have made reservations or interpretative declarations
to the Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome 1998) that protect their sovereignty
coding 0: no reservation or interpretative declaration
1: reservation and/or interpretative declaration, that protects the state from the ICC
(e.g. transitional provision, maintaining reprieves or amnesties, interpreting humanitarian law
or core crimes, stressing self-defense and principle of complementarity)
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Reservations or Interpretative Declarations to the APIC (apic_sov_dec)
time 2000-2016
source United Nations Treaty Series, Chapter XVIII (Penal Matters), No. 13
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-13&chapter=18&clang=_en
(03-05-2017)
type dichotomous
range [0,1]
description counts the states that have made reservations or interpretative declarations to the
Amendment on the Privileges and Immunities of the ICC (New York 2002) that protects their sovereignty
coding 0: no reservation or interpretative declaration
1: reservation and/or interpretative declaration, that protects the state from the ICC
(e.g. restriction of immunity or stressing territorial boarders)
Implementing Norms on Complementarity (imp_comp)
time 2000-2016
source Coalition for the ICC (CICC)
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=world (21-01-2016)
type dichotomous
values 0,1,2
description counts the states that have implemented norms on complementarity into national law
coding 0: no implementation
1: national law on complementarity
2: implementation in progress
Implementing Norms on Cooperation (imp_coop)
time 2000-2016
source Coalition for the ICC (CICC)
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=world (21-01-2016)
type dichotomous
values 0,1,2
description counts the states that have implemented norms on cooperation into national law
coding 0: no implementation
1: national law on cooperation
2: implementation in progress
Triggering Investigations and Prosecutions of the ICC (icc_act_ini)
time 2000-2016
sources International Criminal Court https://www.icc-cpi.int (03-05-2017)
Battle-Related Deaths Dataset UCDP http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ (26-09-2016)
type categorical
range [0,1]
description counts the states that have triggered investigations by state referral (art. 14 Rome Statute)
or by temporarily submission of a non-state party (art. 12(3) Rome Statute)
coding 0: states with armed conflict after 2000 which did not trigger investigation by themselves (0,1,13,15)
1: states with armed conflict after 2000 which triggered via self-referral (12,14)
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7.10 Database & Codebook II: Determinants of Commitment (IV)
Armed Conflicts, Number and Length (LocInc_15)
time 2000-2015
source Battle-Related Deaths Dataset of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ (26-09-2016)
type continuous
range [0, Œ)
description records the sum of conflict years for all conflicts per country
in the certain time frame according to the Battle-Related Deaths Dataset
coding coding according to UCDP
Compulsory Jurisdiction International Court of Justice (ComJur_ICJ)
time 1945-2015
source International Court of Justice
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (10-04-2017)
type dichotomous
range [0,1]
description records if states have made a declaration recognizing the ICJ
as compulsory ipso facto without special agreement
coding 0: no, 1: yes
Democracy (FH_15)
time 2015
source Freedom House, freedom rating (average of political rights and civil liberties), reversed
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016 (26-09-2016)
type continuous
range [1,7]
description measures the level of political rights and civil liberties
categories 1.0-2.5: free
3.0-5.0: partly free
5.5-7.0: not free
Humanitarian Law Commitment (HumLaw)
measured time 1945-2016
source International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl (16-09-2016)
United Nations Treaty Series
https://treaties.un.org/PAGES/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&clang=_en (16-09-2016)
type continuous
range [0, 25]
description records the number of ratifications of treaties on humanitarian law since 1945
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Human Rights Commitment (HumRigh)
time 1945-2016
source O ce of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
http://indicators.ohchr.org (16-09-2016)
United Nations Treaty Series
https://treaties.un.org/PAGES/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&clang=_en (16-09-2016)
type continuous
range [0,18]
description records the number of ratifications of treaties on human rights since 1945
Military Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPK_Mil15)
time 2015
source Troop and police contributors archive, UN Peacekeeping
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml (02-02-2017)
CIA World Fact Book
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2119.html#af (24-04-17)
type continuous
range [0,Œ)
description records the number of military troops per month contributed to UN peacekeeping operations
Number of Amnesties (TJ_Amnesty)
time 1990-2010
source Transitional Justice Database (TJDB)
http://www.tjdbproject.com/ (26-09-2016)
type continuous
range [0,Œ)
description records the number of amnesties
International Criminal Tribunals (TJ_IntC)
time 1990-2010
source Transitional Justice Database (TJDB)
http://www.tjdbproject.com/ (26-09-2016)
type continuous
range [0,Œ)
description records the number of international courts and tribunals
Colonial Power (ColPow)
time 1800-2015
source CIA World Fact Book
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2028.html#af (24-04-17)
type dichotomous
range [0,1]
description measures if a state was a colonial power
coding 0: no, 1: yes
252
Common Law (commlaw)
time 2016
source CIA World Fact Book
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2100.html (26-09-2016)
type dichotomous (dummy variable for legal system)
range [0,1]
description describes if a state has a legal system of common law
coding own coding
0: no, 1: yes (states with common law or common law with traditional influences)
Civil Law (civlaw)
time 2016
source CIA World Fact Book
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2100.html (26-09-2016)
type dichotomous (dummy variable for legal system)
range [0,1]
description describes if a state has a legal system of civil law
coding own coding
0: no, 1: yes (states with civil law or civil law with traditional influences)
Parliamentary System (parl)
time 2016
source CIA World Fact Book
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2128.html (26-09-2016)
type dichotomous (dummy-variable for governmental system)
range [0,1]
description records if the governmental system of a state is parliamentary
coding own coding
0: no, 1: yes (parliamentary republic, parliamentary monarchy)
Presidential System (pres)
time 2016
source CIA World Fact Book
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2128.html (26-09-2016)
type dichotomous (dummy-variable for governmental system)
range [0,1]
description records if the governmental system of a state is presidential
coding own coding
0: no, 1: yes (presidential republic, semi-presidential republic)
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U.S. Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreement (BIA_USA)
time 2015
source Country reports of the Coalition for the ICC (CICC)
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=world (30-09-2016)
type dichotomous
range [0,1]
description records if a state has signed a Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreement withe the USA
coding 0: no, 1: yes
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